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Abstract 
 
 
In the first chapter I compare and contrast the extant literature on sleep loss and 
insomnia, including theories as to how insomnia develops and the role of the circadian 
and homeostatic systems. In Chapter 2 I summarize the extant literature on sleep, 
emotion perception, and social task performance, and review the relevant emotion 
literature. I then critically appraise this literature and suggest future directions for this 
field. In Chapter 3 I pilot an emotion recognition task among students, including 
measures of sleep and empathy. Results suggest that the previous nights’ sleep, as well 
as depression scores, are significant predictors of happiness recognition. In Chapter 4 I 
assess emotion recognition in insomnia using dynamic stimuli, and results suggest that 
insomnia disorder impairs the categorization accuracy of high intensity expressions of 
sadness and low intensity expressions of surprise. Sleep diary parameters were also 
found to be significant predictors of happiness recognition on both accuracy and 
reaction time measures. I then assess how normal sleepers perform with these stimuli in 
Chapter 5, testing subjects at different times since waking. Chapter 5 Experiment One 
suggests that the early group are more sensitive towards several temporal parameters, 
with no effects on emotion recognition. Chapter 5 Experiment Two suggests that normal 
sleepers tested early are less sensitive towards mid-intensity expressions of anger and 
sadness, with effects on intensity recognition. These results are interpreted in the 
context of differences with the two late-tested groups. Chapter 6 extends these results 
to static stimuli, with results suggesting that the early group tend to make more errors 
when categorizing happy faces. Chapter 7 returns to the daytime impairments in 
insomnia disorder, suggesting that theory of mind task performance is altered when 
reaction times are measured. As a result of issues raised in this thesis Chapter 8 
systematically reviews the literature on how normal sleepers are screened for 
participation in research studies, suggesting future criteria. Chapter 9 summarizes these 
results in the context of hyperarousal and the etiology of insomnia disorder. 
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Chapter One 
 
 
Sleep Loss and Insomnia 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Sleep loss and insomnia are often assumed to be similar. In the current chapter we 
review the literature on sleep loss and insomnia, and their effects on daytime 
functioning. Both sleep loss and insomnia are associated with effects on daytime 
functioning, although objectively impairments in task performance have been harder to 
identify in insomnia. This is surprising in light of the subjective complaints of people 
with insomnia, and the importance of distress in its diagnosis. We then summarize the 
literature on how insomnia develops, identifying ways in which sleep loss and insomnia 
are different. In particular, arousal and hyperarousal seem to play a key role in 
insomnia disorder, and vulnerability towards stress-induced sleep disruption seems to be 
important, alongside other relevant predisposing, precipitating, and perpetuating 
factors. We conclude with a brief review of the contributions of homeostatic and 
circadian contributions towards insomnia, in keeping with an understanding of insomnia 
whereby this disorder is placed in the context of normal sleep.  
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Sleep Loss and Insomnia 
 
What is sleep loss? 
 
Sleep deprivation refers to a period of continual wakefulness over at least 24 hours. 
Sleep restriction has been defined as “a reduction in sleep time below an individual’s 
usual baseline, or the amount of sleep needed on a regular basis to maintain optimal 
performance” (Reynolds and Banks, 2010). While sleep deprivation studies last for a 
couple of days, sleep restriction can be chronic, and results in sleep debt. This sleep 
debt arises when an individuals’ sleep need is not being met. Sleep loss will be used as a 
general term to describe both sleep restriction and sleep deprivation. 
 
Sleep need has been defined as “the daily amount of sleep that allows a subject to be 
fully awake and able to sustain normal levels of performance during the daytime” 
(Ferrara and De Gennaro, 2001). With regards to sleep architecture, slow-wave sleep 
can be used as an indicator of sleep need (Greene and Frank, 2010). On average, 7.5 
hours of sleep per night is common (Ferrara and De Gennaro, 2001). However, among 
students, a quarter report less than 6.5 hours of sleep on average (Lund et al., 2010). 
Some factors which affect sleep need have been identified as gender and age, as well as 
preferred sleep duration and sleep-ability (Ferrara and De Gennaro, 2001; see also 
Anderson and Horne 2008; Kronholm et al., 2006). 
 
Behaviourally, a large weekend-weeknight time-in-bed difference could indicate chronic 
sleep debt (Monk et al., 2000). Furthermore, individual differences in sleep timing 
preference could modulate total sleep time. For example, individual differences in 
diurnal preference could contribute towards sleep loss, with evening-types more likely 
to be sleep deprived during the working week (Wittmann et al., 2006). To be specific, 
an evening type individual would choose to stay up late most nights, reflecting their 
sleep timing preference. However, the normal working week would mean that they 
would be unable to sleep longer the next day, and so their sleep opportunity would be 
curtailed. Morning types would show the opposite pattern, and might be expected to be 
sleep deprived at the weekend in order to meet social demands. 
 
How does sleep loss affect daytime functioning? 
 
In the general population, sleep loss could be a matter of public health (Ferrara and De 
Gennaro, 2001; Luyster et al., 2012; Meerlo, Sgoifo and Suchecki, 2008). Even in healthy 
subjects, sleep restriction, total sleep deprivation, and sleep disruption affect cognitive 
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functioning, sleepiness, and mood (Reynolds and Banks, 2010; Pilcher and Huffcutt, 
1996; Dinges et al., 1997; Barnett and Cooper, 2008; Caldwell et al., 2004; Rose et al., 
2008; Haack and Mullington, 2005; Drury, Ferguson and Thomas, 2012; see also Magee et 
al., 2009). Complex and socially-relevant decision making is also affected by sleep loss 
(Killgore et al., 2008; Killgore et al., 2007; McKenna et al., 2007). The rate of sleep loss 
could be a factor in how sleep loss is perceived and its impact on performance (Drake et 
al., 2001). Specifically, a gradual reduction in sleep time has been found to be less 
impairing (Drake et al., 2001). Moreover, some individuals are more affected by sleep 
loss than others, and subjective and objective measures of the effects of sleep loss form 
different factors (Van Dongen et al., 2004).  
 
As sleep loss affects performance, there has been interest in identifying factors which 
contribute to this variability. Briefly, subjective and objective reactions to sleep loss 
may be predictable within individuals (Rupp, Wesensten, and Balkin, 2012; Van Dongen 
et al., 2004), although these measures could be somewhat dissociable (Leproult et al., 
2003). Trait factors like extraversion-introversion, in interaction with the environment, 
also affect performance (e.g. Rupp, Killgore, and Balkin, 2010). Following total sleep 
deprivation, a socially-enriched environment affects the performance of extroverts to a 
greater extent than introverts (Rupp, Killgore, and Balkin, 2010). The circadian clock 
gene PER3 seems to contribute to some of this variance in sleep and performance, and 
response to sleep loss (Viola et al., 2007; Groeger et al., 2008; Viola et al., 2008). The 
subjective perception of good sleep quality might differ somewhat from the amount of 
sleep needed to maintain functioning (Ferrara and De Gennaro, 2001), and individuals 
may not always be able to judge their sleep need well (Van Dongen et al., 2003). 
 
Individuals with insomnia disorder also report effects of sleep loss, although there are 
some differences between this and the sleep loss experienced by normal sleeper 
controls. 
 
What is insomnia? 
 
The research diagnostic criteria (Edinger et al., 2004) suggest that insomnia disorder 
comprises three components. Firstly, an individual must report problems initiating or 
maintaining sleep, early morning awakenings, or sleep that is consistently of poor 
quality or not restorative. Secondly, the sleep difficulty must occur despite adequate 
opportunity for sleep. Finally, the sleep difficulty must be associated with daytime 
impairment in functioning (i.e. fatigue/malaise; cognitive impairment; impairments at 
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work; mood disturbance; daytime sleepiness; proneness for accidents; tension 
headaches or gastrointestinal symptoms; or concerns about sleep). 
 
These three components are comparable to those found in other diagnostic systems, 
such as the revision of DSM-5 (2014). In this, insomnia disorder is defined as a complaint 
about sleep quality or quantity, which is associated with impairments in daytime 
functioning, and occurs despite adequate opportunity for sleep. Additional 
specifications are given as to the frequency of sleep disruption, which must occur at 
least three nights a week for at least three months. The ICSD-R (2005) definition of 
insomnia includes similar criteria, with additional specifications as to insomnia severity, 
such as minor daytime functioning impairments in mild insomnia. 
 
Across diagnostic systems therefore, there is consensus that insomnia disorder 
comprises the components of sleep disruption, sleep opportunity, and daytime effects. 
In addition to these criteria for insomnia disorder, some additional specifications are 
given for primary insomnia (Edinger et al., 2004). In particular, any current or past 
mental or psychiatric disorder, or sleep-disruptive medical conditions, must show 
temporal independence from the onset of the insomnia disorder. In addition, the 
insomnia is not caused by another sleep disorder, circadian rhythm disorder, or 
sleep/wake cycle, or by the use, abuse, or withdrawal of any substance or psychoactive 
medications. Furthermore, the insomnia disorder must have been present for one month 
(ICSD-R, 2005). 
 
Suggestions have been made as to how to increase the clinical utility of an insomnia 
diagnosis (Edinger, 2004). For example, cluster analysis of insomnia symptoms suggest 
that diagnostic systems might not reflect how symptoms group together, in a data-
driven approach to classification (Edinger et al., 2004). Furthermore, the different goals 
of researchers and clinicians can also affect how insomnia is defined. For example, 
clinicians are biased against missing a diagnosis, whereas false positives present a 
greater problem for researchers (Edinger, 2004). 
 
How does insomnia affect daytime functioning? 
 
Adverse sleep-related daytime effects are a feature of an insomnia diagnosis, which can 
affect functioning either socially or occupationally, and be cognitive or emotional in 
nature (Edinger et al., 2004). Such daytime effects are found with problems of sleep 
onset and sleep maintenance, and non-restorative sleep (Roth et al., 2010). Differences 
between good sleepers and poor sleepers on daytime mood have been reported, with 
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poor sleep quality and short total sleep time associated with worse daytime mood (Ong 
et al., 2011). In a study of patients and controls, a sleep complaint has been linked to 
two distinct factors, named insomnia and lassitude (Koffel and Watson, 2009; see also 
Neu et al., 2010). In general, fatigue, or lassitude, seems to be an adverse daytime 
effect of sleep disruption. In turn, anxiety and depression also affect sleep (Mayers et 
al., 2009; Ramsawh et al., 2009), and such results suggest that mood and sleep are 
interlinked. 
 
In primary insomnia, specific complaints reported are difficulty with concentration, 
attention, and memory, in addition to pain, anxiety and fatigue, and these problems are 
present even after controlling for comorbidities (Kyle, Morgan, and Espie, 2010). 
However, comorbidities are common in insomnia, and insomnia associated with a 
mental disorder has been linked to more daytime effects (Sanchez-Ortuno, Edinger, and 
Wyatt, 2011). Brain imaging results support alterations in wake-time functioning among 
people with insomnia, who show abnormal resting state connectivity of the emotional 
brain (Huang et al., 2012). 
 
The effects of insomnia on quality of life have been investigated by Kyle, Espie, and 
Morgan, (2010). They identified three areas of functioning which were affected by this 
disorder. Firstly, daily life was reported to be a struggle, with physical, emotional and 
cognitive effects reported. Secondly, people with insomnia reported feeling isolated 
from others, which was thought to be driven by a perceived lack of understanding, fear 
of labelling and skepticism, and their use of well-developed coping strategies. Thirdly, 
insomnia was reported to obstruct their desired, ideal self. In particular, people with 
insomnia perceived their disorder as inhibiting their ability to perform desired roles, 
such as at work, and expected lifestyle improvements with its removal. For example, 
insomnia was found to impact on social interactions, with participants reporting that 
they excluded themselves or avoiding committing to social interactions due to the 
unpredictability of sleep and its effects on functioning. 
 
How does insomnia develop? 
 
The experience of insomnia symptoms is common, and not all poor sleepers go on to 
develop insomnia disorder. Of baseline good sleepers with no prior lifetime insomnia 
episodes, 29% develop insomnia symptoms over a year, and 4% develop insomnia 
syndrome (LeBlanc et al., 2009). Among those with insomnia symptoms at baseline, 21% 
continue to have insomnia symptoms at follow-up, while 12% remit to normal sleep 
(Morin et al., 2009). However, odds ratios indicate that subjects with insomnia 
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symptoms at baseline are three times more likely to remit to normal sleep than develop 
insomnia syndrome (Morin et al., 2009). In order to try to explain how insomnia 
develops and perpetuates in some individuals but not others, several theories have been 
developed. 
 
The neurocognitive model suggests that acute stress precedes acute insomnia, which is 
maintained by maladaptive coping strategies (Perlis et al., 1997). This creates 
conditioned (cortical) arousal to the sleep environment, which contributes to somatic 
arousal, and this in turn feeds in to cortical arousal (Perlis et al., 1997). Cortical arousal 
is also thought to affect cognition. Furthermore, this model acknowledges the 
interactions of insomnia with health, and the presence of insomnia is thought to 
contribute towards the development of illness. In turn, vulnerabilities towards, or the 
presence of, another disorder (whether psychiatric or physical), also interact with 
cognitive alterations. Three types of cognitive alterations have been identified within 
this theory, which affect sensory processing, information processing, and memory 
(Perlis et al., 1997). Sensory processing alterations affect sleep onset latency and night-
time awakenings, and information processing alterations contribute to the 
objective/subjective sleep discrepancy. Thirdly, alterations in long term memory 
formation lead to an overestimation of wakefulness, which is relevant to sleep state 
misperception. 
 
The ‘misperception’ of sleep in insomnia patients reflects their experience of this 
disorder, and may be the result of a dissociation between sleep and arousal systems 
(Riemann et al., 2010). Although people vary in their estimation of sleep time (Vanale 
et al., 2000), normal sleepers often over-estimate sleep time (Lauderdale et al., 2008), 
while those with insomnia tend to underestimate time asleep (Means et al., 2003). REM 
sleep instability may contribute to this effect in sleep maintenance insomnia (Riemann 
et al., 2012). In healthy subjects, a greater amount of slow-wave sleep has been linked 
to longer perceived sleep times (Aritake-Okada et al., 2009), and this sleep stage has 
been linked to the response to treatment in insomnia (Krystal and Edinger, 2010; see 
also Dijk, 2010). 
 
The hyperarousal theory of insomnia suggests that insomnia is a disorder of 24-hour 
‘hyper-arousal’, and this hyperarousal is directly relevant for the risk of depression and 
cardiovascular diseases (Bonnet and Arand, 2010). The evidence for this has been 
reviewed by Bonnet and Arand (2010), Riemann et al. (2010), and Bonnet and Arand 
(1997).  Such hyperarousal is thought to be present at night and during the day, and can 
be measured physiologically via hormones and metabolism, body temperature, EEG, 
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cardiovascular activity, and sleepiness assessed via the Multiple Sleep Latency Test, or 
MSLT (Bonnet and Arand, 2010). These reviews suggest that an inappropriate activation 
of the central nervous system affects sleep-promoting systems, creating a dysregulation 
of the processes involved in sleep (Bonnet and Arand, 2010). 
 
Other researchers have focussed on cognitive processes which contribute towards the 
development and maintenance of insomnia. Lundh and Broman (2000), describe how 
sleep-interpreting and sleep-interfering processes could contribute to insomnia. Sleep-
interpreting processes are defined as those psychological processes which are directly 
relevant to how an individual defines an insomnia complaint. Such appraisals of sleep 
and daytime functioning include attributions, sleep-related beliefs, and perfectionism, 
and these affect the interpretation of sleep. Sleep interfering processes are those which 
affect sleep and arousal levels, such as stressful life events, depression, and worries. 
Levels of arousal are affected by stimulus-arousal associations, interpersonal 
relationships, behavioural and cognitive strategies, and arousability. Sleep-related 
appraisals and arousal interact with each other to result in the insomnia complaint 
(Lundh and Broman, 2000). 
 
The cognitive model of the maintenance of insomnia suggests that arousal and distress 
contribute to perceived deficits of sleep and functioning, leading to a vicious cycle 
which perpetuates the insomnia disorder (Harvey, 2002). Furthermore, the stages of the 
cognitive model of insomnia can be initiated at any point (Harvey, 2002). In this theory, 
excessively negatively toned cognitive activity leads to arousal and distress, which in 
turn leads to selective attention and monitoring, which perpetuates the excessively 
negatively toned cognitive activity. Examples of selective attention and monitoring 
include monitoring of bodily sensations at night-time for signs of falling asleep, night-
time clock watching, noting how rested one feels upon awakening, and daytime 
monitoring of fatigue, performance, functioning, sleep, and mood (Harvey, 2002). Such 
selective attention leads to a distorted perception of the deficit in sleep or functioning 
in those with insomnia, and affects mood, culminating in a real deficit. The excessively 
negatively toned cognitive activity also contributes towards safety behaviours, which 
exacerbate beliefs, and these safety behavioural and sleep-related beliefs both affect 
mood. 
 
Such safety behaviours are motivated by specific feared outcomes, such as not being 
able to sleep following an emotional upset, or the perceived inability to cope with too 
many demands (Harvey, 2002). Sleep-related beliefs can lead to safety behaviours such 
as alcohol consumption, or taking an easy day (Harvey, 2002). Alcohol consumption 
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before bed can aid sleep initiation, but disrupts sleep continuity, and the belief that 
alcohol improves the ability to sleep is therefore not disconfirmed. Similarly, taking an 
easy day leads to boredom, and more time to worry about sleep, with the effect of 
reinforcing the belief that one does not function as well following a night of poor sleep. 
The distorted perceptions can relate to the night-time sleep deficit or effects on 
performance or functioning during the daytime, and can lead to objective night-time or 
day-time deficits. 
 
An attentional focus on sleep, as described in the cognitive model of insomnia, can lead 
to perceived daytime effects (Semler and Harvey, 2006), a process which is implicated 
in the attention-intention-effort pathway (Espie et al., 2006). In this theory, the normal 
automatic processes of sleep become the focus of attention, which paradoxically 
impairs sleep initiation. Following a stressful life event, the associated physiological and 
psychological effects of stress lead to both the inhibition of sleep-related de-arousal, 
and selective attention toward stressors (i.e. adjustment insomnia). This, in turn, 
perpetuates the selective attention towards stressors, although ordinarily normal sleep 
would ultimately recover from this disruption. However, in some individuals this stress-
related arousal and sleep disruption contribute towards the inhibition of de-arousal, and 
causes insomnia symptoms. Insomnia symptoms also lead to an attentional shift towards 
sleep cues, and this attentional bias also contributes to insomnia symptoms. 
 
The attentional shift contains three components, which comprise the attention-
intention-effort pathway. Firstly, this shift is implicit, but becomes explicit, and leads 
to the explicit intention to sleep. In turn, this leads to sleep effort, which can be direct 
or indirect. The effect of the attention-intention-effort pathway in insomnia 
development is to impair the supposed “automaticity” of normal sleep, and contribute 
to sleep onset or maintenance insomnia. The selective attention phase is one of 
vigilance, in keeping with an acute stress response. The explicit intention phase then 
develops, and is predominated by planning. Finally, the sleep effort processes is an 
emotionally-driven performance mode, where action is taken and behaviours are 
initiated with the intention to aid sleep. It has also been hypothesized that normal 
sleepers can fall asleep before they intend to, and that the process of completing a 
sleep diary may itself affect sleep (Espie et al., 2006). 
 
How are sleep loss and insomnia disorder different? 
 
Objectively poor sleep and an insomnia complaint may be somewhat different (Rosa and 
Bonnet, 2000). Poor sleep quality is affected by a range of factors, including stress (c.f. 
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Van Reeth et al., 2000), and physical and mental health conditions (Fernandez-Mendoza 
et al., 2012; Ohayon, 2002). For example, among students, stress and noise are common 
reasons for poor sleep (Lund et al., 2010). However, while transient insomnia is 
common, only a subset of people go on to develop chronic insomnia, which could 
suggest a role of genetic factors (related to vulnerability for sustained hyperarousal) in 
triggering this disorder (Riemann et al., 2010, see also Bonnet and Arand 2010). In 
support of this, Waters et al. (1993) report that emotion, stress, and attentional factors 
have greater effects on the sleep of insomnia subjects than healthy controls. Some 
individual differences which could contribute to insomnia, such as perfectionism and 
arousability, have been described by Lundh and Broman, (2000). 
 
A questionnaire has been developed to assess vulnerability to stress-related sleep 
disruption (Drake et al., 2004). This asks participants about the likelihood of 
experiencing sleep disruption following, for example, a stressful event, or before an 
important meeting, and has been linked to disruptions in objectively measured sleep 
(Drake et al., 2004). High scorers show evidence of emotional dysregulation (Fernandez-
Mendoza et al., 2010), and poor sleep following caffeine intake (Drake et al., 2006). 
Moreover, vulnerability to the effects of stress on sleep can run in families (Drake et 
al., 2008), as can sleep architecture, and the spectral composition of sleep itself 
(Ambrosius et al., 2008; Landolt, 2011), with evidence of trait-like differences in this 
(Buckelmüller et al., 2006; Bonnet and Arand, 2003). 
 
In the psychophysiological model of good sleep, acute stress, for example, can cause 
transient sleep disruption, which the sleep homeostatic and circadian processes can 
typically accommodate without the development of an insomnia problem (Espie, 2002). 
De-arousal, which can be cognitive and physiological, ordinarily interacts with stimulus 
control and daytime actions to result in sleep which is both automatic and resilient. 
Sleep homeostasis, circadian timing, and sleep quality also reinforce the maintenance 
of good sleep. In the model of Espie, (2002), the ‘inhibition of de-arousal’ is thought to 
be enough to result in poor sleep, although additional factors could contribute to the 
development of insomnia, as a disorder as such. 
 
 Another way in which sleep loss and insomnia could differ is in the effects on 
sleepiness, which is not experienced by people with insomnia despite their subjective 
sleep complaint (Riemann et al., 2010). Adequate sleep opportunity may be used to 
help differentiate sleep loss from an insomnia disorder. One way in which sleep 
opportunity has been assessed is via sleep efficiency measures. Sleep efficiency, 
defined as the percentage of time reported asleep, divided by the reported time in bed, 
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can be calculated from sleep diaries (Espie and Kyle, 2009). Poor sleep efficiency can 
arise from excessive time in bed, or staying in bed while awake; maladaptive strategies 
which are often used by people with insomnia (Perlis et al., 1997). For example, a 
normal sleeper could report a total sleep time of seven hours and a time in bed of seven 
and a half hours, which would give a sleep efficiency of 93%. However, a person with 
insomnia disorder would report a diminished total sleep time, for example of five hours 
and 45 minutes. Combined with a time in bed of nine hours, this would result in a sleep 
efficiency of 64%. Importantly however, the extent to which sleep duration is 
objectively impaired in insomnia has been subject to debate, and it has been suggested 
that there may be two distinct insomnia phenotypes which differ in their sleep duration 
(Vgontzas and Fernandez-Mendoza, 2013; Vgontzas et al., 2013). In contrast, sleep loss 
would be expected to affect total sleep time, which could be reduced to five hours, and 
time in bed could be correspondingly reduced, resulting in sleep efficiency close to 
100%. Additional measures of sleep discontinuity include the number of night-time 
awakenings, the sleep onset latency, and the wake time after sleep onset. Importantly, 
while sleep loss would likely result in a sleep complaint, such individuals would not be 
expected to endorse an insomnia complaint, as they would not have internalized poor 
sleep into their self-concept as is found in insomnia disorder (c.f. Kyle, Espie and 
Morgan, 2010).  
 
Insomnia: The role of sleep homeostatic and circadian processes 
 
Both sleep homeostatic and circadian processes have been implicated in the etiology of 
insomnia (e.g. Richardson, 2007; Pigeon and Perlis, 2006; Benoit and Aguire, 1996; Lack 
and Wright, 2007; Espie, 2002). People with insomnia are often found to show little 
evidence of sleepiness, measured objectively, and do not seem to report increased 
sleepiness (Riemann et al., 2010), suggesting that the daytime effects may be more 
related to the fatigue experienced in insomnia (Kyle, Morgan, and Espie, 2010). 
Intriguingly, in contrast to typical insomnia, a category of individuals has been 
described who show the daytime effects of poor sleep, but who deny insomnia, despite 
objectively poor sleep (Trajonovi et al., 2007; Schneider-Helmert, 2007; Attarian, 
Duntley, and Brown, 2004). This ‘positive sleep state misperception’ causes excessive 
daytime sleepiness which subjects do not detect (Trajanovic et al., 2007), and could be 
linked to how night-time awakenings are perceived (Schneider-Helmert, 2007). 
Importantly, both daytime functioning and night-time sleep seem to improve with 
treatment (Schneider-Helmert, 2007). The construct of sleepiness could itself be 
comprised of several factors, such as sleep propensity, sleep need, and subjective 
sleepiness (Horne, 2010). 
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Sleep propensity has recently been modeled by Bes, Jobert and Schulz, (2009), in a 
model with two basic drives, one homeostatic, and the other circadian-based. They 
found two major peaks in sleep propensity as well as two major troughs, corresponding 
to increased sleep propensity at night and in the early afternoon, and decreased sleep 
propensity in the early morning and in the early evening. The circadian clock could 
contribute to sleep onset problems in insomnia, due to attempts to sleep during the 
evening wake-maintenance zone (Strogatz, Kronauer, and Czeisler, 1987; see also 
Czeisler et al., 1980) and an eveningness diurnal preference seems to increase the 
adverse effects of insomnia (Ong et al., 2007), with implications for treatment (Lack 
and Wright, 2007). It has been suggested that in healthy subjects increasing wakefulness 
and the circadian low-point are linked to difficulties awakening and a lack of feeling 
refreshed (following forced awakenings), in spite of good subjective sleep (Akerstedt et 
al., 1997). In healthy subjects, increasing time in bed reduces both sleep propensity 
(Rosenthal et al., 1993), and sleep efficiency (Levine et al., 1988). Furthermore, the 
relationship of an eveningness diurnal preference with poor sleep quality could suggest 
some genetic overlap of these components (Barclay et al., 2010).  
 
Discussion 
 
The literature suggests that both insomnia and sleep loss affect daytime functioning. 
However, the daytime effects of sleep loss are well documented, whereas reports of the 
daytime effects of insomnia have been dominated by its subjective experience. 
Vulnerability towards insomnia seems to be important as sleep disruption is common in 
the general population, and is something which most people have experienced at some 
point. The role of arousal, and predisposing, precipitating, and perpetuating factors 
seem to be important in the development of chronic insomnia; a process which is 
arrested in normal sleepers. How homeostatic and circadian processes interact to result 
in normal sleep is complex, and an understanding of normal sleep seems to be 
important in order to fully understand the etiology of insomnia disorder. Also important 
is the development and identification of sensitive tasks which are relevant for people 
with insomnia, and emotion tasks have recently been used by sleep researchers. These 
tasks and results will be reviewed in the context of the emotion science literature, with 
a view to informing the experiments within this thesis. 
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Social Interactions, Emotion and Sleep: A Systematic Review and Research 
Agenda 
 
Published as Beattie, L., Kyle, S.D., Espie, C.A. and Biello, S.M (2015). Social 
Interactions, Emotion and Sleep: A Systematic Review and Research Agenda. Sleep 
Medicine Reviews 24, 83-100. doi: 10.1016/j.smrv.2014.12.005. 
 
LB conceived the study, conducted the analysis and wrote the paper, with the other 
authors contributing minor suggestions primarily regarding style. 
 
Abstract 
 
Sleep and emotion are closely linked, however the effects of sleep on socio-emotional 
task performance have only recently been investigated. Sleep loss and insomnia have 
been found to affect emotional reactivity and social functioning, although results, taken 
together, are somewhat contradictory. Here we review this advancing literature, aiming 
to 1) systematically review the relevant literature on sleep and socio-emotional 
functioning, with reference to the extant literature on emotion and social interactions, 
2) summarize results and outline ways in which emotion, social interactions, and sleep 
may interact, and 3) suggest key limitations and future directions for this field. From 
the reviewed literature, sleep deprivation is associated with diminished emotional 
expressivity and impaired emotion recognition, and this has particular relevance for 
social interactions. Sleep deprivation also increases emotional reactivity; results which 
are most apparent with neuro-imaging studies investigating amygdala activity and its 
prefrontal regulation. Evidence of emotional dysregulation in insomnia and poor sleep 
has also been reported. In general, limitations of this literature include how 
performance measures are linked to self-reports, and how results are linked to socio-
emotional functioning. We conclude by suggesting some possible future directions for 
this field.  
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Social Interactions, Emotion and Sleep: A Systematic Review and Research 
Agenda 
 
Introduction 
 
Sleep is known to be important for health (Buysse, 2014), and the health risks 
associated with sleep disruption include cancer, metabolic disorders, and cardiovascular 
illness (Luyster et al., 2014). The relevance of sleep to psychiatric disorders has also 
been established (Benca et al., 1992; Baglioni et al., 2011). Poor sleep quality and 
insomnia are pertinent to emotion, and previous studies have investigated the effects of 
loneliness, complicated grief, hostility, and impulsivity on sleep (Baglioni et al., 2010). 
Sleep and emotion are closely linked, and the importance of this area has been 
increasingly recognized. 
 
Recently, experimental paradigms with socio-emotional stimuli (i.e. emotional faces, 
voices, images, or movies) have been employed to investigate how sleep affects 
responses to stimuli. Emotion perception can therefore be defined as the sensory 
processing of emotional stimuli. Emotion is relevant to the meaning, or significance, 
which is given to events, and emotion, cognition, and motivation are interlinked 
(Lazarus, 1991). Specifically, emotion can be associated with approach or withdrawal 
behavioral states, or motivational states of reward and punishment (Adolphs, 2002). 
Affective states comprise a conscious emotional feeling, with associated autonomic, 
neuroendocrine, and somatomotor responses (Phillips et al., 2003). Emotional stimuli 
are therefore highly relevant for the well-being and survival of the perceiver (Brosch, 
Pourtois, Sander, 2010).  
 
Following the perception of a stimulus, the emotional significance to the perceiver is 
appraised (Phillips et al., 2003). This initial appraisal leads to an affective state and 
corresponding behavior (Phillips et al., 2003), which is assumed to be proportionate to a 
situation (Brosch, Pourtois, Sander, 2010). Threatening stimuli can lead to the initiation 
of a behavioral response (Brosch, Pourtois, Sander, 2010), with the initial appraisal 
contributing towards the resultant response. This correspondence of an affective 
response, behavior, and context, is disrupted in psychopathological conditions (Beck, 
1971). In particular, the conceptualization of an event is associated with an excessive or 
inappropriate emotional response (Beck, 1971). This is due to a greater contribution of 
internal processes, such as idiosyncratic interpretations of an event (Beck, 1971). 
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Emotion regulation also contributes towards emotion perception. Emotion regulation 
can be defined as the modification of an affective response by the recruitment of 
cognitive processes. Phillips et al. (2003) suggest that emotion regulation contributes 
towards the initial appraisal of stimuli, and to the affective state produced by stimuli 
appraisal. This implies that emotion regulation can affect the perception of emotional 
stimuli and the subsequent emotional state, suggesting two types of emotional 
regulation strategies. However, emotion is one of the most contentious areas within 
psychology (Gross, Sheppes, and Urry, 2011), and the validity of distinguishing between 
emotion generation and emotion regulation is disputed (Gross and Barrett, 2011). The 
relationships between mood and emotional stimuli are therefore likely to be complex. 
 
When the sleep of healthy subjects has been manipulated, evidence of increased 
emotional reactivity has been found, although evidence of emotional “blunting” has 
also been reported. Experimental tasks have also been used with poor sleepers, with a 
view to understanding the role of emotion in insomnia. However, results to date have 
raised some important questions, such as the directionality of emotion effects (i.e. 
emotional reactivity vs. emotional blunting), the concordance between different output 
measures (e.g. behavioral responses, physiological activity, brain responses), and the 
relative contributions of emotional functioning and social performance to results. A 
working definition of key terms is provided in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Working definitions of key terms  
Key terms Definition 
Affective states, emotional states 
“A conscious emotional feeling, with 
associated autonomic, neuroendocrine, 
and somatomotor responses” (Phillips et 
al., 2003). 
Affective instability  
 
“Rapid oscillations of intense affect, with 
a difficulty in regulating these oscillations 
or their behavioral consequences” 
(Marwaha et al., 2013).  
Emotional blunting; decreased emotional 
reactivity/lability  
Stable and slowly changing emotions due 
to hypo-reactivity to emotional stimuli. 
Emotion perception 
The perceptual processing of emotional 
stimuli. 
Emotion regulation 
The modification of an affective response 
by the recruitment of cognitive processes. 
Emotional reactivity/lability (increased)  
 
“Unstable and rapidly changing emotions 
due to hyper-reactivity to emotional 
stimuli” (Fountoulakis, 2010).  
Socio-emotional stimuli 
Emotional faces, voices, or human-related 
images. 
 
Furthermore, these issues have not been addressed in existing reviews. In general, 
reviews to date have summarized the literature on the bi-directional relationships of 
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sleep and emotions, with a focus on self-reported measures of mood (Kahn, Sheppes, 
Sadeh, 2013). The literature on sleep stages, especially rapid eye movement (REM) 
sleep, and their role in emotional memory and associated affective experiences have 
also been reviewed (Deliens, Gilson, and Peigneux, 2014; Vanderkerckhove and Cluydts, 
2010; Goldstein and Walker, 2014). However, a limitation of these reviews is that 
results from experimental tasks with socially-relevant stimuli or outcome measures are 
largely considered within an emotional context, rather than as measures of social 
functioning. This is relevant to the complex interactions between mood, emotional 
stimuli, facial expressions, and social interactions, and we aim to address these issues in 
this review.  
 
Given the increasing use of objective measures to investigate the relationships between 
sleep and emotion, it seems timely to review the sleep/emotion field with reference to 
the existing literature on emotion and social interactions. Furthermore, integrating 
these areas seems necessary in order to aid the interpretation of results, and advance 
this area. In particular, we start by systematically reviewing the sleep and emotion 
literature, including sleep studies which have investigated emotion with experimental 
tasks and/or objective outcome measures. We summarize results from these studies, 
placing results in the context of the relevant extant socio-emotional literature, and 
highlight some key methodological limitations. Lastly, we set out an agenda for future 
work in this area. 
 
SLEEP AND EMOTION PERCEPTION 
 
The effects of sleep on emotion perception have been increasingly studied, and we 
identified relevant papers in order to summarize this area, and this was done in two 
ways. Firstly, relevant papers were identified as published in an ongoing ad-hoc 
literature search. Secondly, relevant papers were identified via a systematic review of 
the literature. However, it should be noted that this systematic literature search was 
not linked to a quality rating of the papers, due to homogeneity in study designs and 
participants, dose of sleep deprivation, experimental tasks, and stimuli. 
 
Papers were identified as indexed in PubMed (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/) 
via a search for the key terms relevant to sleep and emotion on 30th August 2014. The 
resultant 3293 items were then auto-filtered for article type, language, humans, and 
age. This resulted in 1716 items, and combined with those 33 papers previously 
identified resulted in 1735 unique papers. 
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We sought to identify those papers with an emotional task, and an associated 
neuroimaging, physiological, or behavioral dependent variable (DV). Emotional tasks 
were defined as those making use of social or emotional stimuli as independent 
variables (IV), such as emotional words, images, or faces. Also included were papers 
with measures of emotional expressivity, perceived emotion in sleep-deprived or 
insomnia individuals, measures of emotional intelligence in conjunction with an 
objective DV, and tasks of emotional reactivity in memory paradigms. Emotional 
reactivity is defined in Table 1 as “unstable and rapidly changing emotions due to 
hyper-reactivity to emotional stimuli” (Fountoulakis, 2010). 
 
Figure 1. Outline of the literature search strategy 
 
 
These 1735 titles were then manually screened to identify those papers meeting the 
above criteria, and supplemented by an auto-search to identify and review those papers 
with “emotion” in the title. In total 72 papers were identified and their abstracts 
screened, with the full text paper screened where there was ambiguity. Papers with 
self-reported measures of emotion alone were not included. 
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Excluded were tasks of attentional bias (n = 2), stress paradigms (n = 4), memory tasks 
(n = 5), priming task (n = 1), and other stimuli (food stimuli n = 1; humor n = 1),  studies 
based on self-reports (n = 17), reviews (n = 1), letters (n = 1), case studies (n = 1), non-
insomnia patients (n = 2), and a circadian study (n = 1). The resulting 35 papers were 
then organized by the use of neuroimaging, physiological, or behavioral measures, as 
well as studies of emotional expressivity, emotional intelligence, and rapid eye 
movement (REM) sleep, and are summarized in Table 2. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Summary of papers included within the review.  
 
 Author Subjects Design   Task Stimuli Measures   Result 
1. Baglioni et 
al. (i2014)  
22 insomnia disorder, 
38 healthy good 
sleepers. 
Between-
subjects. 
Emotional images 
were shown in five 
blocks, repeated 
twice. Assessed 
habituation. 
Emotional 
images. 
 
10 neutral with 
low arousal 
levels. 
 
10 negative 
stimuli with 
moderate 
arousal levels. 
 
10 negative 
stimuli with 
high arousal 
levels. 
 
10 insomnia-
related 
negative 
stimuli with 
moderate 
arousal levels. 
 
40 neutral 
stimuli with 
low arousal 
levels. 
fMRI results. 
 
Recognition task. 
Significant 
interactions of 
group and contrast 
(first presentation). 
 
Healthy good 
sleepers showed 
increased amygdala 
activation to 
negative stimuli 
versus neutral 
stimuli with similar 
arousal levels. 
There was no such 
difference in 
insomnia patients. 
 
Insomnia patients 
responded with 
increased 
activation to 
insomnia related 
stimuli compared to 
non-insomnia 
related stimuli. 
Healthy good 
sleepers showed 
the opposite 
pattern. 
 
Healthy good 
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sleepers showed 
similar amygdala 
activation to the 
first and second 
presentations of 
neutral moderate, 
negative moderate, 
and sleep negative 
images. 
 
Insomnia patients 
displayed increased 
amygdala activation 
to the second 
presentation of 
neutral moderate 
images. Conversely, 
they showed 
decrease activation 
with regards to 
negative moderate 
and sleep negative. 
 
Healthy good 
sleepers also 
responded with 
increased amygdala 
activation towards 
negative stimuli 
compared to 
neutral, with no 
such effects in 
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insomnia disorder. 
 
2. Cote et al. 
(2014) 
 
49 healthy subjects.  
 
Between-
subjects. 24 
subjects were 
sleep 
deprived. 
 
 
Emotion face 
categorization. 
 
 
Faces showing 
angry, sad, 
happy and 
fear, at 
different 
intensity levels 
(100%, 50%, 
40% and 30%).  
 
 
 
Behavioral; accuracy and 
reaction times. N170 and 
P1 ERP responses were 
analyzed.  
 
Sleep deprived 
participants were 
less accurate 
towards sad faces 
and slower with the 
full expressions. 
  
Sleep deprived 
subjects were less 
accurate with 
morphed sad faces, 
and slower with 
morphed happy, 
sad, and angry 
faces.  
 
Sleep deprived 
subjects also had 
smaller P1 
amplitudes and a 
larger N170 
amplitude on the 
full face task. With 
morphed faces, 
sleep deprived 
subjects had a 
smaller P1 
amplitude at 50% 
intensity, and main 
effects of sleep 
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deprivation on N170 
amplitude, with a 
larger amplitude in 
this group.  
There was also a 
significant three-
way interaction on 
the N170.  
3. Kyle et al. 
(2014)  
 
16  
psychophysiological 
insomnia subjects; 15 
controls.  
 
Between-
subjects.  
 
Emotion face 
categorization and 
intensity judgments. 
Faces showing 
anger, fear, 
happy and sad 
expressions.  
 
Behavioral; accuracy and 
intensity judgments. 
 
Lowered intensity 
ratings of sadness 
and fear in 
insomnia. 
4. DelVentura 
et al. (2014) 
 
12 insomnia subjects; 
13 controls.  
 
Between- 
subjects.  
 
Emotional images 
were shown, with 
intermittent startle 
probes or pain 
induction, followed 
by emotional ratings.  
 
Emotional 
images 
depicting 
mutilation, 
neutral, and 
erotica.  
 
Behavioral ratings, and 
physiological measures.  
 
Insomnia subjects 
rated mutilation 
images as less 
unpleasant, and 
erotica images as 
less pleasant. Pain 
ratings were not 
modulated by 
image in insomnia. 
Strength of the 
relationship 
between NFR and 
pain was weaker in 
insomnia.  
5. Killgore, 
(2013) 
 
65 healthy adults. Between-
subjects.  
 
Emotional 
intelligence task and 
questionnaire.  
 
Sleep assessed via 
Bar-On 
emotional 
intelligence 
inventory; 
Mayer-Salovey-
fMRI and subjective and 
objective emotional 
intelligence. 
Less sleep was 
linked to lower 
subjective 
emotional 
intelligence. Sleep 
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previous night‘s 
sleep duration.  
 
Caruso 
intelligence 
test.  
 
 
duration correlated 
negatively with 
prefrontal-
amygdala 
connectivity.  
6. Weber et al. 
(2013) 
55 healthy adults. Between-
subjects. Sleep 
assessed via 
habitual “sleep 
credit”.  
Emotional 
intelligence 
questionnaire. 
Bar-On 
Emotional 
Intelligence 
Inventory (EQ-
i). 
fMRI and subjective 
emotional intelligence. 
Sleep credit was 
correlated with 
greater grey-matter 
volume in two 
areas. 
EQ-i scores 
correlated with 
grey matter volume 
of the left grus 
rectus and superior 
and medial orbito-
frontal gyrus. Grey 
matter volume in 
this area correlated 
with the 
interpersonal 
subscale of the EQ-
i. 
7. Motomura et 
al. (2013) 
 
14 healthy men. Within-
subjects. Sleep 
restricted to 
four hours of 
time in bed, 
with bed times 
four hours 
later than 
normal. 
Presented with 
emotional faces 
under conscious and 
non-conscious 
viewing conditions.  
 
Fearful, happy, 
or neutral 
faces.  
 
fMRI, with button 
response to confirm 
wakefulness.  
 
Significantly 
greater amygdala 
activation to 
fearful faces with 
sleep deprivation in 
the conscious 
condition. 
Significantly 
diminished 
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amygdala – ventral 
anterior cingulate 
cortex connectivity 
with sleep 
deprivation, which 
also correlates with 
mood.  
 
8. Goldstein et 
al. (2013) 
18 healthy adults. Within-
subjects. Sleep 
deprivation of 
one night.  
 
Emotional 
anticipation task 
whereby subjects 
were presented with 
an anticipatory cue, 
followed by neutral, 
negative, or 
combination images, 
and response 
judgements. 
Combination, 
negative and 
neutral images. 
fMRI and behavioral 
(omitted trial and 
response times).  
 
Sleep deprivation 
enhanced 
anticipatory brain 
activity. Sleep 
deprivation was 
linked to more 
omitted trials, but 
no effects on 
reaction times.  
9. Schwarz et 
al. (2013)  
 
33 healthy subjects.  
 
Within-
subjects.  
 
“Smile or “frown” to 
emotional images 
and faces.  
 
Positive and 
negative 
scenes, and 
happy and 
angry faces. 
Behavioral ratings 
(arousal and valence) 
and EMG responses. 
No effects of sleep 
group on arousal 
and valence 
ratings. EMG 
responses were 
slower with sleep 
loss.  
10. Prather, 
Bogdan and 
Hariri, 
(2013)  
 
299 participants.  
 
Between-
subjects.  
Sleep quality 
assessed via 
the PSQI. 
Perceptual face-
matching task.  
 
Anger, fear, 
surprised and 
neutral faces.  
 
fMRI.  Poor sleepers had a 
significant positive 
relationship 
between amygdala 
reactivity and 
measures of 
psychopathology, 
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unlike good 
sleepers.  
11. Sundelin et 
al.,  
(2013) 
10 healthy adults 
were sleep deprived.     
 
Within-
subjects.  
Sleep 
deprivation 
period of 31 
hours, 
preceded by a 
night of 5 
hours of sleep. 
 
Images were rated 
on cues related to 
fatigue, including  
sadness, dark circles 
under the eyes, pale 
skin, tense lips, and 
fatigue.  
 
Photographs 
were taken of 
healthy adults 
when rested 
and following 
sleep 
deprivation. 
 
40 observers rated faces 
for cues relevant to 
fatigue. 
Sleep deprived 
individuals were 
perceived to be 
more sad and 
fatigued, with more 
swollen eyes, 
hanging eyelids, 
redder eyes, darker 
circles under the 
eyes, paler skin, 
more droopy 
corners of the 
mouth, and more 
wrinkles and fine 
lines around the 
mouth.  
 
 
12. Rosales-
Lagarde et 
al. (2012)  
20 healthy adults. 12 
REM-deprived, 8 
controls. 
Between-
subjects.   
 
REM sleep 
deprivation 
(REM-D), 
controls were 
awakened 
from other 
sleep stages. 
Emotional reactivity 
task involved 
responding to image 
presentations with a 
button response. 
Emotional 
images of 
negative and 
positive 
valence. High 
emotional 
reactivity 
(HER) images 
and low 
emotional 
reactivity (LER) 
images were 
Behavioral responses 
(emotional reactivity 
and reaction times).  
 
HER responses 
increased after 
REM-D, with no 
such effects in 
controls. Reaction 
times at second 
test were 
decreased in the 
REM-D group for 
LER responses. 
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identified for 
each 
individual. 
13. Baran et al. 
(2012) 
106 healthy adults. Between-
subjects. 
 
Four groups, 
with testing 
before and 
after sleep, 
before and 
after 
wakefulness, 
morning 
testing, and 
evening 
testing. 
Encoding phase with 
emotional judgments 
(arousal and 
valence), followed 
by a surprise 
recognition phase 
with emotional 
judgments (arousal 
and valence). 
Emotional 
images 
(negative and 
neutral). 
Behavioral arousal and 
valence, and memory. 
Sleep group were 
more accurate with 
negative and 
neutral images, and 
made less false 
alarms.  
 
Higher valence 
ratings in the wake 
group than the 
sleep group, with 
ratings in the wake 
group becoming 
more neutral. 
Similar results were 
found with valence 
in the wake group, 
whose responses 
became more 
neutral. 
14. Minkel et al. 
(2012) 
97 adult volunteers. 
Sleep was assessed via 
the PSQI. 
Between-
subjects. 
Emotional regulation 
task, whereby 
emotional images are 
presented, with 
subjects cued to look 
at the stimulus, or 
decrease their 
emotional response, 
followed by ratings. 
Neutral and 
negative 
images.  
 
fMRI and behavioral 
(emotional reactions, 
neutral-negative). 
Higher PSQI scores, 
and sleep 
medication use, 
were associated 
with less medial 
prefrontal cortex 
activity.  
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15. Gujar et al. 
(2011) 
36 healthy subjects. Between- 
subjects. 
Subjects were 
allocated to a 
nap/no nap group, 
and completed an 
emotion face task 
twice. 
Emotion faces 
of angry, fear, 
happy and sad 
were morphed 
with neutral to 
create an 
emotional 
range. 
PSG and behavioral 
intensity ratings. 
In the no-nap 
group, anger 
ratings were 
significantly 
increased at the 
second test, a 
result not found in 
the nap group. Fear 
ratings were also 
significantly 
reduced in the nap 
group, and 
increased in the no-
nap group. Happy 
faces showed 
increased ratings at 
re-test in the nap 
group, with no 
significant change 
in the no-nap 
group. The effects 
with happy and fear 
in the nap group 
were driven by 
those who had 
achieved REM 
sleep.  
16. Pace-Schott 
et al. (2011) 
46 volunteers. Between- 
subjects. 
Subjects were 
allocated to a 
nap/no nap group, 
with the emotion 
task repeated twice. 
Emotional 
images 
(negative and 
neutral). 
Behavioural (valence and 
arousal), ECG, EMG, 
SCR. 
Significant effects 
of nap/wake with 
physiological 
measures 
(“frowning” EMG 
37 
 
and SCR).  
 
17. Van Der 
Helm et al. 
(2011) 
34 healthy adults. Between-
subjects. 
Participants rated 
the emotional 
intensity of images 
presented before and 
after sleep and 
wakefulness.  
 
Emotional 
images, of 
positive and 
negative 
valence and 
low and high 
arousal.  
fMRI and behavioral 
intensity ratings. 
Amygdala reactivity 
decreased, and 
ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex 
activity increased 
following sleep.  
 
Amygdala activity 
increased, and  
ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex 
activity increased 
following an 
equivalent period 
of wakefulness. 
 
Emotional intensity 
ratings decreased in 
the sleep group and 
increased in the 
wake group. The 
extent of reduced 
prefrontal gamma 
during REM 
significantly 
predicted this 
effect. 
18. Anderson 
and Platten, 
(2011) 
32 good sleepers, 16 
per group. 
Between-
subjects. 36 
hours of sleep 
Emotional Go/NoGo 
task.  
 
Neutral or 
emotional 
(positive or 
Behavioral; hit rate and 
response times. 
Faster incorrect 
responses and 
increased failure to 
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 deprivation. negative) 
words. 
inhibit a response. 
19. McGlinchey 
et al. (2011) 
55 healthy 
participants, 17 
adults.  
Within-
subjects. 
Sleep period 
the previous 
night of a 
maximum 2 
hours. 
Speak freely 
interview. 
N/A Computerized  and 
human rater (eight 
raters) analysis of 
expressed emotion, 
computerized acoustic 
properties. 
Increased negative 
expressed emotion, 
and alterations in 
vocal properties.  
20. Minkel et al. 
(2011) 
23 subjects. 15 
subjects were sleep 
deprived; 8 controls. 
Between- 
subjects. Sleep 
deprivation 
period of one 
night. 
Emotion-inducing 
films were shown, 
with responses 
recorded. 
Movie clips to 
induce sadness 
and 
amusement. 
Expressed emotion, 
facial movement 
analyzed via the FACES 
scoring system (two 
raters). 
 
Sleep deprivation 
was linked to fewer 
facial movements 
to both types of 
movies.  
 
21. Gujar et al. 
(2011) 
14 sleep deprived, 13 
controls.   
 
Between-
subjects. 
Around 32 
hours of sleep 
deprivation.  
 
Viewing of 
increasingly pleasant 
images. 
Emotional 
images raging 
from neutral 
(neutral 
valence, low 
arousal) to 
increasingly 
positive 
(positive 
valence, high 
arousal).  
 
Emotional classification 
(pleasant/neutral).  
 
fMRI and behavioral 
response 
(pleasant/neutral).  
 
With sleep 
deprivation, an 
increased 
activation e.g. in 
brain areas 
responsible for 
reward, and altered 
functional 
connectivity, and a 
greater tendency to 
categorize stimuli 
as pleasant.  
 
22. Tempesta et  
al. (2010) 
40 subjects; 20 per 
group.  
Between- 
subjects. One 
night of total 
sleep 
Passive viewing 
followed by 
behavioral 
responses.  
Neutral, 
pleasant, and 
unpleasant  
images. 
Behavioral; arousal and 
valence judgments. 
 
Increased 
unpleasant ratings 
of neutral stimuli 
following sleep 
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deprivation. deprivation. 
23. Baglioni et 
al. (2010) 
18 good sleepers; 21 
primary insomnia. 
Between-
subjects.  
 
Passive viewing. Neutral, 
negative, 
positive, sleep 
negative and 
sleep positive 
images. 
Heart-rate, cardiac vagal 
tone, facial EMG, 
subjective valence and 
arousal ratings. 
Insomnia subjects 
showed decreased 
sleep-positive tonic 
responses of the 
corrugator, unlike 
good sleepers. 
Insomnia subjects 
had enhanced CVT, 
and no differences 
in the valence 
ratings of sleep-
negative and 
general negative 
stimuli; and rated 
all stimuli as more 
arousing. 
24. Chuah et al. 
(2010) 
24 healthy subjects. Within-
subjects. 24 
hours of sleep 
deprivation. 
Delayed match-to-
sample working 
memory task for 
faces, with 
emotional 
distracters.  
 
Images were 
high arousal 
negative, low 
arousal 
neutral, or 
digitally 
scrambled 
versions. 
Behavioral ratings and 
fMRI.  
Sleep deprivation 
impaired working 
memory 
performance, but 
did not affect 
ratings of intensity 
or distractibility. 
Working memory 
decreases 
correlated with 
increased amygdala 
activation to 
distracters with 
sleep deprivation, 
and functional 
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connectivity. 
25. Van Der 
Helm et al. 
(2010) 
37 healthy subjects.  
 
20 sleep deprived and 
17 controls. 
Between-
subjects (total 
sleep 
deprivation vs. 
controls). 
Intensity judgments 
of emotion faces. 
Faces 
displaying 
anger, sad, and 
happiness 
morphed with 
neutral. 
Behavioral intensity 
ratings. 
Sleep deprived 
subjects made 
lower intensity 
ratings of happy 
and angry faces.  
26. Kuriyama, 
Soshi, and 
Kim, (2010) 
28 healthy students. 
 
14 sleep deprived, 14 
controls. 
Between-
subjects. One 
night of sleep 
deprivation. 
Passive viewing 
(memory encoding). 
Movies of safe 
driving and of a 
motor vehicle 
accident.  
Recognition accuracy 
(old-new) and fear 
rating, skin conductance 
response (SCR).  
Sleep deprivation 
diminished the fear 
rating of SAFE 
movies. 
Sleep deprivation 
diminished the SCR 
in all contexts to 
incorrectly 
identified stimuli.  
27. Lara-
Carrasco et 
al. (2009) 
35 healthy subjects.  
 
17 REM deprived, 18 
controls. 
Between-
subjects (REM 
sleep 
deprivation vs. 
controls). 
Arousal and valence 
ratings of emotional 
images at night and 
in morning.  
 
Emotional 
images, 
including 
neutral and 
negative 
images. 
Behavioral ratings 
(valence and arousal) 
and PSG. 
Emotional 
adaptation 
(arousal) scores 
were significantly 
lower in the in 
those subjects with 
a high REM %. No 
effects were found 
with neutral images 
or valence ratings. 
28. Franzen et 
al. (2009) 
30 healthy volunteers. 
15 subjects per group.  
 
Between-
subjects. One 
night of total 
sleep 
deprivation.  
 
Passive viewing task. Emotional 
images 
(neutral, 
positive and 
negative). 
Behavioral ratings of 
valence and arousal and 
pupillography. 
Sleep deprived 
subjects showed 
anticipatory 
reactivity to 
negative blocks, 
and larger pupil 
41 
 
diameters to 
negative images. 
29. Franzen et 
al. (2008) 
29 healthy adult 
volunteers. 15 
subjects per group. 
Between-subjects.  
 
One night of 
total sleep 
deprivation. 
Objective and 
subjective measures 
of sleepiness and 
mood. 
Positive, 
negative, and 
neutral images. 
Self-reports, behavioral, 
and physiological 
measures. 
Distinction of 
subjective and 
objective measures 
was less clear 
following sleep 
deprivation. 
30. Huck et al. 
(2008) 
54 healthy subjects. All subjects 
sleep 
deprived, up 
to 44 hours of 
sleep 
deprivation. 
Between-
groups 
comparisons. 3 
drug conditions 
and a placebo 
group.  
 
Recognition of angry, 
sad, happy, 
surprised, fearful 
and disgusted faces. 
Ekman 60 
Faces test, the 
Emotion 
Hexagon Test. 
Behavioral; accuracy. Sleep deprivation 
impairs recognition 
of complex 
emotions, which all 
drugs improve.  
31. Yoo et al. 
(2007)  
 
14 sleep deprived, 12 
controls. 
Between-
subjects 
comparisons. 
Around 35 
hours of sleep 
deprivation. 
Viewing of 
increasingly aversive 
images. Emotion 
classification 
response to verify 
wakefulness. 
Emotional 
images, 
ranging from 
emotionally 
neutral to 
increasingly 
aversive. 
fMRI and behavioral 
(unpleasant/neutral). 
Sleep deprived 
subjects showed 
amygdala responses 
with impaired 
prefrontal 
connectivity. 
32. Pallesen et 
al. (2004) 
36 cadets.  Within-
subjects. 
Sleep 
deprivation 
Delayed match to 
sample task with 
faces, presented to 
visual half-fields. 
9 schematic 
facial 
expressions. 
Behavioral; reaction 
times and accuracy. 
Less accurate with 
sleep deprivation. 
Significant 
interaction of half 
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period of 72 –
120 hours. 
field with state on 
reaction times. 
33. Wagner, 
Fischer, and 
Born, (2002) 
24 healthy subjects.  Within 
subjects. 
 
 
Emotional judgments 
were made before 
and after sleep 
which was taken 
early or late at 
night. 
Aversive 
images.  
 
Behavioral ratings 
(arousal and valence). 
Old-new valence 
ratings were more 
positive after early 
sleep and more 
negative after late 
sleep. Old-new 
arousal ratings 
were greater after 
sleep than 
wakefulness. 
34. Harrison and 
Horne, 
(1997) 
9 healthy subjects. Within 
subjects. 
 
One night of 
sleep 
deprivation (36 
hours). 
 
Word fluency task 
and short story oral 
reading. 
 
 
 
N/A 10 trained raters. Decreased word 
count during sleep 
deprivation; small 
increase on control 
nights (trial 3). 
 
Larger proportion 
of semantically-
related words 
during the last two 
trials of sleep 
deprivation (trial 2 
and 3). 
 
Diminished number 
of nouns and 
adjectives during 
trial 3 of sleep 
deprivation. 
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Deterioration of 
intonation by day 
two of sleep 
deprivation, and 
sleep deprivation 
increased fatigue. 
35. Dushenko 
and 
Sterman, 
(1984) 
10 healthy subjects.  Within 
subjects (sleep 
adaptation 
night and REM 
deprivation). 
Left and right 
hemisphere tasks 
were presented to 
subjects 
tachistoscopically. 
25 cartoon 
drawings of 
adult faces 
(extremely 
positive, mildly 
positive, 
neutral, mildly 
negative, 
extremely 
negative). 
 
80 abstract 
nouns. 
Same/different 
judgments (accuracy and 
reaction times). 
There was a 
significant 
improvement in 
performance in the 
night 2 to night 3 
left hemisphere 
first presentation of 
the facial stimuli.  
 
The left 
hemisphere first 
presentation of 
faces was linked to 
higher accuracy 
than the right 
hemisphere first 
presentation. 
 
Abbreviations: electrocardiogram (ECG), electromyogram (EMG), emotional quotient inventory (EQ-i), event related potentials (ERPs), functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), high emotional reactivity (HER), low emotional reactivity (LER), Nociceptive pain reflex (NPR), polysomnography 
(PSG), Pittsburgh sleep quality index (PSQI), rapid eye movement sleep (REM sleep), rapid eye movement deprivation (REM-D), skin conductance 
response (SCR). 
 
 
EFFECTS OF SLEEP LOSS IN NORMAL SLEEPERS 
 
Firstly, we review evidence for effects of sleep deprivation and sleep restriction on 
emotional responding. These studies of normal sleepers used neuroimaging, 
physiological and behavioral techniques. We then review those studies on emotional 
expressivity and emotional intelligence. 
 
Neuroimaging studies 
  
In 2007, Yoo et al. (2007) reported that 35 hours of sleep deprivation increases 
amygdala reactivity to a series of increasingly aversive images. In particular, they report 
that sleep deprivation was associated with 60% greater magnitude of activation of the 
amygdala, and a three-fold greater extent of activation of the amygdala volume 
between groups. Similar results were found when the upper and lower quartiles of the 
stimuli set were compared, suggesting that amygdala reactivity to the baseline 
condition was not responsible for these results. Diminished amygdala-prefrontal 
connectivity was also found after sleep deprivation, suggesting a lack of cognitive 
control over emotional brain areas. However, there was greater connectivity within 
brainstem areas which are involved in autonomic activation. Behavioral responses 
(unpleasant/neutral) were also recorded to verify wakefulness. Although no significant 
group differences were found in the use of these labels, sleep deprived subjects tended 
to rate stimuli as more negative (p = 0.10). 
 
The same group has also reported hyper-reactivity to positive stimuli following sleep 
deprivation. Gujar et al. (2011) used a similar paradigm whereby increasingly arousing 
positive images were presented in an emotional gradient. A night of sleep deprivation 
(32 hours) increased activation in brain areas responsible for reward, such as the ventral 
tegmental area of the brain stem, as well as the amygdala and insula cortex between 
groups. Specifically, sleep deprivation increased functional connectivity within regions 
of the left amygdala and left anterior temporal pole, and connectivity of the insular 
cortex with several regions of the visual cortex was increased relative to control 
subjects. The bilateral amygdala showed increased reactivity, and decreased 
connectivity with the medial prefrontal cortex, bilateral orbitofrontal cortex, and left 
fusiform gyrus. The fusiform gyrus showed stronger connectivity with the left anterior 
temporal pole, and increased connectivity in the left superior insula and left lateral 
prefrontal cortex. There was also a significantly greater tendency of sleep deprived 
subjects to categorize stimuli as pleasant compared to neutral. 
 
Using comparable tasks, Yoo et al. (2007) and Gujar et al. (2011) therefore report 
similar results with both negative-arousing and positive-arousing stimuli, i.e. increased 
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emotional brain activation and decreased functional connectivity with cognitive control 
regions. The test times of these studies are also comparable, with both studies testing 
subjects at 5pm. However, the presentation of stimuli in an increasingly arousing 
gradient could affect results. In particular, this approach seems likely to conflate the 
initial perception of stimuli with the capacity to regulate subsequent emotion. 
Specifically, antecedent-based methods of emotional regulation affect the perception 
of the emotion-inducing stimuli, whereas response-based methods of emotional 
regulation target the subsequent emotional response (Green and Malhi, 2006). 
Emotional regulation therefore contributes towards the appraisal of stimuli, as well as 
the subsequent emotional response and behaviour (Phillips et al., 2003). Both studies 
report evidence of impaired emotional regulation via connectivity measures, and the 
intensity of an emotional experience could modulate its ability to be regulated (Green 
and Malhi, 2006). 
 
Sleep deprivation has also been studied in conjunction with a task of emotional 
distracters, in a counterbalanced crossover study (Chuah et al., 2010). In this delayed 
matching to sample task, task subjects were first instructed to remember 3 faces. After 
a 10 second delay subjects were asked to judge whether a newly presented face was old 
or new. In the interim, emotional images of highly arousing negative images, low 
arousal neutral scenes, or visual control images were presented as distracters. Following 
24 hours of sleep deprivation, performance in this delayed-matching-to-sample task was 
significantly impaired in comparison to rested wakefulness (Chuah et al., 2010). When 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) results were analyzed, amygdala 
activation to emotional distracters following sleep deprivation was found to correlate 
with working memory impairments. In particular, those with greater working memory 
impairments following sleep deprivation showed greater amygdala activation to 
emotionally distracting images (Chuah et al., 2010). The maintenance of performance 
was also positively associated with connectivity of the emotional brain and cognitive 
control areas. However functional connectivity between the amygdala and prefrontal 
cortices was impaired following sleep deprivation. Sleep deprivation was not found to 
affect behavioral ratings of emotional stimuli, with distractibility and emotional 
intensity assessed (Chuah et al., 2010). Importantly, this study suggests ways in which 
neural activation patterns and task performance are linked, indicating that increased 
amygdala reactivity to distracters and diminished prefrontal-amygdala connectivity 
correlates with working memory impairments. This could be relevant to increasing 
resilience to sleep deprivation. 
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The effects of 24 hours of sleep deprivation on the anticipation of emotional stimuli 
have also been studied in a within-subjects design (Goldstein et al., 2013). In this task, 
a cue predictive of aversive or neutral images, or an ambiguous cue, was presented in 
advance of an emotional image. Sleep deprivation enhanced anticipatory brain 
activation to all predictive cues in the amygdala region, without emotion-specific 
effects. There was also a significant interaction of cue type with sleep deprivation in 
the right anterior insula, which showed greater activation to emotional cues than 
ambiguous cues (Goldstein et al., 2013). Furthermore, trait anxiety was found to 
modulate these effects, with higher scores linked to greater amygdala activity. 
Identifying factors which increase vulnerability to sleep loss is important given the links 
of sleep and health (Buysse, 2014; Luyster et al., 2012; Benca et al., 1992; Baglioni et 
al., 2011) and amygdala reactivity could contribute to this. These results by Goldstein 
et al. (2013) appear broadly comparable to the effects of acute stress on amygdala 
activation (Van Marle et al., 2009). In particular, acute stress induction increases 
amygdala activation to all images, reducing specificity and increasing sensitivity. Such 
effects of sleep deprivation on amygdala reactivity could contribute towards the 
development of psychiatric disorders. Specifically, sleep disruption has been found to 
increase the likelihood of psychiatric disorders developing following a traumatic event 
(Bryant et al., 2010). 
 
Emotional images have been used as stimuli in these four experiments. However other 
authors have used facial expressions of emotion in order to assess emotional responding. 
Facial stimuli are different from emotional images, in that facial expressions of emotion 
communicate information (Blair, 2003; Ekman, 1997) and serve social motives (Fridlund, 
1991). These different types of emotional stimuli - words, images, and faces - have 
been compared, with different effects found on the speed of processing, extent of 
neural activation, and induced emotion. Specifically, compared to faces, images are 
more complex and novel, and may be more demanding to process, resulting in sustained 
patterns of activity (Britton et al., 2006). Emotional images also induce greater 
experienced emotion than emotional faces (Britton et al., 2006). However, brain 
responses to emotional faces are more pronounced in several brain areas (Britton et al., 
2006). Distinctive universal facial expressions have been identified for anger, fear, 
sadness, enjoyment, and disgust, with weaker evidence found for other emotions 
(Ekman, 1993). In particular, anger/disgust and fear/surprise seem to be frequently 
confused, creating four emotional categories (Jack et al., 2014). These “basic” 
emotions can themselves be further classified according to their associated levels of 
arousal and valence, in a dimensional approach to emotion (Adolphs, 2002; Gerber et 
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al., 2008; Dailey et al., 2002). The following studies in this section have made use of 
emotional face stimuli. 
 
Cote et al. (2014) measured the effects of sleep deprivation (31.5 hours of wakefulness) 
on emotion recognition, using behavioral measures in conjunction with event-related 
potentials (ERPs). When the behavioral response categorization labels were analyzed, 
sleep deprived subjects were significantly poorer at recognizing sad faces. These 
subjects were also slower to respond when the full emotional expressions were 
displayed. When images were morphed to vary the emotional intensity, sleep deprived 
subjects were less accurate at recognizing sad faces, and slower to recognize happy, 
sad, and angry faces. On the full-face task, sleep deprived subjects evidenced a smaller 
P1 amplitude and a larger N170 amplitude, with similar results found with morphed 
faces. At 50% morph level the P1 amplitude was also significantly smaller, and there was 
a significant three-way interaction for the N170 amplitude. These effects were linked to 
the increased perceptual difficulty of morphed faces, with a failure to make use of 
perceptual resources with subtle expressions of sadness. Neural reactivity increased for 
the threat-related emotions as they became more subtle. This suggests increased 
reactivity towards more ambiguous expressions with sleep loss, consistent with a 
behavioral study by Van Der Helm et al. (2010). 
 
The effects of sleep restriction on emotion have also been investigated, and evidence 
for emotional reactivity has been found with facial stimuli. In the paradigm of 
Motomura et al. (2013), time in bed was restricted to four hours a day for five days. 
These authors report that sleep restriction increased emotional brain responses to 
negative face stimuli. Emotional faces showing happy, fearful, and neutral expressions 
were presented in two conditions. These stimuli were shown for 1000 ms in an “aware” 
condition, and 26 ms in an “unaware” condition, in a randomized crossover design. 
Significant differences in amygdala activation were found in the aware condition, when 
fearful and neutral faces were contrasted. This contrast was also associated with 
significantly impaired amygdala-anterior cingulate cortex connectivity (Motomura et al., 
2013). When behavioral responses were analyzed, there were no significant differences 
between groups in the responses or reaction times towards target images. However, 
button responses were used to verify wakefulness rather than to assess recognition 
performance. In general, decreasing stimuli presentation times of emotional faces 
impairs recognition (Calvo and Lundqvist, 2008), and it would be interesting to 
investigate how this paradigm is linked to behavioral recognition responses.  
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Also of interest would be the effects of different levels of sleep restriction and sleep 
deprivation on performance. In particular, there has been found to be a dose-response 
effect of sleep loss on measures of neurobehavioral functioning (Van Dongen et al., 
2003). These authors report that cumulative sleep restriction results in performance 
impairments which are comparable to that of total sleep deprivation. Meerlo et al. 
(2008) have also discussed the effects of sleep restriction with regards to markers of 
stress and arousal. They report that the adverse effects of chronically restricted and 
disrupted sleep can occur in two ways. Firstly, the effects of sleep deprivation on 
sympathetic and hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenal axis (HPA axis) activity could 
accumulate. Secondly, the chronic effects of this could be to dysregulate the stress and 
arousal systems, resulting in altered sensitivity and responses to stress. These changes 
become persistent via gradual changes on the stress systems and its regulation. 
 
Physiological studies 
 
Evidence of hyper-reactivity following sleep deprivation has also been found with 
physiological measures, specifically, there are greater pupillary responses to negative 
images when sleep deprived (Franzen et al., 2009). In this task, high arousal positive, 
high arousal negative and neutral images were selected, and presented in emotion 
blocks of 5 images. Each image was preceded by a 2 second warning cue, and presented 
for 6 seconds. Subjects were awake from 31-33 hours. There was greater anticipatory 
pupillary reactivity to negative stimuli following a night of sleep deprivation. Larger 
pupillary reactivity in the inter-stimulus interval following neutral trials was found with 
sleep deprivation too, along with effects while viewing negative images (Franzen et al., 
2009). However, there were no significant effects on emotion ratings or reaction times 
with sleep deprivation (Franzen et al., 2009). This study supports the evidence for 
anticipatory reactivity following sleep deprivation reported by Goldstein et al. (2013) on 
fMRI parameters. Moreover, behavioral results appear to be less sensitive to the effects 
of sleep deprivation, both in this study and Chuah et al. (2010). 
 
Measures of facial movements have been linked to a somewhat different pattern of 
results, and sleep loss slows intentional movements (Dimberg and Thunberg, 1998). 
Schwarz et al. (2013) asked subjects whose sleep opportunity had been partially 
restricted (sleeping between 2am and 6am) to “smile” or “frown” in response to 
emotional faces and scenes. Using electromyography (EMG) responses, they found that 
sleep deprived subjects were slower to respond. Dimberg suggests that the facial 
muscles involved in smiling and frowning respond congruently to emotional stimuli 
(Dimberg and Thunberg, 1992; Dimberg, 1990; see also Achaibou et al., 2008), although 
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importantly these movements may not be visible by eye (Dimberg, 1990). Modulating 
affective displays may, in turn, affect emotional experiences. In the facial feedback 
hypothesis, Izard (1990) suggests that modulating expressed emotion affects the 
emotional experience itself. Facial muscle movements could therefore contribute 
towards both emotional experience and emotional regulation (Izard, 1990). 
 
Furthermore, the relationships between different types of measures could be affected 
by sleep deprivation. Franzen et al. (2008) examined how sleep deprivation affects the 
relationships between different measures, using the same sample as Franzen et al. 
(2009). In exploratory factor analyzes, they found that sleep deprivation influenced the 
relationships between subjective measures (such as self-reported mood and sleepiness) 
and objective measures (such as pupillography, and the multiple sleep latency test, or 
MSLT), making this distinction less clear (Franzen et al., 2008). This suggests that the 
relationships between the different components of emotions become dysregulated 
following sleep deprivation. 
 
Behavioral studies 
  
The effects of sleep deprivation on the ratings of emotional images have also been 
tested. Subjects were compared on their ratings of arousal and valence towards images 
depicting pleasant events, unpleasant events, and neutral. Images were presented in a 
random order for two seconds and rated after a one second pause. Behaviorally, a night 
of sleep deprivation was linked to more negatively valenced ratings of neutral images, 
with no effects on positive or negative stimuli when test and retest were compared 
(Tempesta et al., 2010). This group difference was significant when mood was included 
as a covariate. Some evidence of effects with arousal ratings were also reported, with 
sleep deprived subjects rating unpleasant images more arousing than pleasant ones, an 
effect not found in control subjects (Tempesta et al., 2010). This task appears 
comparable to that of Franzen et al. (2009), although with discrepant results. In 
particular, Franzen et al. reported no effects with behavioral ratings. 
 
One explanation may relate to the precise stimuli which were selected, and their 
associated normative ratings of valence and arousal. However, these ratings appear 
comparable (Tempesta et al. (2010), pleasant valence: 8.0, arousal: 5.1; neutral stimuli 
arousal: 5.0, valence: 3.0; unpleasant valence: 2.0, arousal: 6.0; Franzen et al. (2009) 
positive valence: 7.6, arousal: 5.3; neutral valence: 5.0, arousal: 3.3; negative valence: 
2.3, arousal: 5.7; all ratings out of 10). However, Franzen et al. collected behavioral 
ratings several hours after the eye-tracking task, and Tempesta et al. displayed stimuli 
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on screen while response judgments were made. These differences may be relevant to 
the discrepant behavioral results between these two tasks. Also relevant could be that 
the images of Tempesta et al. were also presented in color whereas Franzen et al. used 
grayscale images. Additionally, the sleep deprivation period of Franzen et al. appears to 
be longer. Future studies should investigate the reasons for these discrepant behavioral 
results in greater depth. However, in general, behavioral studies appear to be less 
sensitive to the effects of sleep deprivation than neuroimaging or psychological studies. 
 
Sleep deprived participants also show evidence of diminished inhibition and greater 
impulsivity to negative stimuli, in an emotional Go/NoGo task (Anderson and Platten, 
2011). This task involves the presentation of neutral and emotional (positive and 
negative) words, which subjects are asked to respond to, or inhibit responses towards. 
Following 36 hours of sleep deprivation, subjects made fewer correct responses overall, 
with more incorrect responses to negative emotional stimuli. Sleep deprived subjects 
also responded more quickly (and incorrectly), to negative stimuli, suggesting a failure 
to inhibit responses to such stimuli (Anderson and Platten, 2011). When emotion words 
are compared to faces, emotion faces are processed faster, although with similar 
patterns of brain activity (Schacht and Sommer, 2009), suggesting that word stimuli are 
comparable to results with facial stimuli. However, it would be interesting to repeat 
this task using alternative stimuli, and using alternative measures of impulsivity. 
 
Facial stimuli have also been used to investigate the effects of sleep deprivation. 
Pallesen et al. (2004) used schematic faces within a delayed matching-to-sample task. 
In this study of cadets, sleep deprivation was found to impair performance on accuracy 
and reaction times in the face-matching task. Dushenko and Sterman (1984) have also 
investigated the effects of sleep loss, using a matching task with schematic faces. 
Following REM deprivation, the recognition of these faces was found to improve in the 
left hemisphere first presentation condition. Both of these studies were interested in 
hemispheric differences. In general task performance was impaired following sleep loss, 
and improved following REM sleep deprivation, although the emotion specificity of 
results was not reported. These studies indicate that the nature of sleep deprivation 
affects results, with different sleep stages exerting different effects on performance. 
 
In an emotion categorization task, Huck et al. (2008) found no effects of sleep loss on 
simple emotion recognition, although complex emotion recognition was significantly 
affected. Stimulant medications were found to improve recognition of complex 
emotions following sleep deprivation. The emotion-specificity of these effects was not 
reported. In this experimental paradigm faces are presented until response, with the six 
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emotional labels (anger, surprise, fear, sadness, happiness and disgust) presented on 
screen below the image. A similar task was employed in a complex emotion recognition 
task. Complex emotional faces were defined as those which are blends of two emotional 
faces, resulting in a ratio of two emotions which are displayed on the face. However, 
the extent to which such “complex” images are representative of how expressions are 
formed in real life is unclear. Different facial action units (AUs) may be displayed in 
different ways to represent emotional expressions (Yu et al., 2013). The facial 
physiology is capable of displays of more than one emotional state at once, and emotion 
blends or sequences are commonplace (Ekman and Friesen, 1969). This flexibility 
contributes to the ability to modulate facial expressions of emotion, depending on the 
situation (Ekman, 1992). Such emotional expressions may therefore be said to increase 
perceptual difficulty (Cote et al., 2014). 
 
Also using face stimuli, Van Der Helm et al. (2010) found reduced intensity ratings (in 
the mid-intensity range) following sleep deprivation, results which were driven by 
responses towards angry and happy faces. Subjective sleepiness was not found to 
correlate with results. In this task the stimuli were created by morphing expressions of 
anger, sadness, and happiness with the neutral image of a single male identity. The 
resultant ten blends, or morphs, were shown in emotional blocks in a randomized order. 
Participants were familiarized with the image sets prior to testing, and rated the 
perceived intensity of emotion. This was done on a four-point scale (definitely neutral, 
more neutral than emotional, more emotional than neutral, definitely neutral) following 
a two second image presentation. 
 
Behavioral facial emotion recognition tasks typically involve the random presentation of 
the emotional expressions of several posers, with subjects asked to categorize the 
emotion shown using emotion labels. This is akin to real-life situations, where emotions 
are recognized from several options. Emotion recognition can also occur at high 
accuracy following a brief image presentation (Calvo and Lundqvist, 2008), and 
extended presentation durations (10 seconds) have been linked to results which fail to 
replicate under more naturalistic presentation times (Cooper, Rowe, and Penton-Voak, 
2008). Although emotion categorization and intensity responses are linked (Utama et 
al., 2009), the presentation of stimuli within emotion blocks could also have affected 
results. For example, angry faces have been linked to sensitization responses within the 
hippocampus and other brain areas (Strauss et al., 2005). We suggest that sensitive 
tasks of emotion recognition performance could include categorization and intensity 
judgments, or the use of dynamic stimuli based on facial movements (Yu, Garrod, and 
Schyns, 2012). Alternatively, Adolphs (2002) has suggested that intensity ratings could 
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be made concurrently on several different emotional categorization options for each 
trial. Measures of accuracy could then be derived from these responses. 
 
Emotional expressivity 
 
While the previous studies have investigated the perception of emotion, other authors 
have been interested in how emotions are expressed. This is relevant to both social 
interactions and emotional regulation. Specifically, Minkel et al. (2011) induced 
amusement or sadness via movie clips, and subjects’ facial movements were visually 
recorded. Sleep deprived subjects were significantly less facially expressive when shown 
both types of movies compared to rested controls, with a larger effect size towards 
amusing clips than sad movies. However, this study assessed overall expressivity of 
facial movements via the “FACES” scoring system. As such, the way in which sleep 
deprivation affects the specific components of emotional expressions is unknown. With 
regard to facial expressions as social signals, Ekman and Friesen (1976) and Ekman, 
Friesen, and Tomkins (1971), detail how different AUs combine to display the different 
emotional expressions. How facial expressivity was linked to expressed emotion in this 
study is therefore unclear, although the precise links of facial expressions to emotional 
experiences is subject to debate. 
 
Ekman (1992) suggests that some emotions have no distinct expression, and that 
subjective affect may not correspond to facially expressed emotion. This indicates that 
the processes involved in emotional experience and emotion expressions are separable. 
Emotional expressions serve social motives (Fridlund, 1991), and the “readout” 
hypothesis suggests that motivational-emotional processes with social implications are 
displayed on the face (Ekman and Friesen, 1976). Furthermore, Blair (2003) stresses the 
role of expressions in communication, with an audience important to emotion displays. 
Ekman and Friesen (1969) have described four display rules, which can serve to de-
intensify, over-intensify, appear neutral, and mask experienced emotion, and these are 
subject to social norms and context. Such modulations of affective displays may, in 
turn, affect emotional experiences (Izard, 1990). Expressing fear alters parameters (e.g. 
faster eye movements, increased nasal volume) which are linked to behavioral action 
tendencies (Susskind et al., 2008). Future studies in this area should consider reporting 
the social context of testing (e.g. solitary, group testing, or experimenter present), and 
this would be interesting to investigate further. Furthermore, the environment has been 
identified as a fourth component of emotional instability (Marwaha et al., 2013) (see 
Table 1). 
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Individual differences in emotional expressivity could also be relevant. People vary in 
their emotional expressivity, and this relates to differences in the specificity of 
expressions, the threshold for expressions, and aspects of the timing of expressions 
(Ekman, 1992). Furthermore, there are differences between people in the structure and 
differentiation of facial muscles, and in the neural control of them (Schmidt and Cohn, 
2011). The ability and tendency to produce universal facial expressions also varies 
between people (Schmidt and Cohn, 2011). Such differences have been observed 
experimentally. In 1924, Landis conducted a series of experiments whereby the facial 
expressions produced by emotion-inducing stimuli were recorded, and noted two factors 
of emotional disruption. One was related to the tendency to display emotion, and the 
other was the emotional stability, or duration of emotional impact, following an 
emotional upset. As such, individuals have been found to respond in idiosyncratic ways 
to emotion-inducing procedures, with different patterns of facial expressions observed 
between individuals (Landis, 1924). Future studies could consider how facial reactivity 
relates to measures of emotion, and how sleep affects this.  
 
Sleep deprivation also affects vocal expressivity (McGlinchey et al., 2011). Following a 
night of sleep deprivation, subjects use fewer words, and are judged to express less 
positive affect and more negative affect via speech. The acoustic properties of speech 
are also affected by sleep deprivation, with effects on several parameters (McGlinchey 
et al., 2011). Of 30 acoustic properties studied, there was significant disruption to 
several properties (e.g. increased jitter, decreased psycho-acoustical bark at specific 
high frequency energy band, increased shimmer, decreased pauses and decreased high 
frequency energy). In an earlier study, Harrison and Horne (1997) have reported effects 
of sleep deprivation on speech. These authors found that sleep deprivation decreased 
word count on trial 3, with decreased nouns and adjectives on this trial. Sleep deprived 
subjects also generated a larger proportion of semantically related words at trials 2 and 
3. In addition, intonation was found to be affected by sleep deprivation, and was more 
inappropriate, with voices reported to be more monotonic or flat. There was a 
corresponding increase in ratings of fatigue. 
 
Taken together these results suggest that speech is affected by sleep deprivation, and 
that perceivers detect these differences on several measures. Specific parameter 
differences can also be detected by computerized analysis. Given the importance of 
vocal expressivity to social interactions, it might be worth investigating how perceivers 
interact with sleep deprived individuals. The emotional reactions of observers to such 
expressions might also be worth investigating. This would seem to be relevant to both 
facial and vocal cues. Axelsson et al. (2010) have found that facial cues of sleep 
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deprivation are detected by observers, with such images rated as being less healthy and 
attractive. The social implications of sleep loss are therefore worth investigating in 
terms of the effects on the perceiver. Also relevant is the concordance between 
measures of timing and maximum expressivity in a social exchange. This might be 
relevant to individuals with insomnia disorder (Kyle, Espie, and Morgan, 2010), who are 
thought to have difficulties with emotion regulation (Harvey, 2002), and there is 
evidence that voices can be “fatigue-proofed” (Bagnall et al., 2011). 
 
Furthermore, individuals who have been sleep deprived are perceived to be more sad 
and fatigued, with significant differences in facial cues (Sundelin et al., 2013). The 
specific facial cues included were redder eyes, hanging eyelids, swollen eyes, darker 
circles under the eyes, pale skin, more wrinkles/fine lines around the eyes, and more 
droopy corners of the mouth. This is from images that were taken of unexpressive, or 
“neutral” faces following 31 hours of sleep deprivation and 5 hours of sleep. Sadness 
ratings and ratings of fatigue were found to be correlated. Such studies suggest that 
sleep loss affects appearances and that this can be detected by observers. Future 
studies might wish to consider the role of familiarity in how faces are assessed. This 
could also be relevant to insomnia disorder subjects, in whom social interactions are an 
area of concern (Kyle, Espie, and Morgan, 2010), and sensitivity to these changes may 
contribute towards the maintenance of insomnia disorder (Harvey, 2002).  
 
Emotional intelligence 
 
Emotional intelligence could also modulate reactions to sleep loss. Killgore, (2013) 
assessed emotional intelligence, measured subjectively (via the emotional quotient 
inventory, or EQ-i) and objectively (via the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso emotional intelligence 
test, or MSCEIT). Subjects reporting < 6.5 hours of sleep the previous night scored 
significantly lower on subjective emotional intelligence than those subjects who 
reported > 8 hours of sleep the previous night, with no significant group differences on 
objectively measured performance. Insomnia complaints were not found to account for 
the correlation of total sleep time with subjective emotional intelligence. When resting-
state fMRI results were analyzed, greater negative functional connectivity was found 
between the right ventro-medial prefronal cortex and right amygdala, and this was 
negatively correlated with greater reported total sleep time. The strength of this 
connectivity correlated with overall subjective emotional intelligence, but effects with 
objective emotional intelligence were not significant. Furthermore, insomnia 
complaints appear to account for the correlations between emotional intelligence and 
functional connectivity (Killgore, 2013). Of particular interest is the failure to find 
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deficits in objective performance, although there were significant effects on subjective 
and neuroimaging measures. 
 
In a new approach from the same group, Weber et al. (2013) calculated sleep credit as 
the difference between habitual sleep time, and the reported minimum amount of sleep 
necessary before impairments became apparent in ability to work. In the right middle 
orbitofrontal gyrus and the left gyrus rectus/superior and medial orbitofrontal gyrus, 
greater grey matter volume was associated with habitual “sleep credit”. Total EQ-i 
scores were found to correlate with the left gyrus rectus and the superior and medial 
orbitofrontal gyrus. Volume of this area correlated with interpersonal subscale of the 
EQ-i. Impairments in subjective emotional intelligence following sleep deprivation have 
also been previously reported by this group (Killgore et al., 2008). Taken together these 
results suggest significant effects of sleep on subjective emotional intelligence and 
brain responses, but not on objective measures of emotional intelligence. 
 
ROLE OF (REM) SLEEP IN EMOTIONAL REACTIVITY 
 
There is much evidence that sleep benefits the memory of emotional content, and it has 
been suggested that REM-sleep plays a role in maintaining an emotional memory, while 
removing its associated emotionality, or “affective tone” (Walker and Van Der Helm, 
2009). We now briefly review the evidence for how sleep affects emotional reactivity.  
 
Baran et al. (2012) report evidence of attenuated arousal and valence ratings of 
negative emotional images following wakefulness, in contrast to sleep. This effect was 
associated with greater time in REM sleep. Evidence of more rapid extinction of fear 
responses have also been reported by Kuriyama, Soshi, and Kim (2010). These authors 
used movie clips of vehicle accidents or safe driving as stimuli. They report that there 
were significant differences between sleep and wake groups on the fear ratings of 
“safe” movies on day three, with lower ratings following sleep deprivation. Sleep 
deprivation was also associated with a diminished skin conductance response (SCR) to 
incorrectly identified stimuli in all contexts. However, Van Der Helm et al. (2011) report 
decreased intense emotional ratings, and increased non-emotional ratings with sleep, 
with no such effects found in wakefulness. This result was associated with REM sleep. As 
such the evidence as to how sleep affects emotional reactivity is currently unclear, and 
further work is needed to clarify this issue, and the role of specific sleep stages and 
especially REM sleep. 
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Another approach has been to assess emotional ratings comparing old-new images, with 
early or late sleep periods. Wagner, Fischer, and Born (2002) found late, REM-rich sleep 
to enhance old-new valence ratings of images towards more negative ratings, compared 
to early sleep and wakefulness. The early sleep condition took place for three hours 
from around 23:00 to 02:00, and had significantly greater slow-wave sleep than late 
sleep. Late sleep took place from 03:00 to 06:00, with significantly greater REM sleep. 
An additional experiment found similar effects with a full night of sleep. Significant 
differences were found between these sleep conditions on the emotion ratings of 
images before and after sleep (i.e. emotional habituation/sensitization). Images were 
rated more positively after early sleep and more negatively after late sleep, with no 
such effects on arousal ratings (Wagner, Fischer and Born, 2002). 
 
Emotional ratings of old-new images have also been studied in conjunction with partial 
sleep deprivation. Emotional adaptation has been investigated via REM sleep deprivation 
(Lara-Carrasco et al., 2009). Lara-Carrasco et al. found REM sleep deprivation to be 
linked to greater emotional adaptation towards images, on subjective ratings of arousal. 
These results suggest that emotional adaptation/habituation is not benefited by REM 
sleep (Wagner, Fischer and Born, 2002; Lara-Carrasco et al., 2009). Partial sleep 
deprivation has also been investigated with other tasks. Rosales-Lagarde et al. (2012) 
report that REM sleep deprivation enhances brain reactivity to emotion, in a task 
whereby participants were asked to imagine themselves within an emotional scene 
shown on screen. These results indicate the need for further research to clarify the role 
of REM sleep in emotional reactivity. However, REM-sleep deprivation paradigms may 
produce results which are difficult to translate to everyday life. In this regard we prefer 
the early/late sleep deprivation paradigm of Wagner, Fischer and Born (2002). 
 
Nap paradigms have also been used to investigate emotional responding. Gujar et al. 
(2011) report a role of REM sleep in diminishing emotional reactivity following a nap, 
when subjects are asked to rate the emotional intensity of a face displaying varied 
emotional intensities, shown in emotion blocks (anger, fear, happy, sad). In this task, 
participants who did not nap showed increased reactivity to these emotional 
expressions, which was reversed by napping and in particular by REM sleep. Napping 
could also aid habituation towards emotional images when physiological reactivity is 
assessed (Pace-Schott et al., 2011). Pace-Schott et al. used negative and neutral 
images, and assessed responses towards repeated and novel image sets. These authors 
report evidence of habituation (skin conductance response) in the nap group to 
repeated stimuli, a result which was not found in the wake group. This was found for 
negative stimuli. There was also significant inter-session habituation in the wake group, 
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but not the nap group, on heart-rate deceleration and corrugator electromyogram 
(EMG) responses. EMG responses in the wake group were found to sensitize, and these 
results were found for both negative and neutral stimuli. In general, results suggest a 
role of REM sleep in emotional responding. However the precise role of REM sleep in 
emotional reactivity clearly warrants future attention. 
 
EFFECTS OF POOR SLEEP QUALITY & INSOMNIA 
 
In the following section, we describe those studies which have investigated the links of 
poor sleep quality and insomnia with socio-emotional functioning. All insomnia subjects 
were tested outside of the context of any treatment study. 
 
Neuroimaging studies 
 
Prather, Bogdan and Hariri (2013) used the Pittsburgh sleep quality index (PSQI; Buysse 
et al., 1989) to obtain a subjective evaluation of sleep quality, and investigated its links 
with brain activity. This was done via a matching task with emotion faces; a task 
previously found to engage the amygdala. They found that poor sleepers, defined on the 
basis of PSQI scores, showed significant relationships of amygdala activity with measures 
of psychopathology (depression, stress, and anxiety). These results were not found in 
normal sleepers. Such results add support to the relationships of sleep and mental 
health (Benca et al., 1992; Baglioni et al., 2011), and suggest that poor sleep quality 
affects the relationships of brain activity with indicators of psychological distress. 
Franzen, Siegle and Buysse (2008) have previously found sleep deprivation to alter the 
relationships between various subjective and objective measures of sleep and emotion, 
and the process by which emotional dysregulation occurs could be different in normal 
sleepers and poor sleepers. Interestingly, the precise task demands can affect how 
stimuli are processed. In particular, selecting emotion labels has been described as a 
cognitive task, with evidence of top-down effects on the emotional brain, whereas 
matching faces has been described as perceptual (Hariri, Bookheimer, and Mazziotta, 
2000; Lieberman et al., 2007). Such tasks could be useful in order to assess emotional 
regulation and sleep. 
 
Another type of paradigm is to investigate emotion regulation strategies by asking 
participants to regulate their reactions to emotional information. Minkel et al. (2012) 
asked subjects to view negative or neutral emotional images, and to either maintain 
attention, or to use cognitive reappraisal to reduce their emotional reaction. In a 
sample drawn from the general population, subjective sleep quality, as measured by the 
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PSQI, was not found to be associated with amygdala activation during emotion 
regulation. However, the use of sleep medication was associated with less activation in 
a medial prefrontal cortex area, with no effects of other PSQI subcomponents. Future 
studies might wish to employ this paradigm with normal sleepers and varying levels of 
sleep deprivation, in order to assess changes in the processes by which emotional 
regulation occurs.  
 
Baglioni et al. (2014) have also recently studied the effects of sleep-related and 
emotional stimuli on amygdala activity in insomnia disorder. These authors report that 
at the first presentation of stimuli, healthy controls show increased amygdala activation 
to negative stimuli compared to neutral stimuli with similar arousal levels. There were 
no such differences in insomnia disorder. When insomnia-relevant stimuli were shown, 
insomnia subjects showed increased amygdala activation to disorder-related stimuli 
compared to the non-insomnia stimuli. The opposite pattern was found in healthy 
controls. When neutral moderate, negative moderate and sleep-related negative stimuli 
were presented to healthy good sleepers, the amygdala activation levels were 
comparable between the first and second presentations. However, insomnia participants 
showed increased amygdala activation levels at the second presentation of neutral 
moderate images. These subjects also showed less amygdala activation at the second 
presentation of negative moderate and sleep-related stimuli. 
 
Physiological studies 
 
Emotional reactions have also been investigated in insomnia participants with multiple 
measures of emotion. Baglioni et al. (2010) presented subjects with positive sleep, 
negative sleep, positive, negative, and neutral images, and measured their responses 
using physiological measures (EMG, cardiac vagal tone and heart-rate) and behavioral 
ratings. These authors report evidence for emotional reactivity in a group of primary 
insomnia subjects. People with insomnia showed decreased tonic activity of the 
corrugator muscles in response to sleep-positive stimuli, unlike controls. There was also 
evidence of increased tonic activity of the zygomatic muscle to all stimuli in those with 
insomnia. Cardiac vagal tone was also increased to all stimuli in insomnia. The valence 
ratings of negative and negative sleep-related images in insomnia were not significantly 
different, unlike controls. Similar results were found with arousal ratings, and negative 
sleep-related stimuli were rated as more arousing than positive sleep-related stimuli, 
which was also unlike controls. 
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These results suggest that in insomnia there was less activation of the “frowning” 
muscles to positive sleep-related stimuli, and increased activation of the “smiling” 
muscles to all stimuli. Insomnia participants rated sleep-related negative stimuli and 
negative stimuli similarly on valence, and rated positive sleep-related stimuli as less 
arousing than negative sleep-related stimuli. All stimuli were linked to increased 
cardiac vagal tone in insomnia subjects. These results may be interpreted in terms of an 
increased negative emotional reaction to positive sleep-related emotional stimuli in 
normal sleepers, and similar arousal ratings of sleep positive and sleep negative stimuli. 
Normal sleepers also evidenced less positive emotional responses to all five emotional 
image categories. The valence ratings of negative and sleep-negative stimuli were 
significantly different in normal sleepers. Normal sleepers also responded with 
decreased cardiac vagal tone to all stimuli, unlike insomnia subjects. These results 
suggest systematic differences between normal sleepers and insomnia subjects across 
multiple levels of responsivity: subjective, cardiac, and EMG. 
 
A second study has also investigated emotional responses in insomnia, via physiological 
measures. Evidence of lowered subjective ratings of valence was found in response to 
emotional images in insomnia participants, who also showed evidence of impaired 
ability to regulate emotion (DelVentura et al., 2014). Specifically, participants were 
shown images of mutilation, erotica, or neutral images, and their emotional reactions 
were assessed via behavioral ratings and physiological measures. The relationships 
between pain ratings and a physiological measure of the pain response (nociceptive pain 
reflex, or NPR) were diminished in insomnia subjects. Insomnia appears to disrupt the 
relationships between physiological measures, subjective measures, and responses to 
stimuli. Future studies might wish to consider the point at which these relationships 
become dysregulated as insomnia disorder develops. 
 
Behavioral studies 
 
There is also recent evidence that insomnia affects the subjective ratings of emotional 
stimuli. Kyle et al. (2014), using emotional face stimuli, found evidence that the 
subjective intensity ratings of fear and sadness were blunted in insomnia subjects. The 
categorization judgments of angry, sad, happy, and fearful faces were unaffected. In 
this study emotional faces were presented in a random order, and displayed until 
response. Emotional intensity judgments were not found to correlate with sleep diary 
responses, measures of sleepiness, or daytime functioning. However, there were 
significant negative associations of intensity judgments with anxiety and depression 
scores in insomnia subjects. In these subjects anxiety correlated negatively with anger, 
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happiness and overall judgments. Overall intensity judgments and sadness ratings were 
negatively correlated in this group. In healthy controls, sadness ratings were linked to 
anxiety. As such the perception of emotion from faces appears to become linked to 
psychological distress, whereas normal sleepers fail to show such a pattern. This could 
be relevant to the results of Kyle, Espie and Morgan (2010), who found that insomnia 
subjects reported concerns regarding social interactions. 
 
SUMMARY 
 
Results from neuroimaging studies suggest that sleep loss affects the processing of 
emotion, with similar effects found with positive (Gujar et al., 2011) and negative (Yoo 
et al., 2007) stimuli. These results are suggestive of both increased reactivity, and 
altered connectivity. Sleep loss also seems to amplify anticipatory activity, towards all 
cues (Goldstein et al., 2013) or when expecting negative emotional stimuli (Franzen et 
al., 2009), and this discrepancy could depend on the measure of emotion 
(fMRI/pupillography) and/or task. Similar neural effects of sleep deprivation are 
reported by Chuah et al. (2010). These authors report that increased emotional 
distraction with sleep deprivation is linked to impaired prefrontal-amygdala 
connectivity. These results could be in keeping with behavioral evidence of impaired 
inhibition following sleep deprivation (Anderson and Platten, 2011). Furthermore, 
emotional images could be associated with greater subjective emotion and more 
sustained neural processing, suggesting sustained patterns of activity (Britton et al., 
2006). However, an important issue with these neuroimaging studies relates to the 
relative nature of the reported results. In particular, results are contrasted relative to 
another condition or resting state activity, and as such, the responses to the initial 
condition could result in the appearance of positive or negative results. However, 
results appear consistent with regard to effects of sleep deprivation on neural activity, 
across different types and durations of sleep loss. 
 
The effects of sleep loss on behavioral ratings are less consistent. With emotional 
images, Chuah et al. (2010) and Franzen et al. (2009) found no effects of sleep 
deprivation on emotional ratings, although effects have been reported by Tempesta et 
al. (2010) on neutral images. Yoo et al. (2007) and Gujar et al. (2011) also report 
evidence of effects on emotional ratings with sleep deprivation. The reasons for these 
discrepant results appear unclear, although possible explanations may be related to the 
images presented, features of their presentation, or the rating scale which was 
employed. Also relevant could be characteristics of the participant group. Working 
memory (Chuah et al., 2010) and trait anxiety (Goldstein et al., 2013) have both been 
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identified as factors which modify the effects of sleep loss on neural responses. Future 
studies should investigate the reasons for these different reactions to emotional images 
in greater depth. 
 
With emotional faces, Huck et al. (2008) reported no effects on basic emotion 
recognition, and Motomura et al. (2013) found no effects with button responses to 
target stimuli. However, Huck et al. (2008) reported effects of sleep loss on complex 
emotion recognition, and Van Der Helm, Gujar, and Walker (2010) found impairments in 
intensity ratings of subtle, mid-intensity ambiguous, emotional images. Pallesen et al. 
(2004) also reported lower accuracy and increased reaction times, in a matching task 
with schematic images. Using schematic images, Dushenko and Sterman (1984) also 
found impaired facial recognition performance. However, neither of these two studies 
or Huck et al. (2008) reported effects on specific emotions. Sleep loss seems to impair 
the processing of emotion from faces, and this effect seems most apparent with more 
complex tasks. Different cognitive processes could also be involved in these different 
tasks. Specifically, perceptual processes could be more involved in face matching, 
whereas cognitive processes could be more involved in emotional labeling, a task which 
has also been linked to emotional regulation processes (Hariri, Bookheimer, and 
Mazziotta, 2000; Lieberman et al., 2007). Emotional intensity ratings have also been 
studied less, and may follow on from categorization decisions (Utama et al., 2009). We 
suggest that future studies should focus on identifying sensitive and ecologically valid 
tasks of facial emotion recognition, taking account of the social implications of such 
tasks. 
 
Evidence of impaired performance on emotional face tasks appears consistent with 
studies of expressed emotion, and with self-reported decreases in emotional 
intelligence and interpersonal functioning following sleep deprivation (Franzen, Siegle 
and Buysse, 2008). Minkel et al. (2011) found that sleep deprived subjects were less 
facially expressive in response to emotional stimuli, and Schwarz et al. (2013) found 
evidence of slower facial responses with sleep loss. Similarly, McGlinchey et al. (2011) 
report that sleep deprived subjects were less vocally expressive, with similar results 
reported by Harrison and Horne, (1997). These results seem consistent with reports of 
impaired subjective emotional intelligence following sleep loss (Killgore et al., 2008). 
However, objective measures of emotional intelligence have been found not to be 
affected by sleep loss, despite significant effects on subjective emotional intelligence 
and neural reactivity (Killgore, 2013). As such, sleep loss seems to impair performance 
on tasks related to social functioning, on subjective measures, performance measures, 
and expressivity measures. Importantly, these tasks could also be tapping in to 
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emotional processes. The relationships of emotion generation with emotional regulation 
are disputed (Gross, Sheppes and Urry, 2011; Gross and Barrett, 2011), and expressivity 
could both be a consequence of emotion (Buck, 1994; Dimberg, 1990), and contribute 
towards emotional regulation (Dimberg, 1990; Izard, 1990). Separating these processes 
out appears particularly relevant for insomnia disorder, due to its links with emotion 
regulation (Harvey, 2002). 
 
With regard to insomnia, there is evidence of impaired emotional regulation 
(DelVentura et al., 2014), and increased emotional responsiveness (Baglioni et al., 
2010), when multiple physiological measures are assessed. With socially-relevant 
stimuli, however, insomnia subjects make lower ratings of intensity in faces (Kyle et al., 
2014), with comparable results with emotional images (Delventura et al., 2014). 
Evidence of altered brain activity has also been reported in conjunction with sleeping 
medication use and emotional regulation (Minkel et al., 2012). In poor sleepers, the 
relationships of amygdala activity with measures of psychopathology are also disrupted 
(Prather, Bogdan and Hariri, 2013), with similar results recently reported in insomnia 
disorder (Baglioni et al., 2014). Future studies should consider the trajectory of how 
emotional reactivity is altered across different phases of insomnia disorder (e.g. 
predisposing factors, acute, and chronic insomnia) and with different comorbidities. 
 
LIMITATIONS 
 
Task characteristics & demands 
 
The studies of Yoo et al. (2007) and Gujar et al. (2011) have displayed stimuli in an 
increasingly emotional gradient, based on normative data, and this may exaggerate the 
effects of sleep deprivation. In particular, such a presentation would be expected to 
prohibit any return to an emotional baseline (Landis, 1924), which could itself be 
negatively affected by sleep loss. This could lead to more extreme emotional states 
which are increasingly difficult to regulate (Green and Malhi, 2006), and makes it 
difficult to specify whether the processes involved in emotion generation or emotion 
regulation are contributing towards results.  
 
While the relationships between these processes are complex and debated (Gross and 
Barrett, 2011), it seems important to attempt to identify the stage(s) at which sleep 
deprivation affects emotions. Different task instructions could be used to assess this. 
Emotional labeling could engage cognitive processes, whereas a matching task may 
involve perceptual processes (Lieberman et al., 2007), and subjects have been asked to 
63 
 
modulate their emotional reactions via specific regulatory strategies (Minkel et al., 
2012). 
  
A further limitation may relate to the way in which facial stimuli are created. Ekman 
and Friesen (1976) have identified facial action units which are responsible for 
expressing an emotion, and physiological constraints are important to how expressions 
are formed and displayed in real life (Adolphs, 2002; Ekman and Friesen, 1969). 
Importantly, such faces could increase perceptual difficulty (Cote et al., 2014). Landis 
(1924) suggests the importance of distinguishing between emotional expressions and 
social expressions, and the social context in which testing took place could also be 
relevant to emotional expressivity (Schmidt, Cohn and Tian, 2003). 
 
Social effects 
 
The socio-communicative role of emotion is important, and this modulates the 
expression of emotional displays (Buck, 1994; Ekman and Friesen, 1969). Emotion 
perception involves stimulus appraisal, emotion regulation, and affective states (Phillips 
et al., 2003), and these brain systems overlap with those involved in face processing 
(Adolphs, 2002). The social relevance of tasks is therefore important to consider, and 
this seems especially important when expressivity is assessed, or when socially-relevant 
stimuli are used. Furthermore, the correspondence between self-reported mood and 
emotional task performance, and their associated neurological and physiological 
correlates, are likely complex. Indeed, the relationships between objective and 
subjective measures of emotion may be affected by sleep deprivation (Franzen, Siegle 
and Buysse, 2008), suggesting benefits of assessing subjects using multiple 
measurements, and the importance of the social context. 
 
In support of this, altered perception of facial emotions is reported in insomnia and with 
sleep deprivation (Van Der Helm, 2010; Kyle et al., 2014). Sleep loss is known to alter 
the stress system (Meerlo et al., 2008), and insomnia has been associated with 
hyperarousal (Bonnet and Arand, 2010; Riemann et al., 2014). As such, evidence of 
hypervigilance or improved performance may be anticipated, although expressed 
emotion is also reportedly “blunted” with sleep loss (Minkel et al., 2011; McGlinchey et 
al., 2011) and with evidence of slower facial movements (Schwartz et al., 2013). The 
relationships between emotion perception, emotional expressivity, and emotional 
experiences also seem to be important to investigate further. For example, Kyle et al. 
(2014) reported differences between normal sleepers and insomnia participants on the 
associations between emotional intensity ratings and psychological distress. This could 
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occur as a result of the chronic effects of sleep loss (Meerlo et al., 2008) or pre-existing 
differences in emotions between groups. 
 
FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 
Four avenues of future research seem most pertinent, related to 1) diverse measures of 
emotional functioning, 2) multi-faceted tests of social functioning, 3) role of sleep 
stages and circadian effects, and 4) inter-individual vulnerabilities of sleep and 
emotion. 
 
Diverse measures of emotional functioning 
 
Measured emotion 
 
Emotion is complex, and single measures may provide an incomplete picture of 
emotional functioning. Self-reported measures can be used to indicate subjective 
emotion; behavioral tasks can be used to assess objective performance; and 
physiological and neuro-imaging measures can provide information as to the neural, 
physiological and temporal mechanisms of emotional processing and experience (see 
Table 4.). The inter-relationships of these measures could also be complex, and this is 
affected by sleep loss (Franzen, Siegle and Buysse, 2008). Furthermore, emotional 
processing could itself comprise several components, and differences may emerge at 
different stages. Emotion seems to comprise several elements, such as reactivity to 
emotion, the duration of emotional impact, and tendency to express emotion (Landis, 
1924). To investigate these, experimental tasks could include manipulating the stimulus 
presentation time and inter-stimulus interval, as well as investigating the effects of 
feedback on performance and anticipatory effects, and subjective performance. The 
relationships between different types of measures also appear to be important to 
consider. 
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Table 3. Summary of relevant methods.  
 
Measures  Processes  
Questionnaires Subjective emotional experiences, 
emotional regulation and intelligence, 
meta-emotion and meta-cognition, 
subjective social functioning.  
Observed behavior Facial expressivity, generation of social 
cues, reactions to social cues, social 
interactions. 
Behavioral tasks  
 
Objective measures of task performance, 
with accuracy and reaction times 
indicators of underlying cognitive 
processes.  
Physiological responses  
 
EMG, ECG measures derived from heart-
rate, skin-conductance response, and 
measures of ANS/PNS activity. 
Neuro-imaging techniques  EEG and ERPs, fMRI, PET can be used to 
measure recruitment of brain areas and 
activity, and connectivity between them.  
Abbreviations: autonomic nervous system (ANS), electroencephalogram (EEG), 
electrocardiogram (ECG), electromyogram (EMG), event related potentials (ERPs), 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), peripheral nervous system (PNS), 
positron emission tomography (PET). 
 
Emotional context 
 
The emotional context of facial expressions also affects their processing (Righart and de 
Gelder, 2008; Aviezer et al., 2008) and there is evidence that state anxiety is associated 
with a greater use of contextual cues (Blanchette, Richards, and Cross, 2006). As such, 
the situational context could exert additional effects on emotional processing following 
sleep loss. Furthermore, mood is thought to become more independent of the situation 
with increasing illness severity (Beck, 1971), and sleep could contribute to this (Bryant 
et al., 2010). The contribution of context to emotion has been investigated in 
depression, and insomnia and depression are linked (Baglioni et al., 2011). Blysma, 
Morris and Rottenberg (2008) have performed a meta-analysis of emotional reactivity 
(emotional context insensitivity; ECI) in major depressive disorder, finding that 
depressed individuals show diminished responses to both positive and negatively 
valenced stimuli. This was discussed as insensitivity towards the emotional context 
within this disorder. Beck (1971) has previously discussed the correspondence between a 
situation and mood states relevant to psychological disorders, suggesting a greater role 
of internal cognitive processes with psychological disorders. The precise context of an 
experiment is also important to consider when investigating socio-emotional 
functioning, although this may become less relevant with specific patient groups such as 
major depressive disorder (Blysma, Morris and Rottenberg, 2008). 
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Multi-faceted tests of social functioning 
 
Social “building blocks” 
 
Social functioning is complex, and several processes contribute towards socially-
competent behavior (Iarocci, Yager and Elfers, 2007). Specifically, social interactions 
involve the comprehension of social cues, such as expressed behavior and speech, in 
conjunction with knowledge about a person and situation. Gaze (Ewbank, Fox and 
Calder, 2010; Bindemann, Burton and Langton, 2008), body cues (Aviezer, Trope, and 
Todorov, 2012), and voices (Yovel and Belin, 2013) are all relevant social signals. These 
different signals influence each other, and emotional faces showing direct gaze are 
processed less efficiently (Bindemann, Burton and Langton, 2008). The way in which this 
integration occurs can be affected by individual factors, such as anxiety (Ewbank, Fox 
and Calder, 2010). Social competence includes face recognition as well as emotion 
recognition (Iarocci, Yager and Elfers, 2007), and the changeable aspects of a face (such 
as movements) and its invariant aspects (e.g. identity) are both important to face 
perception (Haxby, Hoffman and Gobbini, 2000), and contribute towards the social 
context. 
 
Related to this, information about an individual‘s identity is thought to be somewhat 
independent of emotion (Calder and Young, 2005; Vuilleumier and Pourtois, 2007). 
Importantly, “neutral” faces are arguably not unemotional. In particular, unexpressive 
faces are judged on two dimensions, namely dominance, and trustworthiness or 
valence, and these are linked to trait judgments (Oosterhof and Todorov, 2008). 
Familiarity of faces also affects the perception of emotion (Dobel et al., 2008), and 
familiar and unfamiliar faces seem to be recognized qualitatively differently (Johnston 
and Edmonds, 2009). Such basic sensory/perceptual, cognitive, and emotional processes 
are thought to lead to the development of the higher-order capabilities which are 
involved in social functioning (Iarocci, Yager and Elfers, 2007) – for example, emotional 
contagion is a pre-requisite of empathy (Frith and Frith, 2012). As such, future research 
aimed at these “building blocks” could help to identify the point at which emotional 
impairments appear. 
 
Empathy & social interactions 
 
Importantly, emotional behavior can serve social motives (Buck, 1994), and reflect 
emotional states (Gerber et al., 2008). Such social motives may contribute towards the 
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additional processes that are involved in social competence, such as theory of mind 
(Iarocci, Yager and Elfers, 2007), which has also been called cognitive empathy (Davis, 
1980). Theory of mind, or “mentalizing”, is a form of meta-cognition (Frith and Frith, 
2008), and is thought to be an explicit process (Amodio and Frith, 2006; Zaki and 
Ochsner, 2012) which engages the neural systems involved in self-projection (Singer, 
2012). Implicit processes which are involved in social cognition include prejudice and 
perspective taking (i.e. tracking the mental states of others). Such processes are 
relevant to social emotions, like compassion and embarrassment, and social decision 
making, which includes fairness, trust, and Schadenfreude (Singer, 2012). Indeed, 
performance on social decision-making tasks has been found to be affected by sleep 
deprivation (Anderson and Dickinson, 2012; Libedinsky et al., 2011; Killgore et al., 
2007). 
 
Context also contributes towards social behavior, and adaptive socially competent 
behavior is the result of the match between genotype and the environment (Iaroci, 
Yager and Elfers, 2007). The social environment might mitigate the effects of sleep loss. 
Trait factors such as extraversion-introversion, in interaction with the social context, 
have been linked to altered performance following sleep deprivation (Rupp, Killgore and 
Balkin, 2010). It is also important to consider the effect of sleep loss on dynamic social 
exchanges. For example, people who have been sleep deprived are judged to look less 
healthy and attractive (Axelsson et al., 2010), and such trait judgments correlate with 
perceived trustworthiness (Todorov, 2008). As such, sleep loss could affect the sleep-
deprived person‘s ability to interpret social information. It could also affect the 
perceptions made of the sleep deprived person, and behavior towards them. Such 
factors may be important in the development of insomnia disorder. 
  
Sleep stages & circadian effects 
  
Sleep stages 
  
The role of specific sleep stages, especially REM sleep, in emotional reactivity is of 
particular interest, and this sleep stage has been implicated in psychiatric disorders 
(Vanderkerckhove and Cluydts, 2010; Walker, 2009), such as depression 
(Vanderkerckhove and Cluydts, 2010; Walker and Van Der Helm, 2009). The “sleep to 
remember, sleep to forget” hypothesis posits that with sleep an emotional memory is 
strengthened while its associated emotional effects are weakened, and REM sleep is 
crucial to this (Walker and Van Der Helm, 2009). This process is thought to ameliorate 
any hyperarousal, and its disruption may contribute towards depression and post-
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traumatic stress disorder (Walker and Van Der Helm, 2009). However, studies on how 
sleep relates to emotionality appear contradictory. Discrepancies in methods relating to 
sleep (early/late sleep restriction, REM sleep deprivation and restriction, nap 
paradigms), emotion (e.g. adaptation, old/new contrasts), and measurements (valence 
and arousal ratings, experimental tasks, neuroimaging, physiological) likely contribute 
towards these effects. Studies with combined methods and measures would help to 
clarify the role of REM sleep in emotional reactivity, as would studies investigating 
changes in emotionality over time, as well as the role of the different sleep phases. 
 
Circadian effects 
 
Few studies have investigated the role of circadian processes on emotional tasks. While 
sleep loss and sleep disruption have been found to affect emotion perception, the 
circadian system could also exert effects. Five studies, to our knowledge, have looked 
at how the circadian system affects emotionality in healthy subjects using objective 
measures of emotion. Circadian effects have been investigated via measures of diurnal 
preference, with Paradee et al. (2008) reporting a significant effect of chronotype-
congruent test times in overall emotion recognition performance among a group of 
rehabilitation patients. Other researchers have investigated the role of light in emotion 
perception, and blue light, which plays an important role in the circadian system, has 
been found to affect how emotional information is processed (Vandewalle et al., 2010). 
  
In another approach, emotionality has been assessed at different times of day. Hot, 
Leconte and Sequeira (2005), presented subjects with images of neutral scenes and high 
arousal negatively-valenced scenes, and recorded the skin conductance response. In a 
within-subjects design with seven different test times, at 2-hour intervals between 
09:00 and 21:30, they found a time of day effect on the skin conductance response to 
aversive images. Specifically, they found a significant linear trend to unpleasant images, 
and a significant quadratic trend to neutral images, across the day. Hasler et al. (2008) 
have also investigated how emotional behavior varies across the day via the sampling of 
ambient noise. These authors report a significant diurnal effect on behaviors associated 
with positive affect, namely socializing, laughing, and singing. No such effects were 
found with arguing or sighing, suggesting that behaviors linked to negative emotion 
show no diurnal patterns. Similarly, Golder and Macy (2011) found effects of time of 
day, day of the week, and season in the affective content of twitter messages. These 
studies suggest the importance of controlling for time of day when investigating the role 
of sleep in socio-emotional interactions. 
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Inter-individual vulnerability in sleep & emotion 
 
Sleep loss & emotion 
 
Individuals vary in their response to sleep loss, and in how different types of measures 
are affected (Leproult et al., 2003). These factors could be somewhat dissociable 
(Leproult et al., 2003), suggesting that perceived impairments may not correlate with 
objective performance deficits, and the rate of sleep loss could also affect this (Drake 
et al., 2001). The dose-response effects of sleep loss are also important to consider, 
and the effects of different kinds and durations of sleep loss. Individual differences in 
vulnerability to sleep loss seem important to investigate in conjunction with socio-
emotional tasks, as this could contribute towards the effects of sleep loss on 
functioning. Baseline cognitive abilities, such as working memory, could also mediate 
the effects of sleep loss (Chuah et al., 2010). In addition, individuals also vary in 
aspects of emotion (Ekmna, 1992; Landis, 1924), and social behavior is similarly 
complex (Iarocci, Yager and Elfers, 2007). In particular, trait anxiety has been reported 
to magnify the emotion effects of sleep disruption (Goldstein et al., 2013). As individual 
differences related to the effects of sleep loss interact with tasks to affect 
performance, a detailed understanding of these relationships would be useful in order 
to predict the effects of sleep loss. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
Sleep loss affects socio-emotional functioning in several ways. Emotional reactivity to 
emotional stimuli appears to be enhanced with sleep deprivation, with results most 
obvious in neuro-imaging studies. Tasks of behavioural inhibition are also sensitive to 
sleep deprivation. Sleep loss impairs social functioning, with results most apparent in 
measures of subjective emotional intelligence, and with some tasks of emotional face 
recognition. Emotional expressivity also seems to be impaired with sleep loss, and this 
has clear implications for social functioning. In general, the relationships between 
sleep, emotion, and social functioning are complex, and the specific outcome measures 
(e.g. subjective/objective, behavioral, physiological, brain) could also affect reported 
results. Future studies should include multiple measures of emotion, and consider the 
inter-relationships between tasks, stimuli and measures. Consideration of the social 
context, and individual differences in emotion, social functioning, and sleep are also 
important. In addition, the role of (recovery) sleep, sleep stages, and circadian 
processes require clarification. As sleep affects socio-emotional functioning, and is 
associated with psychopathology, understanding the links of socio-emotional functioning 
and task performance with sleep is an important avenue of future research. 
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Figure 2. Key practice points from the systematic review 
 
Practice points  
 Sleep deprivation increases emotional reactivity, which is most apparent with 
fMRI results.  
 Sleep deprivation impairs social functioning, measured by emotional expressivity 
parameters, and behavioral performance with emotional faces.  
 Sleep-related daytime functioning, emotion, and social interactions are 
interlinked.  
 Emotional tasks comprise different component processes, and multiple measures 
of performance are optimal.  
 The social context of emotion tasks is as important as the emotional context.  
 
 
Figure 3. Research agenda from the systematic review 
 
Research agenda  
 Include multiple measures of emotional responding, across domains.  
 Consider the effects of the social context of experimental studies.  
 Compare results of tasks measuring different components of socio-emotional 
functioning.  
 Clarify the role of sleep stages, especially REM sleep, in emotional 
phenomenology.  
 Investigate the effects of the circadian system in socio-emotional functioning. 
 Assess the role of individual differences in sleep, emotion, and social 
functioning, in task performance. 
 
 
The following chapters in this thesis address the role of sleep in socio-emotional task 
performance. This was done by looking at the sleep of normal sleepers, poor sleepers, 
and people with insomnia. Emotional faces were chosen as stimuli and task performance 
was assessed via behavioural measures of accuracy and reaction times. As a result of 
this review it was hypothesised that socio-emotional task performance would be 
impaired in poor sleepers and people with insomnia disorder. We also assessed how 
emotion recognition performance changes across the day in normal sleepers, in order to 
investigate variability within a healthy sample. The final experimental chapter in this 
thesis extended these results to theory of mind tasks.  
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Chapter Three 
 
Sleep disruption, emotion perception, and empathy: An exploratory study  
 
Abstract 
 
Sleep disruption is common in the general population, and especially in students. In 
general, sleep disruption and insomnia are associated with adverse daytime effects on 
social interactions and mood. The purpose of the current study was to assess the effects 
of PSQI-derived sleep groups on sleep and mood, emotion perception, and empathy in a 
student population. These results were then used to inform subsequent studies within 
this thesis. In total 56 healthy subjects completed measures of sleep, mood, and 
empathy, as well as an emotion recognition task. Sleep data were gathered on a 
continuum basis, and sleep groups were formed on the basis of questionnaire cut-offs. 
There were significant effects of sleep group, and significant differences were found 
with regards to mood and sleep diary measures of sleep disruption. Results suggest that 
the previous night’s sleep was significant predictor of happiness recognition, in both 
accuracy and reaction time measures. Depression scores also contributed towards 
happiness recognition. There were no significant effects of sleep group or predictor 
variables in measures of empathy. As a consequence of this study, future studies 
employed more sensitive measures of emotion face recognition, and targeted 
recruitment towards normal sleepers and people with insomnia. 
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Sleep disruption, emotion perception, and empathy: An exploratory study 
 
Introduction 
 
Sleep disruption is common in the general population, with around 30% of people 
displaying insomnia symptoms in a year (LeBlanc et al., 2009). When insomnia is defined 
more stringently, around 7% meet criteria for insomnia (LeBlanc et al., 2009). Sleep 
disruption is also high among students, 32% of whom are unable to fall asleep within 30 
minutes at least once a week, and this is most commonly attributed to stress (35%) or 
ambient noise (33%; Lund et al., 2010). In practice, the Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index 
(PSQI; Buysse et al., 1989) and the Insomnia Severity Index (ISI; Bastien, Vallieres, and 
Morin, 2001) are commonly used measures to assess sleep quality, and define sleep 
groups (e.g. Jones et al., 2005; Ree, Pollitt, and Harvey, 2006). When the PSQI is used 
among a student population, 34% score within the normal range, with a majority of 
students experiencing poor sleep (Lund et al., 2010). Sleep diaries provide information 
about the daily timing of sleep, as well as measures of sleep continuity (e.g. wake after 
sleep onset) and its qualitative experience, and are regarded as the “gold-standard” in 
measuring subjective sleep experience (Carney et al., 2012). Sleep diary measures of 
sleep onset latency and sleep duration correlate highly with PSQI derived estimates 
(Backhaus et al., 2002). Sleep quality, assessed by the PSQI, and chronotype, assessed 
by the moringness-eveningness questionnaire (MEQ), have been found to be linked 
(Barclay et al., 2010). 
 
Sleep disruption is also linked to negative mood states (Baglioni et al., 2010; Lund et 
al., 2010), and people with insomnia have identified social interactions as an area of 
impaired functioning (Kyle, Espie, and Morgan, 2010). Emotion face perception involves 
emotional brain areas (Phillips et al., 2003), and the recognition of emotional faces has 
been studied with regard to psychiatric disorders (Phillips et al., 2003; Gilboa-
Schechtman, Erhard-Weiss, and Jeczmien, 2002; Joormann and Gotlib, 2006; LeMoult et 
al., 2009; Langenecker et al., 2005; Beevers et al., 2009; Surguladze et al., 2004). 
Furthermore, emotional faces are recognized with a high degree of accuracy, and 
curtailing stimuli presentation times may be a way of increasing task sensitivity (c.f. 
Calvo and Lundqvist, 2008). 
 
Due to the novelty of research investigating the links between sleep and emotion, this 
exploratory study was conducted in order to investigate the sensitivity of measures and 
tasks within the student population. In the current study, participants completed 
measures of sleep, mood, and empathy, and a task of emotion perception. The aims of 
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the current study were to assess the links between sleep assessments and their effects 
on emotion recognition performance, in order to inform subsequent studies in this 
thesis. We also aimed to assess the effects of sleep groups on emotion perception and 
empathy. Participants in the current study were predominately recruited from the 
student population, where experiences of sleep disruption are common (Lund et al., 
2010). These subjects completed the questionnaire measures and emotion task and 
where assigned to sleep groups retrospectively, with measures gathered on a continuum 
basis. This allowed for the testing of exploratory regression models with regard to 
emotion recognition performance and empathy. Furthermore, these results could be 
used to inform future studies. 
 
Methods 
 
Participants 
 
In total 56 participants were recruited from around campus at the University of 
Glasgow, and took part in exchange for course credit or £6. These participants were 
recruited via convenience sampling of student forums and snowball techniques. This 
study was in accordance with the University of Glasgow, School of Psychology Ethics 
Committee, and all subjects provided written consent. Subjects ranged in age from 16 
to 61, with a mean age of 22.12 (SD = 8.07). There were 35 females and 21 males, and 
no subjects were currently receiving treatment for a psychiatric disorder or mental 
condition. 
 
Measures 
 
 Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index (PSQI; Buysse et al., 1989). 
 Insomnia Severity Index (ISI; Bastien et al., 2001). 
 Morningness-Eveningness Questionnaire (MEQ; Horne and Ostberg, 1976). 
 Sleep diaries for the previous nights’ sleep (Morin and Espie, 2004).  
 The Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS; Zigmond and Snaith, 1983). 
 Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980).  
 
Further information as to these measures can be found in Appendix 1.  
 
Stimuli 
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Four male and four female identities were selected from the Ekman and Friesen (1976) 
stimuli set, and their corresponding emotion displays (anger, fear, happy, surprise, 
disgust, and sad) were selected, creating 144 trials. These greyscale faces were 
presented at average dimensions of 6.43 x 9.04 cm. 
 
Figure 4. Example facial stimuli 
 
 
Procedure 
 
To familiarize participants with the task response keys, participants initially completed 
practice trials. In these trials 6 emotion words (sad, happy, fear, disgust, surprise, and 
anger) were presented for 50 ms and followed by a blank black screen. Words were 
presented following a fixation cross lasting 750 ms, and each was repeated 5 times in 
total. Participants were asked to respond as quickly and accurately as possible. If an 
incorrect response was made, participants were asked to respond with the correct key 
to continue. The following keys were used: ‘s’ (sad), ‘d’ (happy), ‘f’ (fear), ‘j’ (disgust), 
‘k’ (surprise), and ‘l’ (anger), and were labelled with ‘Sa’, ‘H’, ‘F’, ‘D’, ‘Su’ and ‘A’. 
Words were presented as black text within a white box, at a max height of 0.5 cm. 
 
Following these practice trials, participants completed the emotion task. Emotion faces 
were presented for 50 ms  on a black background followed by a blank screen, and 
75 
 
preceded by a fixation cross of 750 ms. Participants were told to identify the emotion 
shown as sad, happy, fear, disgust, surprise, and anger, by using the labelled keys, and 
were instructed to respond as quickly and accurately as possible. The presentation of 
the face set was randomized, and repeated three times, with two breaks in total. Faces 
were presented at a viewing distance of approximately 60 cm on a Dell laptop, and the 
experiment was created within the SuperLab 4.0 program. Data in this pilot study were 
analyzed using Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), as in practice this is a robust test, and 
violations have relatively minor effects (Howell, 2002). Effect sizes may be found in 
Appendix 2. 
 
Results 
 
Identification of insomnia 
 
In a first step, PSQI scores were used to create two sleep groups, with 35 normal 
sleepers vs. 21 poor sleepers. Sleep groups were found to differ significantly in ISI 
scores (T (54) = - 6.52, p < 0.001), with normal sleepers scoring significantly lower. 
Groups also differed significantly in general distress (HADS-A, t = - 3.50, p = 0.001; 
HADS-D, t = - 3.52, p = 0.001). However, there were no significant group differences in 
diurnal preference (t (54) = 0.80, p = 0.43). 
 
The Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index and the Insomnia Severity Index were then 
correlated, and these measures were significantly highly correlated (rho = 0.71, p < 
0.001). Both measures also correlated significant with anxiety (ISI, rho = 0.44, p = 
0.001; PSQI, rho = 0.41, p = 0.002) and depression (ISI, rho = 0.44, p = 0.001; PSQI, rho 
= 0.34, p < 0.01). Neither sleep measure correlated with diurnal preference (ISI, rho = - 
0.07, p = 0.62; PSQI, rho = - 0.17, p = 0.20). 
 
Table 4. Sleep diary results 
 Percentile 
05 
Percentile 
25 Median 
Percentile 
75 
Percentile 
95 Mean Std Dev 
SOL (mins) .00 5.00 10.00 20.00 75.00 20.66 31.34 
WASO (mins) .00 .00 .00 9.50 45.00 6.73 13.76 
WAKE (#) .00 .00 .00 1.00 4.00 1.44 5.36 
TST (hours) 4.00 5.54 6.63 7.63 9.00 6.63 1.40 
TIB (hours) 5.25 6.79 7.50 8.35 9.75 7.57 1.28 
SE (%) 52.63 85.27 94.65 97.74 100.30 89.08 14.42 
REST (0-4) 1.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 2.23 .87 
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Abbreviations: sleep onset latency (SOL), wake time after sleep onset (WASO), number 
of night-time awakenings (WAKE), total sleep time (TST), time in bed (TIB), sleep 
efficiency (SE), restful/restorativeness (REST), quality (QUAL). 
 
Sleep before testing was assessed via a sleep diary, and this information was then used 
to corroborate the results above. In general, subjects slept well prior to testing, with a 
majority experiencing few indicators of sleep disruption (SOL, WASO, WAKE, SE). 
Subjects also tended to report normal sleep duration (TST), with a normal time in bed 
(TiB). The subjective sleep experience of subjects also tended to be good (QUAL, REST). 
 
Sleep diary measures were then compared on PSQI scores; there were significant group 
differences in SOL (t (54) = - 2.01, p = 0.05), TST (t (54) = 2.40, p = 0.02), SE (t (54) = 
3.54, p = 0.001), REST (t (54) = 3.84, p < 0.001) and QUALITY (t (54) = 2.67, p = 0.01). 
For all measures results were in the expected directions. 
 
Table 5. Sleep diary results by sleep group 
 
PSQI 
< 7  > 6  
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
SOL 14.33 16.42 31.21 45.34 
WASO 4.77 12.08 10.00 15.94 
WAKE .51 .85 2.98 8.59 
TST 6.97 1.28 6.08 1.44 
TIB 7.43 1.19 7.80 1.40 
SE 93.88 8.18 81.08 18.72 
REST 2.54 .78 1.71 .78 
QUAL 2.54 .89 1.90 .83 
Abbreviations: sleep onset latency (SOL), wake time after sleep onset (WASO), number 
of night-time awakenings (WAKE), total sleep time (TST), time in bed (TIB), sleep 
efficiency (SE), restful/restorativeness (REST), quality (QUAL). 
 
We then compared the inter-relationships between these different test-day sleep diary 
measures. Of the measures of sleep continuity, WASO and WAKE were significantly 
correlated (rho = 0.94, p < 0.001), and these measures correlated with subjective sleep 
experience. There were significant correlations between SOL and QUALITY (rho = - 0.27, 
p = 0.05), WASO and REST (rho = - 0.38, p = 0.004), WAKE and REST (rho = - 0.34, p = 
0.01), and SE and REST (rho = 0.41, p = 0.002) and SE and QUALITY (rho = 0.41, p = 
QUAL (0-4) 1.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 2.30 .91 
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0.002). TST also correlated significantly with TiB (rho = 0.55, p < 0.001), SE (rho = 0.57, 
p < 0.001), and QUALITY (rho = 0.39, p = 0.003). 
 
Emotion Perception 
 
We then assessed emotion perception (accuracy and reaction times) for each of the 
sleep groups, in four independent repeated measure ANOVAs. When PSQI groups were 
compared on accuracy, there was a main effect of emotion (F (3.95, 213.42) = 37.08, p 
< 0.001), but no significant effects with emotion and group (F (3.95, 213.42) = 0.15, p = 
0.96), or group (F (1, 54) = 0.51, p = 0.48). For reaction times, there was a main effect 
of emotion (F (3.38, 178.85) = 25.29, p < 0.001), but no effects of emotion by group (F 
(3.38, 178.85) = 0.68, p = 0.64), or group (F (1, 53) = 2.12, p = 0.15). As results were not 
significant the issue of multiple comparisons was not relevant. 
 
In order to assess whether sleep and mood would predict emotion recognition, the 
predictor variables of HADS-D, HADS-A, MEQ, ISI and PSQI scores were entered alongside 
whether subjects were currently experiencing sleep disruption, and measures of the 
previous night’s sleep – total sleep time, time in bed, sleep efficiency, sleep onset 
latency, wake time after sleep onset, number of night-time awakenings, and the 
subjective measures of sleep quality and restorativeness. These variables were used 
against measures of accuracy and reaction times for each of the six emotions, i.e. 
anger, fear, happiness, surprise, disgust and sadness in exploratory regression models. 
Significant models (p < 0.05) were followed up via individual predictor variables. 
 
The resultant models were not significant for the accuracy of recognition towards angry 
faces (F (14, 41) = 0.59, p = 0.86), fearful faces (F (14, 41) = 0.93, p = 0.54), sad faces 
(F (14, 41) = 1.73, p = 0.09), disgusted faces (F (14, 41) = 0.70, p = 0.76), or surprised 
faces (F (14, 41) = 1.04, p = 0.43), although the model was significant for happy faces (F 
(14, 41) = 3.02, p < 0.005). Significant individual predictors were the number of 
awakenings the previous night (B = - 0.24, S.E. = 0.06, p = 0.001), depression (B = - 
0.38, S.E. = 0.13, p = 0.007), and the previous night’s sleep quality (B = 1.26, S.E. = 
0.52, p = 0.02). 
 
Similar results were found for reaction times. The models were not significant for anger 
(F (14, 41) = 1.01, p = 0.46), fear (F (14, 41) = 0.72, p = 0.75), sadness (F (14, 41) = 
1.09, p = 0.39), disgust (F (14, 41) = 1.12, p = 0.38), or surprise (F (14, 41) = 0.61, p = 
0.84), although the model was significant for happiness (F (14, 41) = 1.95, p = 0.05). 
Significant individual predictors were the previous night’s total sleep time (B = 174.91, 
S.E. = 69.21, p = 0.02), quality (B = - 97.80, S.E. = 41.51, p = 0.02), wake time after 
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sleep onset (B = 5.26, S.E. = 2.40, p = 0.03), time in bed (B = - 139.74, S.E. = 64.24, p = 
0.04), and sleep efficiency (B = - 12.21, S.E. = 5.70, p = 0.04). 
 
Empathy 
 
We next compared the four empathy subscales for sleep groups in repeated-measures 
ANOVAs. For PSQI groups, there was a main effect of empathy (F (2.53, 136.57) = 28.06, 
p < 0.001), but no interaction (F (2.53, 136.57) = 1.11, p = 0.34) or main effect of group 
(F (1, 54) = 0.07, p = 0.80). Exploratory regression models were also created for the four 
subscales of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index using the same predictor variables as 
above. The overall models were not significant for perspective taking (F (14, 41) = 1.11, 
p = 0.38), fantasy scale (F (14, 41) = 1.14, p = 0.35), empathy component (F (14, 41) = 
0.46, p = 0.94), or personal distress (F (14, 41) = 1.22, p = 0.30). 
 
Discussion 
 
Results suggest that sleep groups created on the basis of PSQI scores show the expected 
differences in ISI and HADS scores. Poor sleepers have higher ISI, HADS-A and HADS-D 
scores, but there were no significant differences in morningness-eveningness 
preference. PSQI scores also correlate with ISI scores, and both measures correlate with 
anxiety and depression scores, but not with a measure of diurnal preference. Sleep 
groups also showed the expected differences in SOL, TST, SE, REST and QUALITY scores. 
Furthermore, there were significant correlations with TST and TiB, SE and QUALITY. SOL 
and QUALITY were correlated, as were WASO and REST, WAKE and REST, and SE and 
REST. There were no significant effects of sleep group on emotion recognition 
performance, on either accuracy or reaction times. When exploratory regression models 
were created using these predictor variables, the models were significant for the 
accuracy and reaction times towards happy faces. For accuracy, significant predictors 
were depression, and the previous night’s QUALITY and WAKE. For reaction times, 
significant predictors were the previous night’s TST, QUALITY, WASO, TiB and SE. There 
were no significant effects with the components of empathy. 
 
Three main conclusions were drawn from the current study. Firstly, there were few 
significant effects of sleep group on the face task, even though this task was 
intentionally made more difficult by a restricted viewing time. As a consequence, future 
studies will make use of dynamic face stimuli in order to increase task difficulty. Moving 
stimuli which are based on physiological Action Units provide an ecologically valid 
means of assessing emotion perception while simultaneously varying the displayed 
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intensity (Adolphs, 2002; Ekman, Friesen, and Tomkins, 1971; Ekman and Friesen, 
1976). Such an approach is also in keeping with the psychopathology literature. 
 
It also appears noteworthy that although sleep groups were not associated with 
significant effects on emotion perception, regression models identified effects of sleep 
on happiness. With regards to the accuracy of happiness recognition, depression, sleep 
quality, and the number of night-time awakenings were significant predictors. This is 
perhaps surprising as previous results have shown that happy faces are recognized with 
high accuracy (Calvo and Lundqvist, 2008). With regards to reaction times, significant 
results were found with happiness for total sleep time, sleep quality, wake-time after 
sleep onset, time in bed, and sleep efficiency. These results may be interpreted within 
the context of anhedonia, and overlap of depression and insomnia (Staner, 2010). There 
is evidence that depression is linked to a response bias towards sadness, with some 
evidence that sad and happy faces are recognized more poorly (Bourke, Douglas, and 
Porter, 2010). However, the recognition of positive emotion has not been found to be 
affected by psychological distress within a healthy population (Csukly et al., 2008). 
Furthermore, sleep deprivation has been associated with impaired intensity ratings of 
angry and happy faces in the mid-intensity range (Van Der Helm et al., 2010). 
 
Secondly, the correspondence of different sleep measures was considered. In particular, 
the PSQI and ISI are highly correlated, although some participants (29%) classification 
would be altered if a solitary measure was used. Indeed, this is the method employed 
by LeBlanc et al. (2009). In this study, ‘insomnia syndrome’ was a combination of ICD-10 
and DSM-IV-TR criteria. Participants with insomnia syndrome were identified as those 
who were dissatisfied with their sleep and reported distress on the ISI. The PSQI was 
used to assess the presence of sleep disruption, and participants were also included 
within the insomnia syndrome group if they reported the use of sleep medication. 
Furthermore, Edinger et al. (2004) define insomnia disorder as reported sleep disruption 
with associated daytime effects, which occur despite adequate sleep opportunity.  
 
Specifically, results suggest that in the current study, sleep groups evidenced the 
expected effects in measures of distress (i.e. anxiety and depression), and on test-day 
sleep diary measures of sleep disruption. Furthermore, sleep group mean scores suggest 
that restricted time in bed was not a cause of significant sleep disruption. In the current 
sample there were a low number of participants who reported clinically significant 
levels of insomnia severity as defined by the ISI. This could reflect flexibility within the 
student lifestyle, which may result in sleep disruption being accommodated by 
flexibility of sleep timing, thus mitigating the effects of poor sleep. Alternatively, these 
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insomnia participants may be experiencing transient insomnia, and have a preserved 
sleep system which is able to accommodate stress (Espie, 2002). Indeed, normal 
sleepers are known to experience transient sleep disruption (Espie, 2002; Espie et al., 
2012). Furthermore, the sleep of people with insomnia has been found to show night-to-
night variability (Sanchez-Ortuno et al., 2011; Vallieres et al., 2011; Vallieres et al., 
2005), and future studies may wish to consider this in order to understand the 
development of chronic insomnia. 
 
Thirdly, results suggest that assessing subjective empathy is of limited value within the 
current population, as no significant effects of sleep or mood were found on either of 
the two measures of cognitive empathy or affective empathy. Using another measure of 
subjective empathy, Killgore et al. (2007) report significant effects of sleep deprivation 
on three subscales, i.e. intrapersonal functioning, interpersonal functioning, and stress 
management. The failure to find significant associations of sleep and mood in the 
current study may indicate that the sleep disruption of the current subjects was either 
not chronic enough, or that they had not experienced sufficient levels of sleep loss. 
However, concern with social interactions has been reported in patients with insomnia 
(Kyle, Espie, and Morgan, 2010). In particular, insomnia is perceived to be isolating, 
with a lack of understanding by others, and this has been attributed to fatigue. The 
failure to find effects on empathy may also relate to the relatively low levels of 
insomnia severity within this sample. 
 
A limitation of the current study was that the subjects were assigned to sleep groups 
retrospectively on the basis of questionnaire responses. The higher PSQI score was 
chosen due to increased sensitivity for insomnia disorder (Buysse et al., 1989; Backhaus 
et al., 2002). However, it should be noted that levels of sleep disruption among the 
normal sleepers group was relatively high. Furthermore, a majority of participants were 
students, and sleep disruption is common in this population (Lund et al., 2010). As such, 
results may be somewhat different with a sample of subjects with insomnia disorder. 
However, results from the current study suggests that indicators of sleep disruption the 
previous night, and depression scores, affect the recognition of happiness from faces. 
These results would be expected to be more pronounced in samples with stricter 
inclusion criteria. An additional limitation may relate to sample size, and the possibility 
that the srudy was under-powered. However, the sample size was consistent with 
existing experimental work in this area, and it appears more plausible that the 
anticipated effects are subtle. 
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In summary, results suggest that the formation of sleep groups would be improved by 
the intentional recruitment of insomnia and normal sleeper subjects. In particular, this 
is anticipated to increase the levels of insomnia severity which are reported by poor 
sleeper groups. However, the identification of sleep measures affecting the recognition 
of happiness, on both reaction time and accuracy measures suggests that sleep affects 
emotion perception. Emotion is known to play a key role in insomnia (e.g. Riemann et 
al., 2010; Bonnet and Arand, 2010; Espie, 2002; Harvey, 2002), and this result is 
supported by patient experiences of daytime impairments, and the overlap of emotion 
perception with emotional brain areas. The ability of future studies to identify effects 
of sleep on emotion perception will also be improved by the use of 4D stimuli, which are 
expected to be an ecologically valid means of increasing task difficulty and therefore 
increasing the sensitivity towards emotional dysregulation and sleep disruption. As a 
result of this study we decided to investigate the effects of sleep on emotion 
recognition in greater depth, and the current study informed the subsequent one in 
several ways. The subsequent study recruited people with insomnia disorder, rather 
than investigating the effects of poor sleep calculated from PSQI scores. We also 
employed a more sensitive task of emotion recognition, and this task displayed emotions 
dynamically, over three levels of emotional intensity. Dependent variables were 
therefore emotion recognition accuracy (labels and intensity), as well as reaction times. 
In this study we anticipated effects on happiness recognition, based on the current 
results. 
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Chapter Four 
 
Does insomnia disorder affect the recognition of emotion? 
 
Abstract 
 
Daytime impairments in functioning are a feature of insomnia disorder, and this is 
reflected in both diagnostic criteria and subjective reports. Social functioning is an 
important part of daytime functioning, and people with insomnia report that this is a 
pertinent area of concern for them. One way in which social functioning can be assessed 
is via the perception of emotion in faces. However how insomnia affects emotion 
recognition has only recently been investigated, and the current study extends this 
literature by the use of dynamic stimuli, at three levels of intensity. Normal sleepers 
and participants reporting insomnia completed the emotion recognition task with angry, 
fearful, sad, happy, surprised and disgusted faces, and were required to categorize the 
emotion shown and rate its intensity. Participants were found to show impairments in 
emotion categorization towards high-intensity expressions of sadness and low intensity 
expressions of surprise. There were no significant effects of sleep group on emotional 
intensity ratings or reaction times. Regression analyses also found significant effects of 
sleep and mood on happiness recognition. Results indicate that insomnia affects 
emotion recognition, suggesting that the social functioning complaints in insomnia 
patients are supported by objectively measured performance impairments. 
 
  
83 
 
Does insomnia disorder affect the recognition of emotion? 
 
Introduction 
 
Insomnia is a disorder which significantly affects an individual’s daily life, including 
functioning and performance at work (Kucharczyk, Morgan, and Hall, 2012), and 
ultimately impacts upon society as a whole (Kucharczyk, Morgan, and Hall, 2012; Léger 
and Bayon, 2010). For example, 14.5% of all costly workplace accidents are associated 
with insomnia (Shahly et al., 2012), and annual losses to the US labour force equal to 
367 million days and 91.7 billion dollars (Kessler et al., 2011). Such daytime functioning 
impairments are a criterion for the diagnosis of insomnia, and can include impairments 
in social interactions (Edinger et al., 2004), which have been identified by insomnia 
patients as an area of concern (Kyle, Espie, and Morgan, 2010). Furthermore, people 
with insomnia are reported to be more self-focused, and less engaged, than good 
sleepers (Marchini et al., 1983). However, to date the socio-emotional effects of 
insomnia disorder have been largely based on self-reports. 
 
Recently, objective measures of emotion performance have begun to be used in 
patients with insomnia. Baglioni et al. (2010) report effects of emotional sleep-related 
stimuli on physiological measures of emotional reactivity. In particular, people with 
insomnia were less responsive to sleep-related positive images, measured via tonic 
responses of the “frowning” muscles, and rated all stimuli as more arousing, with 
enhanced cardiac vagal tone. In support of this, evidence of impaired emotional 
regulation has recently been reported by DelVentura et al. (2013), using physiological 
measures and self-reports in response to emotional images. Among poor sleepers, 
amygdala activity has been found to correlate with measures of psychopathology, in an 
emotion face-matching task (Prather, Bogdan, and Hariri, 2013). In a task of emotional 
enhancement and regulation in response to emotional images, the use of sleeping 
medication was linked to less activity within the medial prefrontal cortex (Minkel et al, 
2012). Such results are consistent with the importance of emotion in the development 
and maintenance of insomnia (c.f. Baglioni et al., 2011). 
 
While these studies report effects of insomnia and poor sleep on measures of emotion, a 
recent study has assessed how insomnia affects the perception of emotion from faces, 
and these faces are particularly salient for social interactions (e.g. Bruce and Young, 
1998; Calder and Young, 2005). Kyle et al. (2014) report impairments in the recognition 
of emotional intensity in sad and fearful expressions among people with 
psychophysiological insomnia. This result is thought to reflect either the effects of sleep 
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loss, the effects of psychological distress, and/or the effects of trait-level emotional 
coping strategies, although future research is necessary to clarify this. Regardless of the 
underlying reason for impaired recognition of emotional intensity, such results are in 
keeping with the reported adverse effects of insomnia on functioning (Kyle, Espie, and 
Morgan, 2010). No effects were found on the ability to categorize emotion, a result 
which likely represents high levels of accuracy in all subjects. 
 
Indeed, variations of emotion intensity are often employed among patient groups by 
morphing expressions, a procedure which usually involves placing markers on two 
images (of the same individual) and combining them (e.g. Adolphs, 2002). Such 
expressions are commonly used with patient groups, in order to assess the effects of 
psychopathology on emotion recognition of varied intensity levels within static images 
(Mendlewicz et al., 2005; Csukly et al., 2009; Beevers et al., 2009; Gilboa-Schechtman 
et al., 2008; Yoon, Joorman and Gotlib, 2009; Surguladze et al., 2004), or movies 
depicting emotional displays (Kan et al., 2004; Joorman and Gotlib, 2006; Joorman, 
Gilbert and Gotlib, 2009; LeMoult et al., 2009). In everyday social interactions, 
emotional displays are changeable and dynamic, and dynamic images may be linked to 
greater effects on arousal (Sato and Yoshikawa, 2007). In research conditions, dynamic 
faces have previously been created by morphing facial expressions. Given that insomnia 
has been described as a disorder of hyperarousal (e.g. Riemann et al., 2010), such 
images may therefore involve the arousal processes which are thought to be particularly 
relevant to this disorder. 
 
The current study aimed to extend research on the daytime effects of insomnia (Kyle, 
Espie, and Morgan, 2010; Kyle et al., 2014), via the use of a socially-relevant emotion 
recognition task. The 4D faces used as stimuli in the current study confer several 
additional advantages over previously used morphed images. Importantly, the facial 
movements of the 4D stimuli are derived from real-life emotion expressions which are 
based on physiological movements (see, e.g. Adolphs, 2002). In particular, these stimuli 
have been developed from the work of Ekman and Friesen (1976), who have identified 
facial Action Units which are responsible for expressing an emotion. Stimuli were 
created from individual trained in these facial movements, which were demonstrated 
and captured electronically in order to be parameterized, and modeled on new facial 
identities. As such, the 4D platform created by Yu, Garrod and Schyns (2012) may 
provide a sensitive, and ecologically valid, measure of emotion recognition performance 
in poor sleepers. Based on the theory of insomnia as a disorder of hyperarousal 
(Riemann et al., 2010), poor sleepers may be expected to show performance 
enhancement, relative to normal sleepers. Alternatively, and perhaps more likely, poor 
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sleepers may be expected to show impaired performance, consistent with the face task 
of Kyle et al. (2014), and in general (e.g. Kyle, Espie and Morgan, 2010). Performance 
was assessed via accuracy, reaction times, and intensity ratings, and based on the 
previous results sleep was expected to contribute towards happiness recognition. In 
conjunction with this, subjective measures were included to characterize self-reported 
mood and emotional functioning, via the personality trait of alexithymia. 
 
Methods 
 
Participants 
 
In total, data was available from 27 subjects, with three additional subjects excluded 
due to incomplete task data. Ages ranged from 19 to 63, with a mean of 29.07 (SD = 
13.15). All subjects reported good physical health, with no sleep disorders (apart from 
insomnia), or recent psychiatric disorders. All subjects were Western Caucasian. This 
study had the approval of the local Ethics Committee and participants provided 
informed consent. Subjects were identified via emailing the departmental Subject Pool 
and word of mouth. Participants completed the PSQI and ISI prior to testing to indicate 
likely normal sleepers and insomnia participants, and these measures were repeated at 
testing and reported below. Sleep groups were created on the basis of PSQI scores. 
 
Stimuli 
 
Stimuli were created using the 4D stimuli platform, which is described in detail by Yu, 
Garrod and Schyns (2012), and described in Appendix 2.  
 
Emotions were shown with four male and four female Caucasian identities, each 
showing the six emotions (anger, fear, sad, disgust, surprise, happy) at three levels of 
intensity (low, medium, and high). Expressions began with a neutral expression before 
developing to display the full expressions, and back to neutral. Each expression was 
shown twice, giving 288 trials. Emotions were displayed over 1.25 seconds, at average 
dimensions of 8 cm by 13 cm, at a viewing distance of 72 cm. 
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Figure 5. Example dynamic face stimuli 
 
 
Measures 
 
 PSQI (Buysse et al., 1989). 
 ISI (Bastien, Vallieres, and Morin, 2001). 
 MEQ (Horne and Ostberg, 1976). 
 Sleep diary completed on test day (Carney et al., 2012).  
 HADS (Zigmond and Snaith, 1983). 
 Toronto Alexithymia Scale, 20 item version (TAS-20; Bagby, Parker and Taylor, 
1994).  
 Fear of Negative Evaluation (FNE; Watson and Friend, 1969). 
 
Further information as to these measures can be found in Appendix 1. 
 
Procedure 
 
Potential subjects were invited to complete the PSQI and ISI as screening measures, 
which were used to indicate likely normal sleeper and insomnia participants. Suitable 
participants were then invited to take part in the task, and testing took place between 
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12 noon and 6 pm. Participants completed two sets of practice trials first, which 
involved identifying emotion words with the congruent word label; and categorizing and 
rating the intensity of static emotion face stimuli (one individual displaying six 
emotions) was selected from the Ekman and Friesen (1976) stimuli set. 
 
Dynamic face stimuli were then presented in a random order, and following their 
presentation participants categorized the emotion shown and rated its perceived 
intensity of expression. The keys ‘Z’, ‘X’, ‘C’, ‘V’, ‘B’, and ‘N’ were used to label the 
emotions of happiness, surprise, fear, disgust, anger, sadness, with an additional option 
of the space-bar if subjects were unsure. Participants then rated the intensity on a 7-
point scale, anchored at ‘not very intense’ and ‘extremely intense’, and were asked to 
respond as quickly and accurately as possible. Following the task, participants 
completed the questionnaire battery, including the two sleep measures of the PSQI and 
ISI, from which final group allocation was confirmed.  
 
Results 
 
Group characterization 
 
Sleep groups were created using the PSQI cut-off of 6, which resulted in 15 Normal 
Sleepers (NS) and 12 Insomnia (INS) subjects. NS scores ranged from 1 – 5, whereas INS 
scores ranged from 7 – 15. We then assessed the effects on ISI scores, with ISI data 
unavailable for one INS subject. NS scores ranged from 0 – 3, whereas INS scores ranged 
from 7 – 18. No NS subjects endorsed an insomnia complaint, although 58% of INS did. 
 
With regards to the severity of sleep disruption taken from ISI scores, all normal 
sleepers reported none or mild sleep disruption over the previous week. In contrast, INS 
participants reported greater severity of sleep disruption. For all three measures of 
sleep disruption, a majority of insomnia subjects reported moderate or greater levels of 
insomnia severity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
88 
 
 
Figure 6. Proportions of insomnia symptom  severity between groups. 0 = none, 1 = 
mild, 2 = moderate, 3 = severe, 4 = very severe. 
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With regards to the frequency of sleep disruption taken from PSQI scores, all normal 
sleepers reported an inability to get to sleep one night a week or less, and the same 
results were found with night-time awakenings. A majority of people with insomnia 
reported difficulties getting to sleep or staying asleep once or twice a week, or three or 
more times a week. 
 
Figure 7. Frequency of insomnia symptoms (problems falling asleep, staying asleep and 
early morning awakenings) between groups. 0 = not during the past month, 1 = less than 
once a week, 2 = once or twice a week, 3 = three or more times a week. 
 
 
We then assessed sleep satisfaction and the daytime effects of sleep disruption taken 
from ISI scores. All normal sleepers were either very satisfied or satisfied with their 
sleep, with minimal effects on the three additional measures. In contrast, a majority of 
insomnia subjects reported sleep dissatisfaction, with a majority experiencing daytime 
distress at least somewhat. 
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Figure 8. Proportions of the daytime effects of insomnia between groups. 0 = very 
satisfied, not at all interfering, not at all noticeable, not at all worried/distressed. 3 = 
very dissatisfied, very much interfering, very much noticeable, very much worried. 
 
 
In a next step, the effects of sleep groups on the questionnaire measures of the PSQI, 
ISI, MEQ and HADS, and FNE and TAS-20 were assessed. These results were confirmed by 
questionnaire responses. 
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Table 6. Questionnaire responses by sleep group 
 
Group 
NS INS 
Count Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Count Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
PSQI 15 2.33 3.00 1.54 12 10.92 11.00 2.99 
ISI 15 1.00 1.00 .85 12 12.92 13.50 3.53 
MEQ 14 49.50 49.50 7.18 12 45.83 41.00 12.45 
HADS-A 14 4.21 4.50 2.75 12 10.58 9.00 4.01 
HADS-D 14 3.93 3.50 1.59 11 6.91 7.00 2.21 
TAS-20 14 42.36 42.00 7.93 12 48.42 47.50 10.61 
FNE 14 14.50 17.00 7.99 12 20.33 21.50 8.45 
Abbreviations: Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index (PSQI); Insomnia Severity Index (ISI); 
Morningness-Eveningness Questionnaire; Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale – Anxiety 
(HADS A); Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale – Depression (HADS D); Toronto 
Alexithymia Scale 20 item version (TAS 20); Fear of Negative Evaluation (FNE). 
 
As expected, there were significant group differences in PSQI (t (26) = - 9.76, p < 0.001) 
and ISI (t (25) = - 12.69, p < 0.001) scores. There were no significant group differences 
in MEQ scores (t (24) = 0.94, p = 0.36). However, the group differences in anxiety (t (24) 
= - 4.78, p < 0.001) and depression (t (23) = - 3.92, p < 0.001) were significant. There 
were no significant group differences in alexithymia scores, assessed by the TAS-20 (t 
(24) = - 1.15, p = 0.11), but not in the fear of negative evaluation (t (24) = - 1.80, p = 
0.08). Sleep groups were then compared on their sleep reports the night before testing. 
 
Table 7. Sleep diary results by sleep group 
 
Group 
NS INS 
Count Mean Median Std Dev Count Mean Median Std Dev 
SOL (mins) 15 14.33 6.00 15.76 12 43.13 45.00 32.88 
WAKE (#) 15 .60 1.00 .63 12 2.71 2.50 2.37 
WASO (mins) 15 4.73 2.00 8.66 12 53.13 45.00 50.56 
TST (hours) 15 8.02 8.00 .98 12 6.23 5.88 1.32 
TiB (hours) 15 9.15 9.33 1.37 12 8.33 8.50 1.09 
SE (%) 15 88.89 90.23 9.94 12 75.29 79.37 15.01 
QUALITY (0-5) 15 3.40 4.00 .74 12 2.00 2.00 1.04 
REST (0-5) 15 2.93 3.00 .80 12 1.25 1.00 .97 
Abbreviations: sleep onset latency (SOL), wake time after sleep onset (WASO), number 
of night-time awakenings (WAKE), total sleep time (TST), time in bed (TIB), sleep 
efficiency (SE), restful/restorativeness (REST), quality (QUAL). 
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These were significant differences between groups in the measures of sleep onset 
latency (t (26) = - 2.61, p = 0.02), wake-time after sleep onset (t (26) = - 3.35, p = 
0.003), and the number of awakenings (t (26) = - 2.87, p = 0.008). The group differences 
in total sleep time (t (25) = 1.85, p = 0.08), and sleep efficiency (t (26) = 0.63, p = 0.54) 
were not significant, although time in bed was (t (26) = 2.35, p = 0.03). However, there 
were significant group differences in subjective sleep quality (t (26) = 4.12, p < 0.001) 
and restorativeness (t (26) = 4.44, p < 0.001). 
 
Task Results 
 
Performance on the emotion task was compared between groups using three measures 
of performance: categorization accuracy, categorization reaction times, and intensity 
judgements. Categorization reaction times and intensity judgements were calculated as 
median responses of correct categorizations. Data was unavailable for one subject. Data 
were analyzed using Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), as in practice this is a robust test, 
and violations have relatively minor effects (Howell, 2002).When follow-up tests were 
conducted, the threshold for significance was set as 0.01, in order to provide an 
appropriate compromise between type I and type II errors (Perneger, 1998). Indeed, 
0.05/6 = 0.01. Effect sizes can be found in Appendix 2. 
 
For the accuracy of responses, results were compared in an ANOVA with emotion and 
intensity as repeated measures. There was a significant main effect of emotion (F (5, 
125) = 20.02, p < 0.001), but no significant interaction of emotion and group (F (5, 125) 
= 0.62, p = 0.68). There was a significant main effect of intensity (F (2, 50) = 11.85, p < 
0.001) but no significant interaction of intensity and group (F (2, 50) = 0.37, p = 0.69). 
The interaction of emotion and intensity was significant (F (5.93, 148.25) = 2.89, p = 
0.002), but the three way interaction was not significant (F (5.93, 148.25) = 1.29, p = 
0.26). The main effect of group was significant (F (1, 25) = 4.61, p = 0.04). Follow-up t-
tests suggest that this effect was driven by responses to sad faces of high intensity (t 
(25) = 3.50, p =0.002), and surprise faces of low intensity (t (25) = 2.90, p = 0.008). 
These results were confirmed using non-parametric tests (sad high, U = 28.00, p = 
0.002; surprise low, U = 40.50, p = 0.014). 
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Figure 9. Accuracy of recognition of sad faces of high intensity and surprise faces of low 
intensity between groups 
  
  
We then assessed reaction times of categorization judgements. There was a significant 
main effect of emotion (F (2.50, 59.88) = 17.93, p < 0.001), but no significant 
interaction of emotion and group (F (2.50, 59.88) = 0.27, p = 0.93. There was a 
significant main effect of intensity (F (2, 48) = 7.82, p = 0.001), but no significant 
interaction of intensity and group (F (2, 48) = 0.51, p = 0.60. The interaction of emotion 
and intensity was significant (F (3.44, 82.63) = 4.21, p = 0.006), but there was no 
significant three-way interaction (F (3.44, 82.63) = 0.74, p = 0.55. There was no 
significant main effect of group (F (1, 24) = 0.18, p = 0.68). 
 
This analysis was then repeated with the intensity ratings. There was a significant main 
effect of emotion (F (3.62, 86.88) = 19.90, p < 0.001), but no significant interaction of 
emotion and group (F (3.62, 86.88) = 0.23, p = 0.91). There was a significant main 
effect of intensity (F (1.36, 32.62) = 280.43, p < 0.001), but no significant interaction of 
intensity and group (F (1.36, 32.62) = 1.02, p = 0.34). There was a significant 
interaction of emotion and intensity (F (10, 240) = 8.26, p < 0.001), but no significant 
three-way interaction (F (10, 240) = 0.85, p = 058). The main effect of group was not 
significant (F (1, 24) = 1.27, p = 0.27). 
 
Exploratory Regression Models: Happiness 
 
Similarly to the previous chapter, the predictor variables of HADS-D, HADS-A, FNE, TAS-
20, MEQ, ISI and PSQI scores were entered alongside measures of the previous night’s 
sleep – total sleep time, time in bed, sleep efficiency, sleep onset latency, wake time 
after sleep onset, number of night-time awakenings, and the subjective measures of 
sleep quality and restorativeness were used as predictor variables for happiness 
recognition labels. This analysis was repeated for each of the three levels of happiness 
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intensity. Significant models (p < 0.05) were followed up via individual predictor 
variables. 
 
The resultant models were significant for the accuracy of recognition towards happy 
faces of low intensity (F (15, 23) = 6.28, p = 0.007), medium intensity (F (15, 23) = 5.18, 
p = 0.01), and high intensity (F (15, 23) = 3.14, p = 0.05). 
 
Significant individual predictors of happiness low intensity were PSQI (B = 17.22, S.E. = 
2.60, p < 0.001), ISI (B = - 2.97, S.E. = 1.28, p = 0.05), HADS-A (B = - 2.88, S.E. = 1.05, p 
= 0.03), TAS-20 (B = - 3.27, S.E. = 0.61, p = 0.001), SOL (B = - 1.33, S.E. = 0.28, p = 
0.001), WAKE (B = 15.56, S.E. = 2.96, p = 0.001), WASO (B = - 1.01, S.E. = 0.20, p = 
0.001), TST (B = - 73.84, S.E. = 18.81, p = 0.004), TiB (B = 74.04, S.E. = 16.99, p = 
0.002), SE (B = 6.98, S.E. = 1.76, p = 0.004), and MEQ scores (B = 1.47, S.E. = 0.47, p = 
0.01). 
 
Significant individual predictors of happiness medium intensity were PSQI (B = 7.42, S.E. 
= 1.72, p = 0.003), ISI (B = - 2.14, S.E. = 0.85, p = 0.04), HADS-A (B = - 1.71, S.E. = 0.70, 
p = 0.04), TAS-20 (B = - 1.06, S.E. = 0.41, p = 0.03), WAKE (B = 5.62, S.E. = 1.95, p = 
0.02), WASO (B = - 0.30, S.E. = 0.13, p = 0.05), TST (B = - 42.09, S.E. = 12.43, p = 0.01), 
TiB (B = 38.49, S.E. = 11.22, p = 0.009), and SE (B = 3.24, S.E. = 1.16, p = 0.01). 
 
Significant individual predictors of happiness high intensity were HADS-A (B = - 2.94, 
S.E. = 1.04, p = 0.02), and WASO (B = - 0.48, S.E. = 0.20, p = 0.04). This analysis was 
then repeated for reaction times. However, the model was not significant for happy 
faces of low intensity (F (15, 23) = 2.27, p = 0.12), medium intensity (F (15, 23) = 1.69, 
p = 0.23), or high intensity (F (15, 23) = 2.21, p = 0.13). Similarly, the model was not 
significant for intensity ratings of happy faces of low intensity (F (15, 23) = 1.24, p = 
0.39), medium intensity (F (15, 23) = 0.90, p = 0.59), of high intensity (F (15, 23) = 0.48, 
p = 0.90). 
 
Discussion 
 
In summary, people with insomnia were found to be impaired at recognizing emotion 
from sad faces of high intensity and surprise faces of low intensity, with significant 
differences found in the emotional categorization labels used. There were no significant 
differences in reaction times or intensity labels. Sleep groups showed the expected 
differences in measures of sleep and mood disruption. There were also significant 
effects of sleep and mood measures on happiness recognition. In particular, HADS-A and 
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WASO scores contributed towards the recognition of all three intensity levels, with 
additional effects of sleep continuity measures and total sleep time, as well as 
alexithymia, on the recognition of medium and low intensity levels. 
 
Results from this task suggest that insomnia affects emotion categorization performance 
when dynamic stimuli are used. In particular, results suggest that sad faces of high 
intensity, and surprised faces of low intensity, are recognized less accurately in 
insomnia. Such results are consistent with reports of daytime performance impairments 
in insomnia (Kyle, Espie and Morgan, 2010), and with results reported by Kyle et al. 
(2014) with static faces. Both the current study and Kyle et al. (2014), found effects 
with sad faces, although Kyle et al. (2014) reported additional effects with fearful 
expressions. Another potential difference relates to the precise task where effects were 
found. While both Kyle et al. (2014) and the current study required subjects to first 
categorize the emotion then rate its intensity, the current study found effects on 
emotional categorization, whereas Kyle et al. (2014) report effects on intensity ratings. 
However, the dynamic images of the current study were manipulated to show varying 
levels of intensity (based on normative data), thus providing a more difficult task, and it 
is possible that similar processes are contributing to both effects. Furthermore, the 
current study extends the perceived emotional ‘blunting’ effect reported by Kyle et al. 
(2014), to impaired categorization performance, when using dynamic stimuli with 
varying levels of expressed intensity. Measures of sleep and mood were also found to 
contribute towards happiness recognition in keeping with the previous chapter, although 
there were no significant group differences. 
 
Kyle et al. (2014) have identified three possible reasons as to why emotion perception is 
altered in insomnia, which relate to the effects of sleep loss, the effects of 
psychological distress, and/or the effects of trait-level emotional coping strategies. 
These three predictions will now be discussed with reference to the current data. 
Firstly, the insomnia participants in the current study experienced poorer sleep. On the 
night before testing, these subjects reported lower sleep duration, increased sleep 
disruption, and experienced their sleep as of poor quality and not restorative. Results 
from the ISI and PSQI also suggest that subjects with insomnia had experienced poorer 
sleep over the previous two weeks and month (ISI and PSQI). However, these group 
differences are based on self-reports, and this data would be supported by use of 
actigraphy data and sleep diaries over a longer period. In addition, while total sleep 
deprivation has been associated with impaired emotional intensity judgements (e.g. van 
der Helm et al., 2010), total sleep deprivation and sleep disruption are different 
phenomena, and induced sleep disruption in otherwise healthy sleepers could itself 
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differ from the experience of insomnia patients (Bonnet and Arand, 1996). The extent 
to which sleep disruption and sleep loss affect emotion perception would require 
additional research, including objective measures of the sleep of normal sleepers and 
insomnia participants. 
 
Psychological distress could also affect the perception of emotion in faces, and a 
number of previous studies have reported effects of psychopathology on emotion 
perception tasks (e.g. Mendlewicz et al., 2005; Csukly et al., 2009; Beevers et al., 2009; 
Gilboa-Schechtman et al., 2008; Yoon, Joorman and Gotlib, 2009; Surguladze et al., 
2004; Kan, et al., 2004; Joorman and Gotlib, 2006; Joorman, Gilbert and Gotlib, 2009; 
LeMoult et al., 2009). The insomnia subjects in the current sample reported greater 
psychological distress, evidenced by anxiety and depression scores, and this could 
contribute towards results. Indeed, sleep and mood are inter-linked, and the 
relationships between them are complex (Kahn, Sheepes and Sadeh, 2013). This also 
appears in keeping with the results of the regression models showing effects of sleep 
and mood on happiness recognition. Furthermore, it may not be possible to fully 
dissociate the effects of insomnia and mood disruption. For example, insomnia and 
depression are often comorbid, and this vulnerability towards insomnia and depression 
could be related (Staner, 2010). Alternatively, the vulnerability for insomnia could 
contribute towards both depression and insomnia, and the vulnerability for depression 
could contribute towards both depression and insomnia (Staner, 2010). Another 
possibility is that the comorbidity of insomnia and depression could represent an 
additional vulnerability factor and separate disorder (Staner, 2010). As such, emotional 
distress would be expected to relate to sleep disruption and mood disorder 
vulnerability, and to contribute towards alteration in emotion perception due to 
overlapping brain regions (Phillips et al., 2003). A direct test of this would require 
longitudinal studies among subject groups with different mood disorder vulnerabilities. 
However, the report by van der Helm et al. (2010) of impaired perception of anger and 
happiness in healthy sleep-deprived subjects indicates that sleep disruption contributes 
towards mood disruption. These results were not found to be affected by self-rated 
sleepiness. Sleep disruption could therefore represent an additional factor which can 
contribute towards psychiatric disorders (Bryant et al., 2010; Yoo et al., 2007). 
 
With regards to a role of trait-level differences in emotional coping strategies, the 
relationships between emotion perception, emotional regulation, and psychiatric illness 
have been reviewed by Phillips et al. (2003). These authors suggest that emotional 
regulation processes could directly affect the initial appraisal of stimuli. Emotional 
regulation is also thought to affect emotion perception indirectly, by modulating mood 
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state which also affects the appraisal of emotional stimuli. Dysregulation of these 
processes are thought to contribute towards the impairments found in psychiatric 
illnesses (Phillips et al., 2003). In support of this, symptoms of depression have been 
linked to emotion recognition performance, and modulated by emotion recognition 
strategies (Aldinger et al., 2013). With regards to insomnia, emotional regulation is 
thought to contribute towards the sleep problems reported by these patients, and 
insomnia has been characterized as a disorder of regulating arousal (c.f. Espie, 2002; 
Perlis et al., 1997; Riemann et al., 2010). For example, people with insomnia 
experience less control over stressful life events, and perceive daily events as more 
stressful (Morin, Rodrigue, and Ivers, 2003). This may be due to their greater tendency 
to employ emotion-focused coping strategies (Morin, Rodrigue, and Ivers, 2003). When 
the relationships between variables were modeled, emotion-focused coping was found 
to contribute towards the impact of stress and pre-sleep cognitive arousal, thus 
affecting sleep efficiency (Morin, Rodrigue, and Ivers, 2003). 
 
In the current study, alexithymia, a personality trait which is linked to the ability to 
identify and describe one’s own emotions, was measured. This trait has been linked to 
lower scores of cognitive empathy (perspective taking) and greater empathic distress 
(Moriguchi et al., 2006). The alexithymia subscales of ‘difficulty identifying feelings’ 
and ‘difficulty describing feelings’ load on a factor alongside empathic personal 
distress, whereas cognitive empathy and empathic concern loaded with the alexithymia 
subscale of externally oriented thinking (Grynberg et al., 2010). In response to a theory 
of mind task, those with high alexithymia tendencies report a lower appreciation of 
mental state, and appropriateness of animations, in terms of representing the intended 
narrative (Moriguchi et al., 2006). These response differences were reflected in lower 
activity of the right medial prefrontal cortex and superior temporal area (Moriguchi et 
al., 2006). As such, this trait would be expected to be linked to the ability to perceive 
emotion, and has previously been linked to a number of psychological disorders (c.f. 
Bagby, Parker and Taylor, 1994). Although there no were significant group differences in 
this scale, it is possible that alexithymia was a contributing factor in the emotion 
recognition impairment found in the current sample. As such, a contribution of this 
trait, or other measures of emotional coping, to emotion perception performance in 
insomnia disorder cannot be ruled out. Future studies could also investigate whether 
this trait represents a cause or effect of sleep disruption. In particular, alexithymia was 
found to contribute towards happiness recognition in exploratory regression models. 
Also pertinent could be the emotionality (i.e. arousal and valence) of these emotions, 
with sadness a low-arousal unpleasant emotion and surprise a high-arousal pleasant one 
(Adolphs, 2001). Happiness is also a pleasant emotion of mid-arousal, with disgust mid-
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arousal unpleasant and anger and fearful both high-arousal unpleasant emotions 
(Adolphs, 2001). Visual attention towards the eye region could also contribute towards 
effects (Murphy and Isaacowitz, 2010). 
 
Regardless of the underlying reason for these results, the current results suggest that 
even among a young adult population of insomnia subjects, the experience of insomnia 
is linked to impairments in a socially-relevant task. Such impairments may contribute 
towards the development of insomnia disorder, which includes the experience of 
daytime impairments in functioning (e.g. Edinger et al., 2004). For example, selective 
attention and monitoring of the daytime effects of poor sleep are thought to contribute 
towards the maintenance of this disorder (Harvey, 2002). 
 
Social functioning has been suggested as an endpoint of treatment (Bech 2005), and a 
possible ‘biomarker’ for disorders (Derntl and Habel, 2011; Isaac, 2012). Current results 
perhaps suggest the utility of this task as an indicator of impairments in insomnia 
patients, and improvements following treatment, with results suggesting an effect of 
insomnia on the impaired recognition of high-intensity sadness faces. Future studies 
could investigate the neural correlates of this effect, and how the treatment of 
insomnia improves performance. This result adds to the existing literature (Kyle et al., 
2014) and patient reports (Kyle, Espie and Morgan, 2010), in showing that insomnia is 
linked to impairments in social functioning. However, the current emotion recognition 
task measures one aspect of social functioning, and the ability to assess another 
person’s perspective also contributes towards social competence (c.f. Iarocci, Yager, 
and Elfers, 2007). As such, future studies should investigate the effects of insomnia on 
additional measures of social functioning more broadly. 
 
Limitations of this study include the young age of insomnia participants sampled and the 
sample size; however, results are consistent with previous reports of impaired emotion 
recognition in insomnia disorder (Kyle et al., 2014). This suggests that among people 
with insomnia there are differences in emotion recognition performance, and tha ability 
to detect these differences in the current study may relate to the use of a more 
sensitive task. Moreover, the sample size is consistent with that of Kyle et al., (2014). A 
further limitation of the current study relates to the nature of insomnia within the 
current sample. In particular, the severity of insomnia was lower than might be 
expected in a clinical setting, based on total ISI scores. However, a majority of insomnia 
participants reported moderate or greater levels of insomnia severity for each of 
difficulties falling asleep, staying asleep, and waking up too early. When these three 
measures were considered together, all normal sleepers reported mild insomnia 
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symptoms on a maximum of one measure of sleep disruption, in contrast to the 
insomnia participants. Furthermore, all insomnia participants scores above threshold on 
the PSQI, and as such, all insomnia participants met criteria for sleep disruption. 
Secondly, all insomnia participants reported that their sleep pattern was interfering 
with their daily life at least a little. Additionally, those subjects reporting no daytime 
effects on one of the remaining measures (‘noticeable’, and ‘worried’) reported effects 
on the other component. Thirdly, all insomnia participants reported adequate sleep 
opportunity, with a minimum time in bed of over six hours and no significant group 
differences with normal sleepers. As such all insomnia subjects met the criteria for 
insomnia disorder described by Edinger et al., (2004).  
 
Results suggest that insomnia disorder affects emotion perception, with significant 
effects on emotion categorization with dynamic facial stimuli, and with significant 
effects on emotional intensity ratings with static stimuli. These results are most 
consistent with sad faces, and the current results with surprise and previous results with 
fear (Kyle et al., 2014) can be interpreted within the context of the confusabilities of 
these two emotions (Jack, Garrod, and Schyns, 2014). In particular, surprise and fear 
are frequently confused, as are anger and disgust (Jack, Garrod, and Schyns, 2014). 
 
Future studies could also investigate the links of poor sleep and insomnia with the 
recognition of happy and sad faces, as there is evidence that results with these 
emotions may be affected by depression and show evidence of a negative bias (Bourke, 
Douglas, and Porter, 2010). In keeping with this suggestion, Kyle et al. (2014) reported 
significant moderate negative correlations of anxiety and depression with intensity 
rating in psychophysiological insomnia (PI), and similar results with anxiety in good 
sleeper controls. Furthermore, we report in Kyle et al. (2014) that anxiety was linked to 
sad ratings in good sleepers, and to anger and happiness ratings in PI. In patients, 
depression and sadness ratings were also found to be correlated. This may be consistent 
with reports by Van Der Helm et al. (2010) of impaired perception of happiness and 
anger in healthy participants who had been sleep-deprived. The role of happiness 
recognition in results would also be interesting to consider given the results of the 
previous chapter. However, exploratory regression analyses suggest that depression 
scores do not contribute to happiness recognition in the same way as the static stimuli 
used in the previous chapter. Low intensity happy faces, which are more ambiguous, 
also appear to be more sensitive to sleep and mood than high intensity stimuli, given 
the greater number of significant predictor variables associated with low intensity 
stimuli. As results were found with both INS and NS, we next assessed the effects of 
sleep on emotion perception in normal sleepers. In particular, we investigated the role 
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of time of testing on emotion perception, due to a lack of research in this area and its 
potential ability to inform our understanding of the etiology of insomnia (e.g. Espie, 
2002). For example, insomnia has been conceptualized as a disorder of 24-hour 
hyperarousal, and normal sleepers ordinarily show fluctuations in mood and sleepiness. 
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Chapter Five 
 
Is emotional sensitivity affected by sleep proximity? A study of normal 
sleepers 
 
Abstract 
 
Emotionality has been found to vary across the day (Hot, Leconte and Sequeira, 2005; 
Buysse et al., 2007); however, the extent to which this is apparent in sensitivity towards 
emotional images is unclear. As insomnia disorder is linked to hyperarousal (c.f. Espie, 
2002; Riemann et al., 2010; Bonnet and Arand, 2010), it is important to understand how 
emotionality may vary in normal sleepers. Facial expressions of emotion are particularly 
salient for social interactions, and their recognition uses areas of the emotional brain 
with relevance for psychiatric disorders (c.f. Phillips et al., 2003). Of particular interest 
is how subjects recognize emotion early in the day and late in the day, as these periods 
may have particular relevance for insomnia disorder. The current study made use of 
dynamic facial stimuli, and subjects completed emotional recognition tasks, which 
comprised both categorization decisions and intensity ratings. In a first experiment, 
subjects completed the emotional recognition task in the lab, and testing took place at 
around three hours since waking or twelve hours since waking in a between-subjects 
design. Results suggest significant effects of sleep group with regards to sensitivity 
towards different temporal parameters of emotional faces. In a second experiment, 
subjects completed an online emotional recognition task upon awakening and close to 
bed-time, in a within-subjects design. Results suggest a significant effect of time since 
waking on emotional sensitivity in this experiment, in particular, with intensity ratings 
of mid-intensity expressions of sadness and anger. These effects could be linked to the 
testing environment and/or proximity to bed-time. Results are discussed in relation to 
the implications for insomnia disorder. 
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Is emotional sensitivity affected by sleep proximity? A study of normal 
sleepers 
 
Introduction 
 
Emotionality has been found to vary across the day in healthy subjects (e.g. Hot, 
Leconte and Sequeira, 2005; Gujar et al., 2011), and this could indicate that this 
variability may be disrupted in insomnia disorder. For example, poor sleep has been 
linked to the inhibition of de-arousal, which suggests that poor sleep results in 
diminished variability of arousal (Espie, 2002). An understanding of the processes 
involved in normal sleep is important in order to understand how insomnia develops 
(Espie, 2002; Buysse et al., 2011). With regards to waking, the ease of awakening from 
sleep is dependent upon circadian and homeostatic factors, as well as sleep propensity 
(Akerstedt et al., 2002). It has been suggested that, in healthy subjects, increasing 
wakefulness and the circadian low-point are linked to difficulties awakening and a lack 
of feeling refreshed in spite of good subjective sleep (Akerstedt et al., 2002). 
Furthermore, upon awakening, people with insomnia may excessively monitor their 
bodily sensations for signs of poor sleep (Harvey, 2002). Similarly, people with insomnia 
may excessively monitor their bodily signals for signs inconsistent with falling asleep 
around bed-time (Harvey, 2002). It has been suggested that “…there is not a single 
human physiological, subjective, or behavioural system which is unaffected by the 
process of falling asleep. And many of these profound changes occur before sleep 
actually begins.” (Ogilvie, 2001). 
 
Insomnia has been conceptualized as a 24-hour disorder of “hyperarousal” (Riemann et 
al., 2010; Bonnet and Arand, 2010), in which insomnia is thought to be maintained by 
daytime cognitive processes (Harvey, 2002). As such, it seems important to understand 
how daytime changes in emotionality may manifest in normal sleepers. In particular, 
emotion recognition is important for social functioning (Iarocci, Yager, and Elfers, 
2007), and emotional experiences have been found to affect emotion labeling 
(Niedenthal, Halberstadt, and Innes-Ker, 1999). Such results appear to be in keeping 
with the model of Phillips et al. (2003) which suggests that emotion perception involves 
interactions of perception, mood, and appraisal of a stimulus. Moreover, human 
observers have a tendency to infer socially-relevant information from facial cues. These 
cues are derived from the variant and invariant properties of faces, and form the basis 
of judgments as to the gender, identity, and emotional state of others (Haxby, 
Hoffman, and Gobbini, 2000).  
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The human facial physiology is capable of depicting a number of different facial 
movements, or “action units”, which form the basis of facial expressions of emotion 
(e.g. Ekman and Friesen, 1976) which are then recognized by others. Furthermore, 
facial expressions are recognized categorically, rather than on a continuum, and 
emotional blends of two emotions tend to be recognized as expressing one emotion or 
other, with a clear point of demarcation (e.g. Young et al., 1997). The context of 
emotional expressions also affects their categorization (Righart and de Gelder, 2008; 
Aviezer et al., 2008), suggesting that cognition contributes towards an individuals’s 
processing of emotional expressions. 
 
In order to assess emotional sensitivity towards facial stimuli, ambiguous facial stimuli 
were presented to subjects, by varying the intensity of displayed emotion. These stimuli 
are based on facial Action Unit (AU) movements, which are responsible for expressing an 
emotion (Ekman and Friesen, 1976), thus providing a naturalistic model of emotion 
expression formation in real life (see, e.g. Adolphs, 2002). Moreover, dynamic images 
may be linked to increased arousal ratings (Sato and Yoshikawa, 2007). The emotions 
used are also consistent with prior research into psychopathology, in which the 
recognition of subtle expressions of emotion has often been assessed (e.g. Gilboa-
Schechtman, Erhard-Weiss, and Jeczemien, 2002; Joorman and Gotlib, 2006; LeMoult et 
al., 2009; Langenecker et al., 2005; Beevers et al., 2009; Gilboa-Schectman et al., 
2008; Surguladze et al., 2004). These tasks involved viewing ambiguous facial 
movements, then categorizing the emotion and rating its intensity. Subjects completed 
the emotion task early in the day, and later on in the day, at around twelve hours since 
waking in Experiment One and fifteen hours since waking in Experiment Two. Emotional 
sensitivity was hypothesized to be affected by time since waking. 
 
Experiment One 
 
Methods 
 
Participants 
 
In total, 8 male and 8 female subjects took part. Ages ranged from 18 – 28, with a mean 
of 21.06 (SD = 3.04), and all subjects were Western Caucasian with minimal experience 
with other-race cultures. All subjects reported keeping in good physical and mental 
health, with no current use of recreational drugs. No subjects showed any evidence of 
narcolepsy, sleep breathing disorder, periodic limb movements or restless legs 
syndrome, or circadian rhythm sleep disorder, and no subject reported an insomnia 
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problem. Participants took part in exchange for course credit or £15, and this study had 
the approval of the Faculty Ethics Committee. 
 
Exclusion criteria 
 
 The Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index (PSQI; Buysse et al., 1989) was used to 
exclude poor sleepers, identified as scores > 6.  
 The Insomnia Severity Index (ISI; Bastien et al., 2001) was used to exclude any 
subjects with significant evidence of insomnia symptoms, with scores > 14. No 
subject reported an insomnia problem. 
 The Morningness-Eveningness Questionnaire (MEQ; Horne and Ostberg, 1976) was 
used to exclude those subjects with an extreme diurnal preference were 
excluded, i.e. scores < 31 or > 69.  
 The Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS; Zigmond and Snaith, 1983) was 
used to exclude those with significant evidence of subjective distress, defined as 
scores on either of the subcomponents > 10.  
 
Pre-test questionnaires 
 
The University of Glasgow Sleep Centre (UGSC) screening interview (with supplemental 
algorithm, Wilson et al., 2006), was used to provide a preliminary assessment of the 
sleep of subjects, and to identify whether any sleep disorders were present. Experience 
of other cultures was assessed via the 5-item questionnaire developed by Jack et al. 
(2009). These questions formed the basis of a semi-structured interview which was used 
to exclude any subjects who might have significant experience of other cultures. In 
order to individualize testing times according to each subjects’s sleep patterns, the 
Sleep Timing Questionnaire (STQ; Monk et al., 2003) was used, which was developed to 
assess sleep scheduling. Participants are asked about their typical, earliest, and latest 
sleep times. These were recorded for both weekdays and free-days, and for mornings 
and evenings. This measure was used to gauge sleep patterns, and to aid in the 
agreement of individualized testing times and rising times for each subject. 
 
State questionnaires 
 
 The Karolinska Sleepiness Scale (KSS; Akerstedt and Gillberg, 1990). 
 The Daytime Impact of Sleep Scale (DISS; Buysse et al., 2007). 
 The consensus sleep diary (Carney et al., 2012). 
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Facial Stimuli 
 
The platform used to generate the facial stimuli is described in detail by Yu, Garrod and 
Schyns, (2012), and described previously in Chapter Three. Each facial animation was 
generated on the basis of six parameters, which corresponded to peak amplitude, peak 
latency, onset latency, offset latency, acceleration, and deceleration of facial action 
units (AUs). These values were selected for each AU pseudo-randomly, creating 1200 
facial animations, which were shown on eight individual facial identities (four male and 
four female). 
 
Figure 10. Example dynamic face stimuli 
 
 
Procedure 
 
Participants were recruited via the School of Psychology subject pool, and those 
subjects who expressed an interest completed the UGSC screening interview. Normal 
sleepers were recruited to take part in this study, and the STQ was used to guide the 
scheduling of test times at 3 hours or 12 hours since wake. This created early or late 
test groups, in a between-subjects design. As testing took place in the laboratory in 
order to control for test conditions, twelve hours since waking was selected as the late 
time period for ethical reasons relating to time of testing. Participants were asked to 
keep a regular sleep schedule during testing, based on usual rise times. 
 
Due to the numbers of trials involved, testing took place over three or four consecutive 
weekdays, with testing scheduled for the same time each day. Dynamic expressive faces 
were shown to subjects over these days, with participants responding to each face by 
selecting emotion labels (anger, fear, happy, sad, disgust, surprise, and unsure), and 
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intensity judgements. Each animation was viewed by participants at 68 cm, before 
being categorized with the 6 emotion labels (and unsure). The perceived intensity of 
the emotion was judged on a scale of 1-5. Participants completed state measures after 
each test day, with the remaining questionnaires administered upon completion. 
 
The data were analyzed as per Jack et al. (2012), and reverse correlation techniques 
were applied to create models of emotion for each observer. These were based on the 
six temporal parameters, of acceleration, peak amplitude, and deceleration, as well as 
onset latency, offset latency, and peak latency. In an initial step, emotion category 
responses labels were identified which were associated with the facial AUs. Parametric 
tests were used in keeping with Howell (2002). The local Ethics Committee approved 
this study. 
 
Results 
 
Firstly, the sleep diary parameters were averaged over test days for each subject. 
 
Table 8. Sleep diary results in the sample 
 Percentile 05 Percentile 25 Median Percentile 75 Percentile 95 Mean Std Dev 
SOL (mins) 5.00 9.31 18.54 22.50 33.75 17.34 9.52 
WASO (mins) .00 .00 2.19 7.13 22.50 5.39 7.26 
WAKE (#) .00 .00 .50 1.25 4.33 .88 1.14 
TST (hours) 6.44 6.81 7.67 8.28 8.63 7.55 .76 
TiB (hours) 7.11 8.03 8.56 9.01 9.92 8.53 .83 
SE (%) 63.53 78.00 86.71 95.25 100.00 85.90 10.74 
QUAL (0-3) 1.00 1.75 2.25 2.83 3.00 2.17 .68 
REST (0-4) 1.50 2.00 2.50 3.00 3.67 2.54 .57 
Abbreviations: sleep onset latency (SOL), wake time after sleep onset (WASO), number 
of night-time awakenings (WAKE), total sleep time (TST), time in bed (TIB), sleep 
efficiency (SE), restful/restorativeness (REST), quality (QUAL). 
 
Results suggest that the sleep of the sample was good, with a short sleep onset latency 
and brief wake time after sleep onset, and few night-time awakenings. The total sleep 
time of the sample was also good, at over six hours, and subjects tended to report that 
their sleep was restful and of good quality. 
 
Manipulation check 
 
1) In an initial step, we confirmed the presence of the intended group differences on 
time since waking (TSW). Sleep diaries on test days were used to calculate the 
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difference between wake time and test time, and mean scores were then calculated for 
each individual. Results confirmed that testing took place at the intended TSW in the 
early group (M = 3.76, SD = 2.50), and in the late group (M = 11.68, SD = 0.65), with 
significant group differences (T (14) = - 8.67, p < 0.001). 
 
Figure 11. Time since waking between groups 
Groups tested early and late were tested at different times since waking. The ‘*’ 
indicates a data outlier. Abbreviations: Time Since Waking (TSW). 
 
2) We then compared subjects on subjective sleepiness, with scores averaged over test 
days. However, there were no significant group differences on average sleepiness 
measured via KSS scores. 
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Table 9. Karolinska Sleepiness Scale (KSS) scores between groups 
 
GROUP  
EARLY LATE p-value 
Mean Median Std Dev Mean Median Std Dev  
KSS 4.31 4.38 1.37 4.79 4.63 1.64 0.54 
Abbreviations: Karolinska Sleepiness Scale (KSS). 
 
3) Groups were then compared on subjective mood, assessed via the components of the 
DISS. However, there were no significant group differences on any of the four 
subcomponents, of alert cognition, negative affect, positive affect, and sleepiness-
fatigue.  
 
Table 10. Daytime Impact of Sleep Scale (DISS) scores between groups 
 
GROUP  
EARLY LATE  
Mean Median Std Dev Mean Median Std Dev P-value 
AC 62.13 59.89 11.45 66.24 65.38 19.77 0.62 
NA 27.36 26.16 13.28 19.82 14.63 14.15 0.29 
PA 58.85 56.70 7.39 68.62 72.22 17.09 0.16 
SF 39.78 42.97 13.35 34.65 32.46 21.39 0.57 
Abbreviations: Alert Cognition (AC); Negative Affect (NA); Positive Affect (PA); 
Sleepiness/Fatigue (SF). 
 
These reports, taken together, indicate that the early and late groups were tested at 
significantly different times since waking, although this difference was not reflected in 
subjective sleepiness or mood. 
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Task results 
 
Figure 12. Response probabilities between groups. Group 1 corresponds to the early 
group and Group 2 corresponds to the late group. 
 
Response probability refers to the likelihood of an emotional label being used. 
The use of emotional labels and intensity judgements were compared between groups. 
However, there was no significant interaction of group with emotional expression (F (6, 
98) = 0.52, p = 0.79), or main effect of group (F (1, 98) = 0.00, p = 1.00), although there 
was a main effect of emotional expression (F (6, 98) = 5.22, p < 0.001).  
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Figure 13. Average intensity judgements between groups. Group 1 corresponds to the 
early group and Group 2 corresponds to the late group. 
 
 
Similar results were found with intensity judgements. There was no main effect of 
group (F (1, 98) = 0.01, p = 0.93), or interaction of group with emotional expression (F 
(6, 98) = 0.77, p = 0.59), although there was a main effect of emotional expression (F 
(6, 98) = 3.09, p < 0.01). 
 
In a next step, reverse correlation techniques were used to generate cognitive models 
of emotion for each of the six temporal parameters and emotions. 
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Figure 14. Average amplitude between groups. Group 1 corresponds to the early group 
and Group 2 corresponds to the late group. 
 
Mean Amplitude Gradient (Amp Gradient) refers to the peak amplitude of the action 
unit. 
 
For amplitude, there was a significant main effect for each of emotion (F (5, 3528) = 
2.24, p < 0.05), action unit (F (41, 3528) = 7.43, p < 0.001) and group (F (1, 3528) = 
4.76, p < 0.05). There was a significant two-way interaction of emotion and action unit 
(F (205, 3528) = 1.63, p < 0.001), but no significant interactions of emotion and group (F 
(5, 3528) = 2.01, p = 0.07) or action unit and group (F (41, 3528) = 0.66, p = 0.95). 
However, the three-way interaction was significant (F (205, 3528) = 1.29, p < 0.005). 
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Figure 15. Average peak latency between groups. Group 1 corresponds to the early 
group and Group 2 corresponds to the late group. 
 
Time to Peak Gradient (tPeak Gradient) refers to the time to the peak amplitude of the 
Action Unit. 
 
For peak latency, there was a significant main effect of emotion (F (5, 3528) = 3.79, p = 
0.002) and action unit (F (41, 3528) = 2.69, p < 0.001). There was no significant main 
effect of group (F (1, 3528) = 0.11, p = 0.74). The interaction of emotion and action unit 
was significant (F (205, 3528) = 2.19, p < 0.001), but there were no significant 
interactions of emotion and group (F (5, 3528) = 1.17, p = 0.32) or action unit and group 
(F (41, 3528) = 1.29, p = 0.10). The three-way interaction of emotion, action unit, and 
group was significant (F (205, 3528) = 1.18, p = 0.04). 
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Figure 16. Average down rate between groups. Group 1 corresponds to the early group 
and Group 2 corresponds to the late group. 
 
Down rate refers to the rate of deceleration of the Action Unit.  
 
For down rate, or deceleration, there was a significant main effect for each of action 
unit (F (41, 3528) = 5.76, p < 0.001) and group (F (1, 3528) = 12.97, p < 0.005), but not 
emotion (F (5, 3528) = 2.00, p = 0.08). There was a significant two-way interaction of 
emotion and action unit (F (205, 3528) = 2.34, p < 0.001), but no significant interactions 
of emotion and group (F (5, 3528) = 0.89, p = 0.49) or action unit and group (F (41, 
3528) = 0.81, p = 0.80). The three-way interaction was not significant (F (205, 3528) = 
1.08, p = 0.22).  
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Figure 17. Average up rate between groups. Group 1 corresponds to the early group and 
Group 2 corresponds to the late group. 
 
Up rate refers to the acceleration of the Action Unit. 
 
For up rate, or acceleration, there was a significant main effect of action unit (F (41, 
3528) = 2.09, p < 0.001). The main effects of emotion (F (5, 3528) = 0.89, p = 0.49) and 
group (F (1, 3528) = 1.66, p = 0.20) were not significant. The interaction of emotion and 
action unit was significant (F (205, 3528) = 1.80, p < 0.001), but there were no 
significant interactions of emotion and group (F (5, 3528) = 1.10, p = 0.36) or action unit 
and group (F (41, 3528) = 0.87, p = 0.71). The three-way interaction of emotion, action 
unit, and group was not significant (F (205, 3528) = 0.93, p = 0.74). 
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Figure 18a. Average onset latency between groups. Group 1 corresponds to the early 
group and Group 2 corresponds to the late group. 
 
Mean time to up gradient (tUp Gradient) refers to the onset latency of the Action Unit. 
 
For onset latency, there was no significant effect of emotion (F (5, 3528) = 1.41, p = 
0.22) , but there were significant effects of group (F (1, 3528) = 3.81, p = 0.06), and 
action unit (F (41, 3528) = 4.77, p < 0.001). The interaction of emotion and action unit 
was significant (F (205, 3528) = 2.05, p < 0.001), but there were no significant 
interactions of emotion with group (F (5, 3528) = 0.85, p = 0.52) or action unit with 
group (F (41, 3528) = 0.61, p = 0.98). The three-way interaction of emotion, action unit, 
and group was significant (F (205, 3528) = 1.05, p = 0.31).  
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Figure 18b. Average offset latency between groups. Group 1 corresponds to the early 
group and Group 2 corresponds to the late group. 
 
Mean tDown Gradient refers to the offset latency of the Action Unit. 
 
For offset latency, there was a significant main effect of expression (F (5, 3528) = 4.60, 
p < 0.001), action unit (F (41, 3528) = 3.15, p < 0.001), and group (F (1, 3528) = 9.29, p 
= 0.002). The interaction of emotion and action unit was significant (F (205, 3528) = 
2.19, p < 0.001), but there were no significant interactions of emotion with group (F (5, 
3528) = 0.19, p = 0.48) or action unit with group (F (41, 3528) = 0.67, p = 0.94). The 
three-way interaction was significant (F (205, 3528) = 1.30, p = 0.004). 
 
However, it should be noted that follow-up tests adjusting for multiple comparisons 
(Bonferroni) were not significant for any of these six temporal parameters. 
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Experiment One Summary 
 
Results suggest that testing took place at significantly different times since waking, 
with the early group tested on average at three hours since waking and the late group 
tested on average at twelve hours since waking. However, this difference was not 
reflected in subjective sleepiness or mood. There were no significant group differences 
in sleepiness, alert cognition, positive affect, negative affect, or sleepiness/fatigue. 
With regards to the experimental task with dynamic emotional faces, there were no 
significant group differences in the emotional categorization or intensity labels used. 
However, there were significant group differences with regards to several of the 
temporal parameters which formed the dynamic stimuli. These results are shown in a 
summary table below. 
 
Table 11. Summary of temporal parameter results by emotion, action unit and group 
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Amplitude Sig Sig Sig Sig N.S. N.S. Sig 
Peak Latency Sig Sig N.S. Sig N.S. N.S. Sig 
Up Rate N.S. Sig N.S. Sig N.S. N.S. N.S. 
Down Rate N.S. Sig Sig Sig N.S. N.S. N.S. 
Onset Latency N.S. Sig Sig Sig N.S. N.S. N.S. 
Offset Latency Sig Sig Sig Sig N.S. N.S. Sig 
 
There were significant effects of group with regards to amplitude, down rate, onset 
latency, and offset latency. There were also significant three-way interactions with 
amplitude, peak latency, and offset latency. In general, the early group evidenced 
greater emotional sensitivity as shown by higher scores, and these results are 
summarized below. Descriptively, the early group were consistently more sensitive than 
the late group to surprise, disgust, and sadness across all six temporal parameters. The 
early group were also consistently more sensitive than the late group with regards to 
the temporal parameters of down rate, onset latency, and offset latency, for all six 
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emotional expressions. 
 
  
119 
 
Experiment Two 
 
Methods 
 
Participants 
 
Participants had a mean age 23.22 (SD 2.9; range 20-29), and seven subjects were 
female with one male subject. Subjects reported good general health, with no evidence 
of any sleep disorder (i.e., narcolepsy, sleep-related breathing disorder, periodic limb 
movements or restless legs syndrome, circadian rhythm sleep disorder, or parasomnias). 
All subjects were Western Caucasian. In exchange for participation subjects were paid 
£20, and this study had the approval of the local Ethics Committee. 
 
In addition, no subjects met the following exclusion criteria: 
 Morningness-Eveningness Questionnaire (Horne and Ostberg, 1976) scores < 31, 
or > 69, indicating an extreme preference. 
 Insomnia Severity Index (Bastien, Vallieres, and Morin, 2001) scores > 14. 
 Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (Zigmond and Snaith, 1983) scores > 10 on 
either subcomponent, indicating clinically significant distress. 
 Positive endorsement of “Do you have an insomnia complaint?” 
 Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index (Buysse et al., 1989) scores > 6. 
 Toronto Alexithymia Scale (Bagby, Parker and Taylor, 1994) scores > 60. 
 
Stimuli 
 
The platform used to generate the facial stimuli is described in detail by Yu, Garrod and 
Schyns (2012). Dynamic expressions were shown on four male and four female 
identities, and displayed the six emotions (anger, fear, happy, sad, disgust, surprise, 
and happy), at 15 levels of intensity. Emotion expressions were presented in three 
sessions of 240 trials (720 in total), and each test session contained roughly the same 
distributions of intensities across all identities and emotions. This resulted in five blocks 
of 48 trials per session, with eight identities by six emotions. Example stimimii are 
shown below. 
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Figure 19. Example stimuli
 
 
Questionnaires 
 
Participants completed the PSQI and ISI, as well as the MEQ, HADS, STQ, TAS-20, 
alongside demographic information. The state measures of the KSS and DISS were given 
after each task, as well as a sleep diary for the test day (Carney et al., 2012). 
Participants completed an additional 7-day sleep diary before testing, and in the week 
between the two test sessions. 
 
Procedure 
 
Potential subjects completed brief pre-test questions to ensure their status as normal 
sleepers. The study protocol is described in the figure below. After an initial meeting, 
where subjects were given actiwatches to wear on their non-dominant hand, subjects 
completed a 7-day sleep diary. This information was used to guide the scheduling of a 2-
hour ‘task window’ at approximately three hours or fifteen hours since waking; times 
which were subsequently validated with task day sleep diaries. Actiwatches provided an 
additional measure of sleep scheduling, and were used record activity levels as an 
objective measure of sleep patterns. Half of the subjects completed the late session 
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first and the early session second in order to control for order effects, in a within 
subjects design. Participants completed the emotion task and state measures over three 
test sessions, followed by a 7-day sleep diary, and then the final emotion task. The 
emotions, identities, and intensity levels of expressions were counterbalanced across 
test days, and repeated at the second task. The emotion task consisted of viewing the 
facial display of emotion and labeling the emotion shown, from seven options, and 
rating its intensity. Intensity was judged via a five-point scale, anchored at ‘very strong’ 
and ‘very weak’. Participants completed the study online from their own home, and 
were instructed to complete the task in a quiet room free from distractions, with the 
computer screen an arms’s length away. Participants then returned the actiwatches to 
the researcher, and completed the final questionnaires before being debriefed. 
Parametric test were used for the analysis (Howell, 2002) and effect sizes are reported 
in Appendix 2.  
 
Results 
 
Actigraphy data 
 
In a first step, actigraphy data were averaged over test days for each individual 
participant. Data was unavailable for one subject due to non-adherence, and 50% of the 
individual subject averages were calculated over the six test days. 
 
Table 12. Summary of actigraphy scores in the sample 
 Median Mean Std Dev 
SOL (mins) 25.00 28.51 17.25 
WASO (mins) 61.00 60.63 29.59 
WAKE (#) 30.17 26.36 8.59 
TST (hours) 5.95 6.40 1.01 
TiB (hours) 8.28 8.02 1.23 
SE (%) 77.19 78.24 8.45 
Abbreviations: sleep onset latency (SOL), wake time after sleep onset (WASO), number 
of night-time awakenings (WAKE), total sleep time (TST), time in bed (TIB), sleep 
efficiency (SE). 
 
Results from actigraphy suggest that participants fell asleep within thirty minutes and 
were awake for around thirty minutes during the night, with several night-time 
awakenings. The total sleep time of participants was around six hours or greater, with 
at least eight hours in bed. The sleep efficiency of participants was close to 80%. 
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Manipulation check 
 
1) TSW  
 
Results suggest significant differences between the early and late groups on time since 
waking (T (7) = - 16.28, P < 0.001). The testing of the early group took place on average 
at 3:04 (SD 01:33), and the testing of the late group took place on average at 14:55 (SD 
00:56). 
 
Figure 20. Time since waking (TSW) between groups. 
2) Sleepiness 
Figure 21. Karolinska Sleepiness Scale (KSS) scores between groups. 
 
 
Results suggest significant differences between groups in subjective sleepiness (T (7) = - 
2.89, p = 0.02). 
 
3) Subjective mood 
 
Figure 22. Daytime Impact of Sleep Scale (DISS) scores between groups 
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Abbreviations: Alert Cognition (AC); Positive Affect (PA); Negative Affect (NA), 
Sleepiness/Fatigue (SF). ‘o’ refers to a suspected data outlier. 
 
When sleep groups were compared on the DISS, there were significant group differences 
in AC (T (7) = 2.46, p, 0.05) and SF (T (7) = - 3.27, p < 0.05), with the late group 
reporting greater sleepiness/fatigue and less alertness. There were no significant group 
differences in PA (T (7) = - 0.81, p = 0.45) or NA (T (7) = 1.63, p = 0.15). 
 
Task results 
 
There were no significant group differences in categorization accuracy (z = -0.90, p = 
0.37). We then compared groups on the intensity ratings of the emotional faces, with 
the fifteen levels of emotional intensity grouped into five stimuli intensity categories 
for the purpose of analysis. There were significant group effects with intensity ratings. 
In particular, there was a significant interaction of intensity and group (F (4, 6818) = 
195.77, p < 0.001), emotion and group (F (5, 6818) = 6.63, p < 0.001), but no significant 
interaction of emotion and intensity (F (20, 6818) = 1.55, p = 0.06), or three-way 
interaction (F (20, 6818) = 0.87, p = 0.62). There were main effects of group (F (1, 
6818) = 261.51, p < 0.001), intensity (F (4, 6818) = 189.56, p < 0.001), and emotion (F 
(5, 6818) = 3.21, p < 0.001). 
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Figure 23. Perceived intensity of each of the six emotions between groups. 
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Follow-up t-test suggests that there are no significant differences with happy, surprise, 
fear or disgust (all p > 0.01), although there were significant group differences with 
anger, at intensity levels two and three (both p = 0.01), and with sad, at levels three (p 
= 0.01), four (p < 0.001) and five (p < 0.005). In particular, the late group made higher 
assessments of intensity. These comparions are the equivalent of significance at the 
level of 0.05/6 (= 0.01), and are consistent with the analysis in Chapter 4. 
 
Experiment Two Summary 
 
Results suggest that there were significant effects of group on time since waking. There 
were no significant effects on mood (positive affect or negative affect). However there 
were significant effects of group on sleepiness, alert cognition and sleepiness/fatigue. 
With regards to the emotion task, there were no significant effects of categorization 
accuracy with regards to the emotion labels, although there was a significant effect of 
accuracy with regards to the intensity labels. In particular, there was a significant main 
effect of group, and interactions of group with both emotion and intensity. The three-
way interaction was not significant. This effect seems to be driven by significant group 
differences with anger at intensities two and three, and sad at intensities three, four 
and five. Results suggest that the late group were more sensitive for each of these 
comparisons. 
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Discussion 
 
Overall, there were no significant effects of time since waking on emotional 
categorization in either of the two experiments, suggesting that time since waking does 
not affect emotional categorization, with dynamic faces. However, there were 
significant effects of group on the perceived intensity of emotional faces, when tested 
within-subjects. In particular, results suggest that the late group were more sensitive to 
emotionality in faces, with significant effects with angry and sad faces in the mid-
intensity range. This suggests that intensity (expressed or rated) could perhaps be 
especially sensitive in assessing subject emotionality, a conclusion which is consistent 
with the results from Kyle et al. (2014), Van Der Helm et al. (2010), and results from 
the previous study. It has been suggested that intensity ratings follow on from 
emotional categorization, although manipulating the intensity of a stimulus increases 
the accuracy of recognition as well as intensity ratings (Utuma et al., 2009). There were 
also significant effects of group with the temporal parameters used for the 4D faces. In 
particular, there were significant effects with group for the peak latency and 
amplitude, the down rate, and the onset and offset latencies. However, there were no 
significant effects of group on emotional categorization or intensity labels in this task, 
and this discrepancy may be due to one of several factors. 
 
Experiment One took place in the laboratory and was a between-subjects design, 
whereas Experiment Two took place online using a within-subjects design. This meant 
that there were significant differences between groups in the test environment. 
Conditioned arousal to the bedroom environment is thought to play a role in normal 
sleep and insomnia (Broomfield, Gumley and Espie, 2005; Espie, 2002). For example, 
sleep-onset insomnia patients have been found to show less de-arousal in the lead up to 
sleep when compared to controls (Robertson, Broomfield, and Espie, 2007), and the 
periods around awakening from sleep and going to bed may be especially relevant to 
people with insomnia (Harvey, 2002). Future studies should investigate the role of the 
test environment in order to assess whether this contributed towards the current 
results. However, it is possible that other uncontrollable differences in the testing 
environment contributed towards these results (e.g. ambient noise, lighting, location). 
 
The use of online testing also meant that there were differences between studies with 
regards to the test times. The test times of early test sessions were similar, at close to 
four hours since waking in Experiment One and three hours since waking in Experiment 
Two. Proximity to waking is known to affect cognitive performance in the period 
immediately following awakening, a phenomenon known as sleep inertia. Sleep inertia 
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has typically been found to last 30 minutes after awakening, although performance can 
continue to improve for up to two hours (Tassi and Muzet, 2000). As both experiments 
tested subjects at around 3 or 4 hours since waking, it appears unlikely that sleep 
inertia effects were present in the early testing periods.  
 
The late testing time of subjects was more dissimilar when comparing Experiments One 
and Two. In Experiment One, testing took place on average at around twelve hours 
since wake, whereas in Experiment Two testing took place at around fifteen hours since 
wake. This could be reflected in subject self-reports. In Experiment Two of this 
chapter, subjects reported significantly greater sleepiness and sleepiness/fatigue, and 
significantly less alertness, a result which suggests correspondence of subjective fatigue 
with performance. This would be in keeping with the suggestion of Carrier and Monk 
(2000) that alertness ratings can predict performance. The period of evening alertness, 
or wake maintenance zone, could also be relevant (Strongatz, Kronauer, and Czeisler, 
1987). A recent study found performance on vigilance tasks to be significantly improved 
during the wake maintenance zone in comparison to earlier in the day (Shekleton et al., 
2013). Furthermore, this period has been linked to the dim light melatonin onset, and 
those subjects who have crossed this threshold report significantly greater fatigue 
(Gorfine and Zisapel, 2009). It is possible that those subjects in Experiment Two were 
tested after their period of evening alertness. This would be consistent with the 
significant group differences in alertness and sleepiness/fatigue, but not the emotional 
task results. This would need to be tested further in additional studies which include 
physiological measurements. 
 
In general, alertness is thought to be the result of interactions of sleep load and the 
circadian alerting signal (Cajochen, Blatter, and Wallach, 2004). Their interactions 
result in alertness increasing until the post-lunch period, with an additional evening 
peak in alertness which is followed by a decline in the lead-up to sleep (Cajochen, 
Blatter, and Wallach, 2004). Many studies have reported that cognitive performance 
mirrors core body temperature directly (Schmidt et al., 2007), especially when typical 
sleep/wake cycles are experimentally manipulated (Carrier and Monk, 2000). Forced 
desynchrony protocols can be used to identify the relative contributions of the circadian 
and homeostatic influences on performance (Schmidt et al., 2007),  with body 
temperature a “gold standard” in the assessment of human circadian rhythms (Carrier 
and Monk, 2000), although other factors such as task difficulty contribute towards 
performance (Schmidt et al., 2007; Waterhouse, 2010). Simple monotonous tasks which 
are reliant on sustained attention and working memory are more affected by sleep loss 
than more complex tasks (Cajochen, Blatter, and Wallach, 2004). Time since waking has 
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been linked to prefrontal fatigue, whereas the circadian system is linked to a brain 
slowing (Cajochen, Blatter, and Wallach, 2004). In general the task time of Experiment 
Two was around 15 minutes, whereas Experiment One took longer to complete, at 
around 45 minutes. Performance rhythms seem to be affected by both the circadian 
timing system and time since waking independently, and alertness ratings may be able 
to predict performance as well as bodily temperature (Carrier and Monk, 2000).  
 
A further relevant difference could relate to group differences in depression scores. In 
Experiment One, the depression scores of the early group were higher, with comparable 
scores between the late group and the participants taking part in Experiment Two. 
However, this factor seems unlikely to affect results as the scores of all participants 
were low, and below the threshold for subclinical levels of distress.  
 
The early group in Experiment One were also more inclined towards eveningness, and a 
main effect of research in circadian rhythms in performance is congruency between 
diurnal preference and test times, with results superimposed upon alertness in general 
(Schmidt et al., 2007). In particular, extreme types are thought to be phase-shifted 
(Schmidt et al., 2007). However this factor was not thought to contribute towards 
results as extreme chronotypes were excluded, and test times of the remaining 
participants were individualized according to typical wake times.  
 
Results suggest specific effects with regards to mid-intensity expressions of sadness and 
anger (Experiment Two). To summarize previous results, Chapter Three reported 
significant effects of sleep disruption the previous night, and depression, on happiness 
recognition. Chapter Four reported significant effects of insomnia on the recognition of 
high intensity expressions of sadness and low intensity expressions of surprise. In the 
current chapter (Chapter Five), Experiment One suggests that those subjects tested 
later tended to be less sensitive towards facial expressions, with regards to the 
temporal parameters of facial movements. Experiment Two suggests that those subjects 
tested later were more sensitive to emotional displays, with regards to mid-intensity 
expressions of sadness and anger. Results are thought to be a result of changes present 
at the late test session, as early test sessions are at comparable TSWs and beyond the 
point at which sleep inertia would be expected to be present. 
 
With regards to how specific emotions are processed, Loughead et al. (2008) have 
looked at which brain regions were linked to the accuracy of identification of sadness, 
happiness, fear and anger. Healthy participants with a mean age of 27 viewed the 
emotion faces and neutral for 3 seconds, and were asked to indicate whether they 
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displayed the target or not. Greater activation of the amygdala for anger, and the 
thalamus, amygdala, inferior frontal regions, midfrontal regions and fusiform gyrus for 
fear, were found with correct identifications. Greater activation of the thalamus in 
particular was found with poorer recognition of happiness, and greater activation of the 
midfrontal regions were found with sadness recognition errors. In this task, bilateral 
frontal, amygdala, thalamus, fusiform gyrus and cuneus, cerebellum and right 
parahippocampal and angular gyri regions were active during the processing of all 
emotions, except the inferior frontal gyrus which did not respond in happy blocks. In 
another study, Blair et al. (1999) asked subjects to view sad and angry faces of varying 
intensity while making an incidental sex classification. They report increasing activation 
in the left amygdala, right temporal pole, right inferior temporal gyrus and right middle 
temporal gyrus with increasing intensity of sad expressions. With regards to angry faces, 
activations within the right orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and anterior cingulate cortex 
(ACC) correlated with the increasing intensity of the angry faces.  
 
The OFC has been linked to learning (Rolls, 2004), and the ACC has roles in emotional 
regulation and emotional appraisal (Etkin, Enger, and Kalisch, 2011), with a role of both 
in learning-based decision making (Rushworth et al., 2007). The amygdala has been 
found to contribute towards stress, emotion and fear (van Marle et al., 2009; Hartley 
and Phelps, 2010; Calder, Lawrence and Young, 2001; Adolphs, 2008). In general, the 
medial prefrontal cortex has been associated with behaviour, assessments of value, and 
self-reflection, giving it a role in social cognition (Amodio and Frith, 2006). Phillips et 
al. (2003) have reviewed the brain systems which are involved in emotion perception, in 
normal subjects and psychiatric illness. They implicate changes in the sensitivity of the 
amygdala and insula, ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, ventral anterior cingulate gyrus, 
and thalamus, ventral striatum, and the lability/regulation in interaction with the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, dorsal anterior cingulated 
gyrus, and hippocampus, as the neural structures involved in emotion perception. These 
areas are thought to be the neural substrates of emotion regulation, affective states, 
and the appraisal of emotion, and these processes are thought to be disrupted in 
psychiatric illness (Phillips et al., 2003). Future studies should investigate how sleep 
affects emotion recognition with regards to its brain correlates. 
 
A possible limitation relates to the sample sizes in these two studies. However, 
differences in the tasks or groups are thought to be the most likely explanation for the 
current results. These sample sizes are also consistent with both psychophysics methods 
and the circadian literature. Moreover, the nature of the repeated sampling methods 
used made the testing of larger sample sizes impractical. 
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The current results may have been due to alterations in emotional sensitivity in the 
morning or in the evening, although changes in the evening are thought to be the most 
likely explanation. However, to assess how emotional sensitivity may change over the 
waking period we next assessed emotion recognition at four different times since 
waking. We also used the Ekman and Friesen (1976) faces to assess whether emotion 
recognition differences at different times since waking were attributable to the use of 
dynamic faces. In order to assess reaction time performance, we did not assess 
emotional intensity. However, performance was investigated more generally by the 
addition of emotional images and an object matching task. 
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Chapter Six 
 
 
Emotion recognition in normal sleepers – is there a role of time since waking 
across the day?  
 
Abstract 
 
Sleep deprivation affects mood and emotional reactivity; results which have been 
supported by recent experimental paradigms. However, even within the waking day 
there are diurnal changes in mood and alertness, and how this may correspond to 
changes in emotional sensitivity is currently unclear. The current study aims to test how 
emotional sensitivity may change over the day, assessed via emotional categorization 
tasks. Subjective measures of mood and alertness were also used, in order to assess the 
correspondence of subjective reports with objective task performance. In a between-
subjects design, participants completed a recognition task with emotional faces and 
images. A delayed-matching-to-sample task with everyday objects was also used as a 
visual comparison. Four time-since-waking groups were created, and these times ranged 
from roughly three hours since waking, to twelve hours since waking. No significant 
effects were found on emotional categorization with faces or images, or object 
recognition. Results suggest that there are no effects of time since waking on emotional 
categorization over the typical working day. 
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Emotion recognition in normal sleepers – is there a role of time since waking 
across the day?  
 
Introduction 
 
Good sleep is important to physical, mental, and emotional well-being (see, e.g., 
Baglioni, Spiegelhalder, Lombardo, and Riemann, 2010; Roth, 2007), and the adverse 
effects of stress on sleep are well known (Naidoo, 2009; Buckley and Schatzberg, 2005; 
Balbo, Leproult and Van Cauter, 2010). It is now well established that sleep disruption 
leads to changes in a person’s mood state, which can amplify the effects of negative 
events and dampen the effects of positive events (e.g. Zohar et al., 2005). Similarly, 
sleep disruption before a traumatic event such as a motor vehicle accident increases 
the likelihood that a psychiatric illness will develop, even among trauma patients 
without a prior psychiatric disorder (Bryant et al., 2010). These previously healthy 
subjects have been found to be over three times more likely to develop a psychiatric 
disorder (Bryant et al., 2010). A previous history of insomnia has also been found to 
increase the likelihood of developing depression (Baglioni et al., 2011), further stressing 
the bidirectional relationships between sleep and mental health (Kahn, Sheppes, and 
Sadeh, 2013). As sleep disruption is common in the general population (see, e.g., Roth, 
2007) it is therefore important to understand how sleep problems develop. 
 
Recently, the effects of sleep loss on emotional task performance have been 
investigated. In such tasks, sleep deprivation has been found to affect responses to 
emotional images (e.g. Yoo et al., 2007) and faces (e.g. Van der Helm et al., 2010). 
These authors found that a lack of sleep reduces emotional intensity judgements of 
angry and happy faces. These effects were most evident in relatively ambiguous 
emotional expressions that were produced by morphing angry and happy faces with 
neutral faces, suggesting a specific impairment in recognizing subtle facial expressions 
of emotion (Van der Helm, Gujar, and Walker, 2010). Effects have also been reported 
on the ratings of emotional faces following naps, in contrast to a no-nap condition 
(Gujar et al., 2011). Such results have been used to suggest a role of sleep in “re-
calibrating” the human emotional brain, and used as evidence that emotions become 
dysregulated without sleep (Gujar et al., 2011). These studies are important as they 
suggest that sleep disruption affects the ability to process emotion in healthy 
individuals, showing sleep and emotion are closely linked. 
 
An understanding of the processes involved in normal sleep is important in order to 
understand how insomnia develops (c.f. Espie, 2002). Of particular relevance, both 
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sleep homeostatic and circadian processes have been implicated in the etiology of 
insomnia, and the relative contributions of these processes vary across the day (e.g. 
Richardson, 2007; Pigeon and Perlis, 2006; Benoit and Aguire, 1996). In the 
physiobiological model of Espie (2002), normal sleep is thought to be maintained and 
reinforced by sleep homeostasis, circadian timing, and sleep quality (Espie, 2002). 
These three processes are thought to result in a sleep pattern which is able to tolerate 
and accommodate stressors, and which defaults to good sleep (Espie, 2002). Normal 
sleep is therefore thought to occur automatically, without explicit conscious effort. In 
particular, stressors, whether behavioural, mental, or physiological, are not sufficient 
to inhibit good sleep, and de-arousal is not inhibited. However, the inhibition of de-
arousal is itself thought to be sufficient to cause poor sleep, and additional factors can 
lead to insomnia (Espie, 2002). Predisposing, precipitating, and perpetuating factors are 
thought to contribute towards the transition from acute to chronic insomnia (Espie, 
2007). The neurobiological model of insomnia also describes normal sleep-wake 
function, and suggests interactions of arousal, circadian rhythms, and the homeostatic 
sleep drive (Buysse et al., 2011). As such, circadian and homeostatic processes are 
important to both normal sleep and insomnia, and the relative contributions of each to 
sleepiness and arousal vary over the day. 
 
Importantly, de-arousal is affected by emotion (c.f. Espie, 2002), and the brain areas 
identified in the neurobiological model are closely linked to emotion (Buysse et al., 
2011) suggesting close linked between insomnia and emotion (c.f. Baglioni et al., 2010). 
Indeed, the maintenance of insomnia is thought to be affected by excessively negatively 
toned cognitive activity and its effects on daytime functioning (Harvey, 2002). Daytime 
variation in psychological and physiological parameters, and evidence of diurnal effects 
have been reported in mood (Buysse et al., 2007; Levitt et al., 2004; Ong et al., 2011), 
emotional brain activation  (Hasler et al., 2012), and cardiovascular activity (Covassin 
et al., 2011). In particular, Buysse et al. (2007) have investigated daytime variations in 
mood in insomnia, identifying four factors which were related to negative mood, 
positive mood, sleepiness/fatigue, and alert cognition. The daytime effects of these 
measures were different between normal sleepers and insomnia patients, in particular, 
alert cognition showed a small increase over the day in insomnia, whereas normal 
sleepers evidenced a decline towards the evening. Group differences were most 
apparent at specific times, with divergent scores on positive mood and 
sleepiness/fatigue in the morning and evening, and on negative mood in the evening 
(Buysse et al., 2007). In a study by the same group, Levitt et al. (2004) found that there 
were significant differences between normal sleepers and insomnia patients at specific 
times of day. Control subjects were found to have significantly greater morning mood, 
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concentration, energy, and alertness; and greater alertness and energy at noon. These 
studies show that diurnal variations in mood are pertinent among people with insomnia, 
in keeping with evidence of variability in task performance over the waking period in 
normal sleepers (c.f. Valdez, Reilly and Waterhouse, 2008; Schmidt et al,. 2007; 
Waterhouse 2010; Folkard, 1990). For example, circadian rhythms affect performance, 
as do increasing wakefulness, and optimal performance often mirrors core body 
temperature (c.f. Valdez, Reilly and Waterhouse, 2008; Schmidt et al,. 2007; 
Waterhouse 2010; Folkard, 1990). 
 
As such, research to date has established that 1) emotion and sleep are closely linked; 
2) experimental tasks of emotional functioning can be sensitive to sleep-related changes 
and show diurnal variation, and 3) an understanding of sleep and emotion in healthy 
people under typical conditions is important in order to fully understand insomnia. 
Given the newness of research investigating the effects of sleep on emotion recognition, 
an important first step seems to be to clarify how time since waking may affect 
sensitivity towards emotional information among normal sleepers. In particular, how 
sensitivity towards emotional information may fluctuate over the working day seems to 
be pertinent. As emotion perception tasks have only recently been employed in people 
with insomnia (Kyle et al., 2014), and given the importance of homeostatic and 
circadian processes in normal sleep (c.f. Espie, 2002), we decided to assess normal 
sleepers in order to investigate possible diurnal effects in emotion perception.  
 
In particular, the processes involved in emotion perception are thought to be linked to 
mood and emotional regulation (Phillips et al., 2003), and the emotional state of others 
is important for social interactions (e.g. Bruce and Young, 1998; Calder and Young, 
2005). While we have previously used dynamic images, additional advantages of static 
images (Ekman and Freisen, 1976) include the extensive extant research with these 
stimuli; and the categorical perception of emotional faces has been established (e.g. 
Fugate, 2013). These stimuli were therefore used to assess whether previous results 
were due to the nature of the stimuli. Emotional images were also used as an emotional 
control task, and an image matching task was used to assess visual perception as well. 
Emotional scenes, such as the International Affective Pictures, or IAPS series (Lang, 
Bradley, and Cuthbert, 2008), are also commonly used within the study of emotion. 
Emotion faces and IAPS images have been compared directly, with faces rated as having 
lower subjective arousal and valence (Britton et al., 2006). Given the normal waking 
period lasts around 17 hours, with a typical sleep duration of 7 hours (Lund et al., 
2010), participants were scheduled to complete the task at one of four times 
throughout the working day. Test times were individualized according to each subjects’s 
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sleep schedule. It was hypothesized that emotions would show evidence of 
dysregulation over the working day, evidenced via an emotion recognition task. This 
would be consistent with results from Chapter 5. 
 
Methods 
 
Participants 
 
Subjects were recruited from around campus, and ages ranged from 18 – 38 (M = 22.29, 
SD = 0.49). There were 54 females and 33 males, and 8% of subjects were nationals of 
European or American nations. An initial screening questionnaire consisting of the 
Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index (Buysse et al., 1989) was used to exclude outright those 
subjects with evidence of sleep disruption. All participants reported good physical and 
mental health, without recreational drug use at testing. This study was conducted in 
accordance with the local Ethics Committee. 
 
Additional exclusion criteria were: 
 
 Morningness-Eveningness Questionnaire (Horne and Ostberg, 1976) scores < 31, 
or > 69, indicating an extreme preference. 
 Insomnia Severity Index (Bastien, Vallieres, and Morin, 2001) scores > 14.  
 Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (Zigmond and Snaith, 1983) scores > 10 on 
either subcomponent, indicating significant distress. 
 Positive endorsement of “Do you have an insomnia complaint?” 
 Toronto Alexithymia Scale (Bagby, Parker and Taylor, 1994) scores > 60. 
 Total sleep time < 6 hours on the night before testing. 
 Sleep efficiency scores < 80% on the night before testing. 
 
Stimuli and Measures 
 
 Morningness-Eveningness Questionnaire (MEQ; Horne and Ostberg, 1976).  
 Insomnia Severity Index (ISI; Bastien, Vallieres and Morin, 2001).  
 Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS; Zigmond and Snaith, 1983)  
 Sleep Diary (Morin and Espie, 2004).  
 Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index (PSQI; Buysse et al., 1989).  
 Toronoto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20; Bagby, Parker and Taylor, 1994).  
 Karolinska Sleepiness Scale (KSS; Akerstedt and Gillberg, 1990). 
 Global Vigor and Affect Schedule (GVAS; Monk, 1989). 
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Emotion faces 
 
The face recognition task consisted of 40 Ekman and Friesen (1976) faces displaying 
expressions of sadness, happiness, anger and fear. Each face was repeated once, giving 
a total set of 80 faces, and each emotion was posed by 5 males and 5 females. Faces 
were greyscale, and cropped with an oval mask to remove extraneous visual cues. 
Average dimensions of faces were 5.15 by 7.15 cm.  
 
Figure 24. Example facial stimuli 
 
 
Emotion images 
 
Emotion images were selected from the IAPS series (Lang, Bradley, and Cuthbert, 2008) 
following pilot tests, with 10 images chosen to depict each of sad, happy, angry, and 
fear based on subject responses. Images were repeated once, at maximum screen 
dimensions (28.6 by 21.8 cm), to give a total set of 80 images. When the mean arousal 
and valence ratings for each image were obtained from normative data (Lang, Bradley, 
and Cuthbert, 2008) and compared, an ANOVA suggested a significant effect of emotion 
on valence ratings (F (3, 36) = 51.04, p < 0.001), with Bonferroni tests suggesting 
significant differences between happy and the other three emotions (all p < 0.001). 
There was also a significant effect of emotion on arousal ratings (F (3, 36) = 9.08, p < 
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0.001). Bonferroni tests were significant between sad and anger (p < 0.001), and sad 
and fear (p = 0.001). As such, happy images were rated more positively than the other 
emotions, with sad images rated as less arousing than angry and fear. 
 
Figure 25. Example image stimuli 
 
 
Matching Familiar Figures Test (MFFT) 
 
Stimuli are twenty greyscale line drawings of objects (e.g., a lamp, ship, or truck), with 
an image presented at the top of the screen. The identical image and five alternatives 
presented below in a three by two matrix. Participants were asked to respond with the 
numeric keypad (1 – 6) to identify the matching object, and stimuli were presented until 
response. Each image was presented once at maximum screen dimensions (28.6 by 21.8 
cm). These images were developed by Kagan (1965) to assess cognitive style, and 
performance in this task has been found to correlate with the matching of unfamiliar 
faces (Burton, White and McNeill, 2010). 
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Figure 26. Example MFFT stimuli 
 
 
Procedure 
 
Participants were recruited via the School of Psychology subject pool, and word of 
mouth, and took part in exchange for £6 or course credits. They were initially emailed 
the PSQI, with normal sleepers asked to complete a week-long sleep diary. Sleep diary 
data formed the basis of test times, which were scheduled at 3, 6, 9 or 12 hours since 
median weekday wake-times. Participants then came in to the School of Psychology to 
complete the task, which consisted of emotion recognition from faces and images.  
 
Participants were asked to recognize the emotion shown as quickly and accurately as 
possible from four choices, and faces were presented until response. Responses were 
made via the keyboard, and the keys ‘d’, ‘f’, ‘j’, and ‘k’ were labeled as angry, fear, 
happy and sad, respectively. Participants were familiarized with the key responses 
through 16 practice trials where they labeled emotion words. 
 
Stimuli were presented on a black screen, preceded by a central fixation cross of 750 
milliseconds, and followed by a blank screen of 500 ms. The emotion faces were 
presented randomly in two blocks with an optional 30 second break between them, 
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followed by the same procedure for the IAPS stimuli. Participants then completed the 
MFFT. Following this, participants completed the questionnaire battery. 
 
The questionnaire battery was comprised of the state measures of the Karolinska 
Sleepiness Scale (KSS), mood questions, and sleep diary. The Toronto Alexithymia Scale 
(TAS-20), MEQ, HADS, and ISI were also given, and used to exclude clinical scorers on 
anxiety, depression, insomnia, and alexithymia, as well as extreme morningness-
eveningness types.  
 
Results 
 
Firstly, the sleep of all subjects the night before testing is described below. 
 
Table 13. Sleep diary results in the sample 
 Mean Median Std Dev 
SOL (mins) 11.82 10.00 9.80 
WAKE (#) .46 .00 .80 
WASO (mins) 3.02 .00 6.52 
TST (hours) 7.93 7.83 1.23 
TiB (hours) 8.33 8.08 1.27 
SE (%) 95.83 95.77 12.79 
QUALITY (0-4) 2.94 3.00 .91 
REST (0-4) 2.82 3.00 .80 
Abbreviations: sleep onset latency (SOL), wake time after sleep onset (WASO), number 
of night-time awakenings (WAKE), total sleep time (TST), time in bed (TIB), sleep 
efficiency (SE), quality (QUAL); restful/restorativeness (REST). 
 
Participants reported a normal sleep duration, with minimal evidence of sleep 
disruption as assessed by SOL, WASO, SE and WAKE. The time in bed of subjects was also 
normal, and subjects experienced their sleep as restful and of good quality 
 
Manipulation check 
 
1) The median weekday time-since-wake (TSW) was used to gauge subjects’ 
habitual sleep schedule, and estimate test times at three, six, nine or twelve 
hours since waking. In a first step, test-day TSW was calculated, and cut-offs for 
four groups of equal size were obtained. Following visual inspection of the 
scatter plot of time since waking on the day of testing, subject groups were 
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finalized. As a result, the three hour group n = 22, the six hour group n = 24, the 
nine hour group n = 20, and the twelve hour group n = 21.  
 
In order to validate group allocation, we then compared the four groups on their 
TSW. There was a significant effect of group on TSW (F (3, 86) = 515.27, p < 
0.001), with follow-up Bonferroni comparisons suggesting all comparisons were 
significant. 
 
Figure 27. Time since waking (TSW) between groups 
 
 
2) Next, the sleepiness levels of all groups, measured via the KSS, were compared. 
However, there were no significant group differences on reported sleepiness 
(Kruskal-Wallis Test (3) = 5.82, p = 0.12). 
 
Figure 28. Karolinska Sleepiness Scale (KSS) scores between groups. 
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3) Sleep groups were then compared on subjective mood, with no significant group 
differences in global affect (F (3, 83) = 0.29, p = 0.83). However, there was a 
significant group difference in global vigor (Kruskal-Wallis Test (3) = 8.45, p < 
0.05). There were significant differences between the 3 hour and 12 hour group 
(Mann-Whitney U = 107.50, p < 0.005). No other comparisons were significant 
(all p > 0.06). 
 
Figure 29. Global vigor (GV) and affect (GA) scores between groups 
 
Emotion recognition from faces 
 
Following visual inspection of the data, each of the four emotions were analyzed 
individually in nonparametric tests. Effect sizes can be found in Appendix 2. 
 
Results suggest significant group differences with happy faces (Kruskal-Wallis Test (3) = 
8.46, p < 0.05). However, no paired comparison was significant (all p > 0.16). No other 
comparisons were significant (all p > 0.26). There were no significant group differences 
for any emotion on reaction times (all p > 0.21). 
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Figure 30. Error rates and reaction times between groups 
 
Abbreviations: anger (a); fear (f); happy (h); sad (s), reaction times (RT). A ‘*’ indicates 
an outlier and a ‘o’ indicates a suspected outlier. 
  
The effects with happy face recognition were followed up by regression models with 
total sleep time, time in bed, sleep onset latency, wake time after sleep onset, number 
of awakenings, sleep quality and sleep restorativeness; however no model was 
significant (all p > 0.41). As no results were significant the issue of multiple comparisons 
was not considered. 
 
Emotion recognition from images 
 
There were no significant group differences in the accuracy of recognition with any of 
the emotions (all p > 0.12), or on reaction times (all p > 0.58). Effect sizes can be found 
in Appendix 2. As no results were significant the issue of multiple comparisons was not 
considered. 
 
Figure 31. Error rate and reaction times between groups 
 
Abbreviations: anger (a); fear (f); happy (h); sad (s), reaction times (RT). A ‘*’ indicates 
an outlier and a ‘o’ indicates a suspected outlier. 
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Image matching 
 
There were no significant group differences in the matching-to-sample task, on 
accuracy (Kruskal-Wallis test (3) = 1.46, p = 0.68) or reaction times (Kruskal-Wallis test 
(3) = 1.91, p= 0.59). As no results were significant the issue of multiple comparisons was 
not considered. Effect sizes can be found in Appendix 2. 
 
Discussion 
 
Results from these tasks suggest that time since waking does not affect emotion 
recognition towards faces or images, or performance on an object-matching task. These 
results are against predictions from the previous chapter, and there are both theoretical 
(Espie, 2002; Valdez et al., 2008) and experimental (Buysee et al., 2007; Hasler et al., 
2008; Hot, Leconte, and Sequeira, 2005) reasons to expect diurnal variation in 
emotional sensitivity. However, there were some indications of an increased error rate 
towards happiness in the earliest group, a finding which is consistent with results from 
Chapter Three which found effects of sleep on happiness categorization and reaction 
time. The TSW was also comparable to Chapter 5 Experiment One, which found that the 
early group were more sensitive to temporal parameters of the facial expressions. Also 
unlike Chapter 5 Experiment One was the evidence of significant differences between 
the earliest and latest groups on global vigour. There were no group differences on 
subjective mood or sleepiness in Chapter 5 Experiment One, although there were 
significant group differences on alert cognition and sleepiness/fatigue in Chapter 5 
Experiment Two. In both, alert cognition was lower at a later test time. Results appear 
to confirm the importance of the dynamic stimuli which were used in the preceding 
chapter, especially given the presence of significant group differences in subjective 
mood. Several possible reasons for these results are discussed. 
 
One possible reason for the lack of significant group differences could relate to a lack of 
significant groups differences in wakefulness or subjective mood between the four 
groups. However, there were significant group differences in the time since wake on the 
test days, with results suggesting that these group differences are significant between 
all four groups. Secondly, self-reported global vigour was significantly different between 
the earliest and latest sleep groups. However, there were no significant effects of sleep 
group on sleepiness or global affect, suggesting that the effects of the experimental 
manipulation on sleepiness were subtle. Previous studies have found diurnal variations 
in mood (e.g. Levitt et al., 2004), and this may have been expected to be reflected in 
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task performance. It is also possible that self-reported mood is not closely related to 
emotional task performance, and this could be relevant to the communicatory role of 
facial expressions of emotion (c.f. Gross and Barrett, 2011). 
 
A second reason for the failure to find significant effects of time since waking on 
emotion recognition could relate to the tasks which were used. In particular, emotional 
categorization may not be sensitive to diurnal variation, and fluctuations in alertness 
over the waking period may be difficult to detect without particularly sensitive tasks 
(Killgore, 2010). In addition, as static faces tend to be recognized with high accuracy 
(e.g. Calvo and Lundqvist, 2008), dynamic facial expressions (e.g. Yu, Garrod, and 
Schyns, 2012) could perhaps be more sensitive, and have greater ecological validity. 
With regards to the effects of sleep on perceptual performance, the effects of sleep 
deprivation on visual tasks are subtle and can be absent when time is not constrained or 
less sensitive measures are used (Killgore, 2010; see also Williamson and Friswell, 2011). 
Those effects which are found tend to reflect deficits in top-down influences (Killgore, 
2010), and it could be pertinent that emotional categorization or labeling seems to 
involve top-down control of the emotional brain (Hariri, Bookheimer and Mazziotta, 
2000; Liebermann et al., 2007). This explanation appears most likely in light of the 
previous chapter, which reported effects with the 4D stimuli with regards to emotional 
intensity ratings and temporal parameters.  
 
An additional reason for the failure to find significant effects could relate to behavioral 
performance measures, and it is possible that compensatory brain regions were 
employed to counteract any effects of sleep loss (Drummond et al., 2004), or the 
relevant brain areas were unaffected by time-since-waking. It could also be relevant 
that testing was scheduled within the period of the typical working day, and did not 
capture the de-arousal process which occurs in the lead-up to sleep (Robertson, 
Broomfield and Espie, 2007; Levitt et al., 2004). This could suggest that the effects of 
sleepiness or time since wake are only apparent at higher levels of homeostatic sleep 
pressure, such as in sleep deprivation paradigms, or when the circadian alerting signal 
has diminished in the evening.  
 
In the psychomotor vigilance task, a gold-standard measure of sleep loss, performance 
defects have been found to become apparent at 16 hours of continual wakefulness, and 
increase thereafter (Killgore, 2010). While the groups differed significantly in global 
vigour, and time-since-waking, the maximum TSW fell below that which has been linked 
to performance impairments, with the maximum TSW group at around 14 hours. 
However, the clock times necessary to test a later TSW within the laboratory made late 
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testing times impractical. Neuroimaging techniques could also provide a more sensitive 
assessment. For example, Marek et al. (2010) used a Stroop paradigm to investigate 
aspects of attention, with four significant clusters of brain activation identified. These 
areas were particularly involved in the attentional orienting system, and included the 
frontal eye fields, an inferior parietal area, and the supplemental motor area. 
 
It is alos possible that the sample size whas two low to detect differences in task 
performance. However, these results together with chapter three suggest that the 
static faces task is not adequately sensitive to group differences. As the testing times of 
this study and that of Chapter 5 Experiment 1 are comparable, it appears possible that 
the these test times are not sensitive to sleep-related chages in emotion recognition 
performance, with the later within-subjects design was able to identify. 
 
As no significant effects of time of day were found on performance for all three tasks in 
the current chapter, it seems likely that emotional categorization performance is 
maintained across the daytime period. However, it is also possible that the current 
tasks were not sensitive to variations in emotionality. In keeping with this is the 
evidence of time of day effects with other methods. Hasler et al. (2008) report a 
significant diurnal pattern in socializing, laughing, and signing; behaviors associated 
with positive affect. Hot, Leconte, and Sequeira (2005) have found a significant linear 
trend in skin conductance response when unpleasant images are viewed across the day, 
in contrast to a significant quadratic trend with neutral images. As there is evidence of 
effects of time-since-waking in the previous chapter, results suggest that the current 
task was not sensitive to the effects of increasing wakefulness on emotional sensitivity 
due to the nature of stimuli and/or task. 
 
Results in this thesis suggest that sleep disruption the previous night affects the 
recognition of happiness, although this result is not confirmed within the current sample 
of normal sleepers. There is also evidence that insomnia affects the recognition of high 
intensity expressions of sadness and low intensity expressions of surprise. When normal 
sleepers are tested at different times of day, there is evidence of effects of time-since-
waking on sensitivity towards the temporal parameters of 4D faces, and in the 
recognition of intensity in mid-intensity expressions of sadness and anger. There are no 
effects of time-since-waking on emotional sensitivity across the day when reaction 
times and categorization are assessed in static faces. Given evidence of sleep variability 
in insomnia (Vallieres et al., 2005; Perlis et al., 2010; Buysse et al., 2010), and the 
multiple testing sessions used with the 4D faces, the effects of insomnia on emotional 
sensitivity at different times of day were not assessed further at this time. An additional 
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concern related to the results reported in Chapter 5, and the precise reasons for these 
effects. However, people with insomnia would be expected to assess their sleep upon 
awakening, and show increased arousal at bed-time in keeping with the cognitive model 
of insomnia maintenance (Harvey, 2002). Further work would need to be done in normal 
sleepers to clarify the links of sleep, mood and markers of arousal with emotion 
perception, and the variability within these brain systems (c.f. Phillips et al., 2003) and 
physiological markers. As daytime functioning is an area of concern for people with 
insomnia (Kyle, Espie, and Morgan, 2010), we next assessed its effects on additional 
tasks of social functioning. 
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Chapter 7 
 
Does insomnia disorder affect mental state comprehension? 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Insomnia is a disorder characterized by subjective reports of daytime impairment, and 
this is a key diagnostic feature. Social interactions are crucial for everyday functioning, 
and impairments in this domain could contribute towards the daytime distress 
experienced by people with insomnia. Indeed, we have previously found that insomnia 
disorder affects emotion recognition performance. In the current chapter three tasks 
were used to investigate theory of mind performance. These were the mind in the eyes 
task, the false belief task, and a perspective-taking task. Participants were normal 
sleepers and people with insomnia. Results suggest no significant effects of group on 
accuracy on any task, although there were significant effects of insomnia on reaction 
times. In particular, people with insomnia tended to be faster in the false belief task, 
but slower in the perspective taking task. Results suggest that insomnia affects social 
functioning, and this could contribute towards the development and/or maintenance of 
this disorder. 
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Does insomnia disorder affect mental state comprehension? 
 
Introduction 
 
In a year, up to 33% of the population could experience sleep disruption or insomnia 
(LeBlanc et al., 2009), and daytime impairments in functioning are an important feature 
of an insomnia diagnosis (Edinger et al., 2004). Social functioning impairments are 
reported by people with insomnia (Kyle, Espie and Morgan, 2010; Kyle et al., 2013), 
however, tasks using objective measures of social functioning have only recently been 
used among people with insomnia. Kyle et al. (2014) have found that insomnia affects 
the perception of emotion from faces showing sadness and fear. In particular, people 
with insomnia rated emotional intensity in faces as lower than normal sleeper controls. 
However, successful social interactions are complex behaviours involving several 
components, including face and emotion recognition as well as theory of mind (Iarocci, 
Yager, and Elfers, 2007). Theory of mind and empathy are therefore important for 
interpersonal functioning and social competence (Iarocci, Yager, and Elfers, 2007; Zaki, 
Bolger, and Ochsner, 2008). 
 
Theory of mind has been defined as a component of social competence which involves 
inferring the mental states of others, such as their beliefs, desires, feelings and 
intentions (Iarocci, Yager, and Elfers, 2007). Emotional expressions can lead to affective 
reactions and inferential processes (van Kleef, 2009), and this has been termed 
emotional contagion (Frith and Frith, 2012). The processing of emotion and the 
understanding of empathy seem to use the same neural processes (Decety and Jackson, 
2006). Three forms of empathy are thought to be represented by neurocognitive 
circuits, namely cognitive empathy, emotional empathy, and motor empathy (Blair, 
2005). Furthermore, the accuracy of emotion recognition has been linked to empathy in 
general, and both cognitive empathy (Zaki et al., 2008) and emotional empathy (Blair, 
2005) in particular. The reason for this discrepancy seems to relate to the precise 
definitions of the components of empathy.  
 
Motor empathy is the tendency to mimic others in social interactions, and likely involves 
the superior temporal cortex and mirror neuron systems (Blair, 2005). Zaki et al. (2008) 
describe the accuracy of emotion recognition as cognitive empathy, with affective 
empathy described as the experience of shared emotions. However, Blair (2005) defines 
emotional empathy as involving responses to emotional stimuli, which includes the 
recognition of emotional expressions. This suggests that emotional (and motor) empathy 
are more automatic than cognitive empathy (Blair, 2005), and Decety and Jackson 
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(2006) have similarly made a distinction between empathy driven by top-down or 
bottom-up processes.  
 
Cognitive empathy has been defined as the ability to represent another person’s mental 
state, or to engage in theory of mind, and could involve the medial prefrontal cortex 
(Blair, 2005). Tasks such as the Sally-Ann false belief task and the recognition of 
complex mental states assess this (e.g. Frith, 2001). People with high-functioning 
autism have been found to perform significantly more poorly in a task of identifying 
complex emotional states (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), as do depressed individuals (Lee 
et al., 2005), and impairments have also been reported in social anxiety disorder (Hezel 
and McNally, 2014). 
 
There seems to be agreement that empathy involves an affective response, a cognitive 
perspective-taking capacity, and emotion regulation (Decety and Jackson, 2006), with 
emotion generation and emotion regulation closely linked (Gross, Sheppes, and Urry, 
2011). This corresponds to models of emotion recognition. Emotion perception is 
thought to involve three main states: appraisal of the stimulus, an affective state and 
then regulation of that affective state (Phillips et al., 2003). 
 
A questionnaire measure exists which assesses the affective and cognitive components 
of empathy separately. Davies (1980) created the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI), 
which measures two of these aspects of empathy. To identify the effect of empathy on 
behaviour, he believes that the different components of empathy should be considered 
separately, and his measure consists of four factors. The fantasy factor refers to the 
tendency to identify with fictional characters, and perspective taking refers to the 
tendency to take on another person’s point of view. Empathetic concern refers to the 
tendency to experience compassion towards those undergoing adverse experiences, and 
the personal distress factor refers to the tendency to be upset when seeing that another 
person is undergoing a negative experience. This creates two measures of cognitive 
empathy (perspective taking and fantasy) and two measures of affective empathy 
(personal distress and empathetic concern) (e.g. Fontenelle et al., 2009). Affective 
empathy has been found to be influenced by obsessive-compulsive disorder (Fontenelle 
et al., 2009), and cognitive empathy scores are affected by post-traumatic stress 
disorder (Schmidt and Zachariae, 2009), depression (Wang et al., 2008) and bipolar 
disorder (Lahera et al., 2008). Moreover, disruption in the ability to ‘disentangle 
[yourself] from others’, or ‘empathetic overarousal’, is involved in psychopathology, 
and difficulties in ‘self-other distinctiveness’ can lead to personal distress (Decety and 
Jackson, 2006).  
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As such, the extent to which insomnia affects the ability to take another person’s 
perspective and infer their mental state was the focus of the current experiment. This 
experiment aimed to quantify the subjective complaints that people with insomnia have 
with regard to social interactions (Kyle, Espie and Morgan, 2010) with objective task 
performance. People with insomnia completed a battery of theory of mind tasks and 
completed the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1980) in order to assess subjective 
and objective empathy. Consistent with the view that insomnia affects social 
functioning, participants with insomnia were expected to show impairments in these 
tasks. People with insomnia were also expected to report impairments in functioning 
and psychological distress, measured by the cognitive and affective components of the 
IRI. 
 
Methods 
 
Participants 
 
Subjects were recruited from the subject pool at the School of Psychology, and took 
part in exchange for £15. Forty-three subjects took part, and were all native English 
speakers, who reported good physical health. Normal sleepers satisfied the following 
criteria at testing. This study was approved by the local Ethics Committee. 
 
Normal Sleepers: 
 PSQI scores of < 7  
 ISI scores < 8 
 No endorsement of an insomnia complaint 
 No evidence of another sleep disorder 
 No use of sleeping medication 
 
Insomnia participants satisfied the following criteria at testing: 
 PSQI scores of > 6 
 Endorsement of an insomnia complaint 
 
Stimuli 
 
The ‘Mind in the Eyes’ Task was developed by Baron-Cohen et al. (2001). This task 
contains 36 images of complex mental states, which are defined as those involving 
attributions of beliefs or intention. Subjects are asked to select one of four words, 
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which best describes what the person in the picture thinks or feels. These words are 
presented in corners of the visual display, with the expression in the centre, and 
subjects respond via mouse clicks. Images were presented until response. 
 
Figure 32. Example Mind in the Eyes task stimuli 
 
 
 
 
The False Belief Task used was developed by Ferguson, Scheepers, and Sanford (2010), 
and used their paradigm. This task requires subjects to listen to a series of sentences, 
and track characters’ awareness of object locations. In a ‘visual world’ paradigm, each 
stage is represented visually by images of objects and characters. In the first stage, 
participants are told that Character A has put an object in a location, which Character B 
moves in stage two. In the final stage, in one condition, Character A has seen this move 
occur, whereas in the second condition he has not. The test question draws on this 
information to ask subjects e.g. where Character A will look for the object. There are 
two conditions overall, which are ‘true beliefs’ and ‘false beliefs’, with eight individual 
trials of each. Correct responding requires subjects to track both the situational and 
character information, which result in the two conditions. Two test session lists were 
created to balance task sentences between subjects. The behavioual dependent 
variables are recorded as mouse clicks on corresponding objects. 
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Figure 33. Example false belief task stimuli 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Perspective-Taking Task (Samson et al., 2010) asks subjects to adopt either their 
own perspective, or that of an avatar, creating two perspective conditions. They are 
then given a number, which represents how many dots can be seen, depending on the 
perspective taken. Subjects have to respond if this number of dots and the perspective 
match or mismatch via keyboard responses, creating two congruency conditions. In the 
test phase, an avatar is shown in a room facing a wall. There are dots displayed on the 
wall, and if an avatar can see them all (“they” condition), and the number of dots 
matches the number previously given, subjects respond with “match”. If a subject is 
given “your” perspective, and they can see that there are a different number of dots on 
the walls than the number previously given, they respond “mismatch”. In total 192 
trials are shown, with equal numbers of both perspective conditions (you/they), and 
both consistency conditions (congruent/incongruent). Male and female avatars were 
selected to correspond with the participants’ gender. Example stimuli are shown below. 
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Figure 34. Example perspective taking task stimuli 
 
 
 
Questionnaires 
 
The PSQI and ISI were given pre-test, and a sleep diary, DISS, STQ, HADS, MEQ, IRI and 
the FNE were given post-test, alongside a supplemental interview to confirm sleep 
group status. 
 
Procedure 
 
Potential participants were recruited via emailing the departmental subject pool, and 
those participants expressing an interest completed the pre-testing measures of the 
PSQI and ISI, as well as brief questions as to general health. Eligible subjects scored 
above or below threshold on the PSQI, with a corresponding presence or absence of an 
insomnia complaint. Insomnia was defined as a difficulty with getting to sleep, 
maintaining sleep, early morning awakenings, or non-restorative sleep, which adversely 
affects your daytime functioning, and subjects were asked if they thought they had 
insomnia (yes/no). Subjects were then invited to take part in the task battery, which 
was ordered via a latin square design to balance task order across subjects. Tasks were 
presented via the Eyelink1000 software, in a darkened room at a viewing distance of 85 
cm. Screen diameters were 1280 x 1024 pixels, and the tasks took approximately 90 
minutes to complete in total. Afterwards, participants completed the questionnaire 
battery and an additional semi-structured interview confirmed sleep groups. 
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Results 
 
Group characterization 
 
Of 21 NS (15 female, 6 male), the mean age was 22.57 (SD = 3.85). The 22 INS (14 
female, 8 male) had a mean age of 23.00 (SD = 4.02), with no significant group 
differences in age (T (41) = - 0.36, p = 0.73), or gender (X2 = 0.297, p = 0.586). There 
were a majority full-time students in both groups (19 of NS, 20 of INS), with group 
differences not significantly different (X2 = 0.002, p = 0.961). 
 
Table 14. Questionnaire results between normal sleepers and insomnia subjects  
Abbreviations: Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index (PSQI); Insomnia Severity Index (ISI); 
Morningness-Eveningness Questionnaire (MEQ); Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale –
Anxiety (HADS-A); Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale – Depression (HADS-D); 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index – Perspective Taking (IRI-PT); Interpersonal Reactivity 
Index – Fantasy Scale (IRI-FS); Interpersonal Reactivity Index – Emapthic Concern 
(IRI_EC); Interpersonal Reactivity Index – Personal Distress (IRI-PD); Fear of Negative 
Evaluation (FNE); Daytime Impact of Sleep Scale – Alert Cognition (DISS-AC); Daytime 
Impact of Sleep Scale – Negative Affect (DISS-NA); Daytime Impact of Sleep Scale – 
Positive Affect (DISS-PA); Daytime Impact of Sleep Scale – Sleepiness/Fatigue (DISS-SF). 
 
There were significant group differences on the PSQI (T (32.36) = - 13.16, p < 0.001) and 
ISI (T (41) = - 15.85, p < 0.001), MEQ (T (41) = 2.95, p = 0.005), HADS-A (T (34.08) = - 
2.94, p < 0.01) and HADS-D (T (34.22) = - 4.49. p < 0.001). Sleep groups also showed 
differences in mood, assessed by the DISS (AC, T (41) = 3.31, p < 0.005; NA, T (36.60) = - 
1.58, p = 0.12; PA, T (41) = 2.23, p < 0.05; SF, T (41) = - 2.62, p < 0.05). However, there 
 GROUP 
NS INS 
Mean Median Std Dev Mean Median Std Dev 
PSQI 3.29 3.00 1.31 11.14 11.50 2.46 
ISI 2.71 3.00 1.82 14.68 15.00 2.97 
MEQ 48.76 49.00 8.88 40.23 37.00 10.00 
HADS-A 5.71 5.00 2.59 8.95 9.00 4.45 
HADS-D 2.57 2.00 2.09 6.55 6.50 3.56 
IRI-PT 20.33 21.00 4.35 20.23 21.00 4.55 
IRI-FS 19.90 20.00 4.53 21.36 20.00 4.05 
IRI-EC 21.62 22.00 4.72 21.68 22.00 4.36 
IRI-PD 15.95 17.00 4.20 15.27 14.00 4.81 
FNE 16.00 15.00 7.49 16.77 16.50 8.85 
DISS-AC 61.82 64.00 15.26 44.65 43.20 18.50 
DISS-NA 22.56 18.20 14.40 31.44 22.70 21.77 
DISS-PA 53.95 54.80 14.47 42.95 42.30 17.63 
DISS-SF 41.05 45.67 22.91 60.12 64.50 24.83 
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were no significant differences in the components of the IRI (PT, T (31) = 0.08, p = 0.94; 
FS, T (41) = - 1.11, p = 0.27; EC, T (41) = - 0.05, p = 0.96; PD, T (41) = 0.49, p = 0.63) or 
FNE (T (41) = - 0.31, p = 0.76). 
 
The severity of sleep-related insomnia symptoms was assessed via the first three 
questions of the ISI. With regards to difficulty falling asleep, normal sleepers reported 
none-mild symptoms, whereas a majority of insomnia participants reported symptoms 
which were mild-severe. All normal sleepers reported no difficulty falling asleep, 
whereas insomnia participants reported moderate symptoms most commonly. A majority 
of normal sleepers reported no problems waking up too early, and symptoms were mild-
moderate for insomnia participants. 
 
Table 15. Percentage of sleep onset, maintenance, and awakening problems between 
sleep groups. 
 
GROUP 
NS INS 
% (Count) % (Count) 
Difficulty falling asleep None 86% (18) 0 (0) 
Mild 14% (3) 5% (1) 
Moderate 0 (0) 32% (7) 
Severe 0 (0) 45% (10) 
Very 0 (0) 18% (4) 
 
 100% (21) 100% (22) 
Difficulty staying asleep None 100% (21) 4.5% (1) 
Mild  0 (0) 22.7% (5) 
Moderate 0 (0) 50.0% (11) 
Severe   0 (0)   13.6% (3) 
Very 0 (0) 9.1% (2) 
 
 100% (21) 100% (22) 
Problem waking up too early None 76% (16) 22.7% (5) 
Mild 19% (4) 31.8% (7) 
Moderate  5% (1) 31.8% (7) 
Severe 0 (0) 4.5% (1) 
Very 0 (0) 9.1% (2) 
 
 100% (21) 100% (22) 
 
Additionally, the severity of sleep disruption in insomnia subjects was quantified by two 
measures: how long they had been experiencing poor sleep; and the number of nights 
per week their sleep was affected.  
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Figure 35. Frequency of insomnia symptoms in insomnia subjects 
 
 
In a week, insomnia subjects experienced sleep disruption on five nights most 
commonly. All poor sleepers reported sleep disruption at least three nights a week, and 
around 70% reported sleep disruption at least five nights, meeting the frequency 
criterion for acute insomnia described by Ellis et al. (2012). This was reflected in the 
daytime effects of insomnia. 
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Table 16. Reported insomnia complaints between sleep groups (%) 
 
GROUP 
NS INS 
% (Count) % (Count) 
How satisfied/dissatisfied are you with your current sleep 
pattern? 
very 14.3% (3) 18% (4) 
satisfied   33.3% (7) 41% (9) 
neutral 19.0% (4) 9% (2) 
dissatisfied 14.3% (3)   5% (1) 
very 19.0% (4)   27% (6) 
 
 100% (21) 100% (22) 
To what extent do you consider your sleep problem to interfere 
with your daily functioning?  
not at all 76% (16) 0 (0) 
a little 24% (5) 5% (1) 
somewhat 0 (0)   36% (8) 
much 0 (0) 41% (9) 
very much 0 (0) 18% (4) 
 100% (21) 100% (22) 
How noticeable to others do you think your sleeping problem is 
in terms of impairing the quality of your life? 
not at all 95% (20) 5% (1) 
a little 5% (1) 36% (8) 
somewhat 0 (0) 36% (8) 
much 0 (0) 23% (5) 
 
 100% (21) 100% (22) 
How worried/distressed are you about your current sleep 
problem? 
not at all   90% (19) 9.1% (2) 
a little 10% (2) 0 (0) 
somewhat 0 (0)   63.6% (14) 
much 0 (0) 22.7% (5) 
very much 0 (0) 4.5% (1) 
 
 100% (21) 100% (22) 
 
A majority of normal sleepers reported that their sleep was not interfering with their 
daily functioning, whereas insomnia participants reported that their sleep was 
somewhat or much interfering. Normal sleepers also reported that their sleep problem 
was not noticeable to others, in contrast to insomnia participants who reported that 
their sleep problem was a little or somewhat noticeable. Normal sleepers were also not 
worried or distressed by their sleep problem, whereas a majority of insomnia 
participants were at least somewhat worried. However, the numbers of participants in 
both groups reporting sleep dissatisfaction were comparable, indicating a level of sleep 
dissatisfaction among normal sleepers and/or mild sleep dissatisfaction in insomnia 
participants. We then compared sleep groups on their reported sleep the previous night. 
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Table 17. Sleep diary results between normal sleepers (NS) and insomnia subjects (INS) 
 GROUP 
NS INS 
Mean Median Std Dev Mean Median Std Dev 
SOL (mins) 13.81 10.00 12.20 56.67 38.00 59.49 
WAKE (#) 1.10 1.00 1.22 2.14 2.00 1.56 
WASO (mins) 4.33 3.00 5.97 23.10 10.00 38.87 
TST (hours) 8.20 8.00 1.58 5.90 6.00 1.34 
TiB (hours) 9.05 8.50 1.46 9.35 10.00 2.04 
SE (%) 91.49 91.30 17.99 64.58 62.50 14.70 
QUALITY (0-4) 3.38 3.00 .67 2.05 2.00 .84 
REFRESH (0-5) 3.38 3.00 .86 2.45 2.00 .80 
TSW (hr:ms) 7:05 7:07 2:14 6:45 6:50 2:16 
Abbreviations: sleep onset latency (SOL), wake time after sleep onset (WASO), number 
of night-time awakenings (WAKE), total sleep time (TST), time in bed (TIB), sleep 
efficiency (SE), restful/restorativeness (REST), quality (QUAL). 
 
There were significant group differences on test day on SOL (T (21.68) = - 3.23, p < 
0.005), WAKE (T (40) = - 2.43, p < 0.05), WASO (Mann-Whitney U = 321.00, p < 0.05), 
TST (Mann-Whitney U = 53.00, p < 0.001), SE (Mann-Whitney U = 45.00, p < 0.001), 
QUALITY (T (41) = 5.73, p < 0.001), REFRESH (T (41) = 3.65, p = 0.001). However, there 
were no significant group differences in TiB (T (41) = - 0.57, p = 0.58), or TSW (T (37) = 
0.47, p = 0.64). 
 
Mind in the Eyes 
 
There were no significant group differences on accuracy (Mann-Whitney U = 166.00, p = 
0.11) or reaction times (Mann-Whitney U = 156.00, p = 0.07). Effect sizes can be found 
in Appendix 2. 
 
False Belief Task 
 
There were no significant group differences in accuracy, in either condition (FB, Mann-
Whitney U = 228.50, p = 0.78; TB, Mann-Whitney U = 200.00, p = 0.54). However, groups 
did differ significantly on reaction times (FB, Mann-Whitney U = 128.00, p < 0.05; TB, 
Mann-Whitney U = 135.00, p < 0.05). The false belief (FB) results are significant after 
accounting for these two comparisons (0.05/2 = 0.03), although the true belief (TB) 
results are not. Effect sizes can be found in Appendix 2. 
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Figure 36. False belief and true belief reaction times between groups 
 
‘o’ indicates a suspected outlier. Abbreviations: Normal Sleepers (NS); Insomnia (INS). 
 
Perspective Taking Task 
 
There were no significant group differences on accuracy in the THEYXINCONGRUENT 
condition (T (35) = 1.74, p = 0.09) or THEYXCONGRUENT condition (Mann-Whitney U = 
176.50, p = 0.87). Similarly, there were no significant group differences in the 
YOUXINCONGRUENT condition (Mann-Whitney U = 234.00, p = 0.06) or in the 
YOUXCONGRUENT condition (Mann-Whitney U = 208.50, p = 0.26). 
 
When reaction times were compared, there was a significant main effect of group (F (1, 
140) = 4.15, p < 0.05), and a significant main effect of congruency (F (1, 140) = 12.55, p 
= 0.001). There was no significant main effect of perspective (F (1, 140) = 0.08, p = 
0.78), or interactions of perspective with congruency (F (1, 140) = 1.73, p =0.19), 
perspective with group (F (1, 140) = 0.10, p = 0.76), or congruency with group (F (1, 
140) = 0.01, p = 0.93). The three-way interaction was not significant (F (1, 140) = 0.29, 
p = 0.59).  
 
Follow-up t-tests were then carried out between groups, with no significant differences 
in any of the four combinations. For congruent trials with ‘their’ perspective, (T (35) = 
1.19, p = 0.24), for ‘you’ results were (T (35) = 0.89, p = 0.34). Incongruent trials with 
‘their’ perspective resulted in (T (35) = 0.64, p = 0.53), and for ‘you’ results were (T 
(35) = 1.34, p = 0.19). As such the issue of multiple comparisons was not considered. 
Effect sizes can be found in Appendix 2. 
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Figure 37. Perspective taking task reaction time scores between groups 
 
 
Discussion 
 
Insomnia subjects showed no impairments in the Eyes task, on either accuracy or 
reaction times. Both groups also performed similarly on the False Belief task, with 
regards to accuracy, although there was evidence that insomnia participants were faster 
to respond in both conditions. Similarly, sleep groups did not differ in accuracy in the 
perspective taking task, although there was evidence of a significant main effect of 
group on reaction times. In general, poor sleepers took longer to respond, although this 
effect was not specific to any particular condition. There were no significant effects of 
sleep group on any aspect of subjective empathy. 
 
The effects of insomnia on reaction times have previously been reported by Altena et 
al. (2008). These authors found that people with insomnia were faster to respond on a 
simple vigilance task but slower to respond on a complex vigilance task in comparison to 
control subjects, when performance ratios were assessed in a sample of older adults. 
This finding appears relevant to the current study, where insomnia patients were faster 
163 
 
to respond in the false belief task, but slower to respond in the perspective taking task. 
This could reflect differences in task demands. For example, the false belief task 
comprised three sentences, the last of which asked subjects to identify where a 
particular character would look for an object. This segmentation of the task into three 
discrete sentences and screens could have aided comprehension, and it is also possible 
that tasks of this nature are more familiar to participants. In contrast, in the 
perspective taking task participants were given two cues, and were then asked to 
identify whether they were a match or mismatch. This task was therefore less akin to 
how social interactions occur in real life, and could therefore have been more 
cognitively demanding. These results would also seem to be in keeping with the role of 
hyperarousal in insomnia (e.g. Riemann et al., 2010; Bonnet and Arand, 2010).  
 
Perhaps surprisingly, subjects with insomnia did not report alterations in subjective 
empathy. Sleep loss has previously been reported to affect self-reported emotional 
intelligence (Killgore et al., 2008; Killgore, 2013) but not objective emotional 
intelligence (Killgore, 2013). As such, the current results appear dissimilar to those 
found in total sleep deprivation, with effects on task functioning but not on subjective 
reports. The current results therefore do not seem likely to reflect the effects of sleep 
loss, despite several group differences in sleep parameters. However sleep, arousal and 
stress are clearly linked (Meerlo et al., 2008), and the regulation of arousal is thought to 
play a key role in insomnia (c.f. Espie, 2002; Harvey et al., 2002; Riemann et al., 2010). 
Future studies could investigate potential differences in prefrontal functioning and 
prefrontal-amygdala connectivity via neuro-imaging techniques. 
 
In insomnia, poor neurobehavioral performance has been linked to increased 
psychopathology (i.e. depression, anxiety, insomnia, physical health-related quality of 
life), which could relate to general alterations in pre-frontal functioning (Sheckleton et 
al., 2014; Altena et al., 2008). As sleep groups differed in several components of 
subjective mood and psychological distress, it is possible that the current results in 
insomnia subjects were linked to general psychopathology. Indeed, anxiety and 
depression are prevalent in insomnia, and 91% of people with persistent insomnia also 
score highly on measures of anxiety and depression (Jansson and Linton, 2007).  
 
Importantly, there were no significant group differences in performance accuracy 
despite effects on reaction times. This suggests that insomnia is not linked to 
impairments in mentalizing as such, but that alterations in aspects of timing could 
underlie subjective impairments. This could also be relevant to the fatigue reported by 
insomnia patients (Kyle, Morgan and Espie, 2010), and the role of cognitive evaluations 
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of daytime functioning in people with insomnia (Harvey, 2002). It has also been 
suggested that sleep loss may be countered by the compensatory recruitment of 
additional brain areas, although the role of this in the current study would need to be 
investigated further. Differences in task duration could also have contributed towards 
results, and it is also possible that the false belief task, with the combined use of audio-
visual stimuli was more engaging. 
 
Another relevant factor relates to the nature of insomnia within this group. Average 
scores on the ISI were 15, which is the threshold for a clinical level of sleep disruption, 
with a maximum possible score of twenty-eight. However, these scores appear 
comparable to those found in a clinical setting, with Kyle et al. (2014) reporting ISI 
scores of an average eighteen. With regards to the severity of sleep disruption, forty-
five percent reported severe problems falling asleep, with problems very severe in a 
further eighteen percent and moderate for thirty-two percent. Furthermore, insomnia 
participants reported sleep disruption three nights per week or greater. Over ninety 
percent of insomnia participants were distressed by their sleep problem, with ninety-
five percent reporting that their sleep problem interfered with their daily functioning at 
least moderately. There were no significant group differences in time in bed. Insomnia 
participants therefore met the criteria for insomnia disorder described by Edinger et al. 
(2004). However, the subjective distress appeared three points higher in the current 
sample (HADS-A and HADS-D), perhaps suggesting greater arousal in the current sample 
than that of Kyle et al. (2014). Also relevant is that both sleep groups reported similar 
levels of sleep dissatisfaction, despite no reported insomnia complaint. This appears to 
suggest that arousal and distress contributed towards the current results. It is also 
possible that with more subjects these effects could become more apparent. However, 
the sample size selected is consistent with the published experimental literature in 
insomnia disorder. 
 
Overall, results from this study suggest that insomnia affects theory of mind 
performance. In particular, reaction times are significantly different in insomnia 
participants than normal sleepers, with no significant group differences in accuracy. 
Insomnia participants appear faster in a false-belief task, but slower in a perspective 
taking task. Results suggest that the skew is affected by insomnia, with fewer longer 
responses in the false belief task and fewer faster responses in the perspective taking 
task. There were no differences in self-reported empathy. Results appear in keeping 
with the role of arousal in insomnia (Altena et al., 2008; Bonnet and Arand, 2010; 
Riemann et al., 2010), and the importance of daytime functioning complaints (Kyle, 
Espie and Morgan, 2010; Harvey, 2002). Future studies should investigate the role of 
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arousal in theory of mind task performance in insomnia using neuroimaging techniques, 
such as prefrontal hypoactiviation (Altena et al., 2008) and its behavioural correlates.  
 
As a result of the experimental work in this thesis, the issue arose as to how normal 
sleepers are selected and screened, as there are differences between normal sleepers, 
poor sleepers, and insomnia disorder (Espie, 2002). In particular, it became apparent 
that the methods for selecting normal sleepers are typically less rigorous than those for 
insomnia disorder participants, despite published standards on this issue (Edinger et al., 
2004). As data from both insomnia disorder subjects and controls affects result, it 
seemed important to investigate this issue in greater depth. The next chapter 
systematically reviewed the literature in order to address this issue. 
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Chapter 8 
 
How are normal sleeping controls selected? A systematic review of cross-
sectional insomnia studies and research agenda 
 
In press at Sleep Medicine by Beattie L., Espie C.A., Kyle S.D. and Biello, S.M., 
doi:10.1016/j.sleep.2015.01.010 
 
LB conceived the study, conducted the analysis and wrote the paper, with the other 
authors contributing feedback primarily regarding style. 
 
 
Abstract 
 
There appears to be some inconsistency in how normal sleepers (controls) are selected 
and screened for participation in research studies for comparison with insomnia 
patients. The purpose of the current study is to assess and compare methods of 
identifying normal sleepers in insomnia studies, with reference to published standards. 
We systematically reviewed the literature on insomnia patients which included control 
subjects. The resulting 37 articles were systematically reviewed with reference to the 
five criteria for normal sleep specified by Edinger et al. (2004). In summary, these 
criteria are: evidence of sleep disruption; sleep scheduling; general health; 
substance/medication use; and other sleep disorders. We found sleep diaries, PSG, and 
clinical screening examinations to be widely used with both control subjects and 
insomnia participants. However, there are differences between research groups in the 
precise definitions applied to the components of normal sleep. We found that none of 
reviewed studies applied all of the Edinger et al. criteria, and 16% met four criteria. In 
general, screening is applied most rigorously at the level of a clinical disorder, whether 
physical, psychiatric, or sleep. While the Edinger et al. criteria seem to be applied in 
some form by most researchers, there is scope to improve standards and definitions in 
this area. Ideally, different methods such as sleep diaries and questionnaires would be 
used concurrently with objective measures to ensure normal sleepers are identified, 
and descriptive information for control subjects would be reported. Here, we have 
devised working criteria and methods to be used for assessment of normal sleepers. This 
would help clarify the nature of the control group, in contrast to insomnia subjects and 
other patient groups. 
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How are normal sleeping controls selected? A systematic review of cross-
sectional insomnia studies and research agenda 
 
Introduction 
 
Given the significance of sleep to well-being (Luyster et al., 2012), consistency in how 
research participants are selected is important. Indeed, this is accepted among 
clinicians, with diagnostic systems used to identify different sleep disorders (Edinger et 
al., 2004; DSM-IV, 1994; ICSD, 2005). While it is acknowledged that adherence to 
consensus categorization systems is important with clinical groups, such high standards 
have not always been applied to the selection of normal sleepers (controls). As a result, 
the precise definitions, and consequently methods, applied to identify normal sleepers 
are variable within sleep research. The purpose of the current study was to investigate 
exactly how control subjects are assessed, in comparison to insomnia patients. The 
selection of control subjects is important, as group differences may be caused by these 
subjects rather than the patient group, if normal sleepers are not well defined and 
selected. Furthermore, consistency in how normal sleepers are defined is important in 
order to compare results between studies. These results have broader implications for 
the selection of normal sleepers or control subjects within sleep research overall. 
 
A definition of normal sleepers (controls) has been provided, and five criteria have been 
identified. The research diagnostic criteria (RDC) for normal sleepers specifies that 
normal sleepers should show no evidence of sleep disruption (Criterion A), and that the 
timing of sleep should be both regular and conventional (Criterion B; Edinger et al., 
2004). As such, both the quality of sleep and its timing are thought to be important in 
defining normal sleepers. However, these components of normal sleep are not always 
applied in practice. For example, the Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index, or PSQI (Buysse et 
al., 1989), and the Insomnia Severity Index, or ISI (Bastien, Vallieres and Morin, 2001), 
have been used to categorize participants as poor and normal sleepers (Ong et al., 
2011; Bower et al., 2010; Ree, Pollitt and Harvey, 2006; Barclay and Gregory, 2010; 
Jones et al., 2005). In this approach, those participants scoring below threshold are 
categorized as normal sleepers. Others seem to define acceptable levels of sleep 
disruption, or to select healthy subjects based on the absence of insomnia disorder 
rather than the presence of normal or good sleep. However, such differences in 
methods may lead to different groups being used as a comparison, with some subjects 
better sleepers than others. Furthermore, evidence of sleep disruption is only one 
component of research diagnostic criterion for control subjects (Edinger et al., 2004). 
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The second component of research diagnostic criterion for control subjects includes two 
elements; firstly, that sleep timing is conventional (Edinger et al., 2004). Some authors 
specify habitual bed times and rise times as inclusion criteria. This is also pertinent to 
circadian rhythm sleep disorders, and an individual’s preference for morningness or 
eveningness is relevant to their sleep scheduling. The morningness-eveningness 
questionnaire (MEQ) was developed to assess diurnal preference (Horne and Ostberg, 
1976), and has been used to identify morning and evening types (Archer et al., 2003; 
Goel, Kim and Lao, 2005; Taillard et al., 2003; Phipps-Nelson et al., 2003; Carney et al., 
2004). Furthermore, the RDC also specifies that timing of sleep is stable. Sleep diaries 
can be used to monitor adherence to a sleep schedule (Taillard et al., 2003; Vandewalle 
et al., 2007; Yoo et al., 2007), and assess reported sleep patterns and habits, as well as 
their variability (Ferguson et al., 2010; Buysse et al., 2010; Dahlgren et al., 2009). They 
provide information about the daily timing of sleep, as well as measures of sleep 
continuity (e.g. wake after sleep onset), and its qualitative experience, and sleep 
diaries are regarded as the “gold-standard” in measuring subjective sleep experience 
(Carney et al., 2012). However, while a routine sleep schedule is thought to be 
important to normal sleep (Buysse et al., 2011; Espie, 2002), there seems to be a lack of 
clarity as to how much variability in sleep scheduling is acceptable in practice. 
 
To fully understand the development and maintenance of sleep disorders, such as 
insomnia, it is necessary to understand the processes in normal sleep (Buysse et al., 
2011; Espie, 2002; Espie et al., 2006). However, this is hampered when the methods of 
assessment of normal sleepers differ, and this seems especially pertinent when research 
subjects are recruited from a student population, whose sleep can be irregular, and of 
poor quality (Lund et al., 2010). A majority of potential participants (i.e. normal 
sleepers) might be expected to show a moderate level of vulnerability towards poor 
sleep or insomnia, in keeping with a normal distribution, e.g. Yiend (2010).When 
insomnia subjects and normal sleepers are compared on the effects of poor sleep, the 
daytime effects of poor sleep are similar, although more severe for insomnia patients 
(Espie et al., 2012), and both groups use comparable criteria to judge sleep quality 
(Harvey et al., 2008). However, in insomnia patients the daytime effects associated 
with sleep seem especially important, both in theory (Espie, 2002; Harvey, 2002) and to 
patients themselves (Espie et al., 2012; Kyle, Espie, and Morgan, 2010).Current research 
is aimed at investigating the etiology of insomnia disorder, e.g. the development of 
chronic insomnia from acute insomnia (Ellis et al., 2014), and this suggests the 
importance of additional factors in the development of insomnia disorder. For example, 
insomnia patients might experience the effects of sleep disruption more severely, or 
report more frequent nights of poor sleep (Yiend, 2010), and changes in sleep 
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architecture could contribute towards this transition (Ellis et al., 2014). Furthermore, in 
keeping with a normal distribution (Yiend, 2010), some normal sleepers could show 
evidence of sleep disruption, while not quite endorsing insomnia, e.g. Espie, (2002). 
Normal sleepers also could be different from good sleepers, who would be expected to 
report good sleep without sleep disruption. Although investigating the differences 
between good sleep and normal sleep is beyond the scope of the current paper, 
understanding definitions applied to control subjects seems an important first step. As 
such, we have conducted a systematic review on how control subjects are assessed for 
study inclusion within insomnia research. We then outline recommendations for 
assessing normal sleep, and suggest methods of assessment. 
 
Methods 
 
A literature search was conducted within six key sleep-society affiliated journals. In 
particular, Sleep is the official publication of the Associated Professional Sleep 
Societies, the Journal of Sleep Research is published on behalf of the European Sleep 
Research Society, and Sleep Medicine is the official journal of the World Association of 
Sleep Medicine and International Pediatric Sleep Association. Behavioral Sleep Medicine 
is official journal of the Society of Behavioral Sleep Medicine, Chronobiology 
International is the official journal for the International Society for Chronobiology, the 
American Association for Medical Chronobiology and Chronotherapeutics, and the 
Society for Light Treatment and Biological Rhythms. The Journal of Biological Rhythms 
is the official publication of the Society for Research on Biological Rhythms. The Journal 
of Clinical Sleep Medicine, an official publication of the American Academy of Sleep 
Medicine, was not included due to a lack of institutional access. The literature search 
was confined to these journals, as they were expected to apply more stringent criteria 
towards how sleep groups are defined. The anticipated effect of this was to bias the 
literature search towards more conservative or stringent methodologies with regards to 
sleep. 
 
The “Web of Knowledge” (http://wok.mimas.ac.uk/) search engine was used to access 
database entries for these journals. Key search terms were “poor sleep” or “insomnia”, 
and a large number of results was found initially (24, 782 search results). These results 
were filtered by selecting article types which were published in English, and we 
selected those studies based on adults (see Figure 38). We further refined these results 
to identify those papers where an insomnia sample was compared against controls, and 
64 abstracts were then manually reviewed (Figure 38). These papers were all published 
from 2005 – present, following the publication of the RDC in 2004. As the focus of this 
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review was on methods of assessment, sample size was not considered as an exclusion 
criterion. 
 
Figure 38. Literature search strategy 
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Those papers without a suitable control group were excluded (for example, intervention 
studies), giving a final sample of 37 (Table 18.). All papers included an insomnia patient 
group, and the majority (30) used patients with primary insomnia. Data were extracted 
by selecting those methods relevant to each of the 5 criteria in the RDC. In general, 
specific details as to insomnia, and methods of sleep assessment, were coded within 
Criterion A. Information relevant to circadian rhythm sleep disorders and test time, as 
well as work and travel, was contained within Criterion B. In keeping with the RDC, 
methods relevant to physical and psychiatric health, medication use and substance 
abuse, and sleep disorders in general, were coded separately under Criteria C, D and E. 
All data were coded as described in the original papers; and not subject to 
interpretation at initial encoding. 
 
Table I8. Summary of papers meeting inclusion criteria 
 1st Author Year Control 
N 
Age Gender Insomnia 
patients 
1 Bastien 2013 30 35.8 (9.1)  18F, 12M Psychophysiolog
ical insomnia, 
paradoxical 
insomnia 
2 Huang 2012 48 38 (12) 28F, 20M Primary 
insomnia 
3 Israel 2012 22 26.5 (7.3) 19F, 3M Primary 
insomnia 
4 Morgan 2012 17 36 (9) 9F, 8M Primary 
insomnia 
5 Corsi-Cabrera 2012 10 25.6 (4.6) 5F, 5M Primary 
insomnia 
6 Forget 2011 12 44.3 (9.4) 7F, 7M Primary 
insomnia 
7 De Zambotti 2011 8 23.23 (3.24) 5F, 3M Primary 
insomnia 
8 Nissen 2011 53 46.9 (4.65) 32F, 21M Primary 
insomnia 
9 Spiegelhalder 2011 46 37.3 (11.4) 27F, 19M Primary 
insomnia 
10 Manconi 2010 288 58.5 (7.23) 176F, 112M Primary 
insomnia 
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11 Winkelman 2010 15 38.8 (5.3) 6F, 9M Primary 
insomnia 
12 Deuschle 2010 827 54.6 (17.2) 455F, 372M Primary 
insomnia 
13 Spiegelhalder 2010 30 48.3 (12.9) 21F, 9M Primary 
insomnia 
14 Parrino 2009 20 45 (8) 16F, 4M Paradoxical 
insomia 
15 Lanfranchi 2009 13 42 (9) 9F, 4M Primary 
insomnia 
16 Buysse 2008 25 30.6 (7.4) 15F, 10M Primary 
insomnia 
17 Winkelman 2008 16 37.6 (4.5) 7F, 9M Primary 
insomnia 
18 Feige 2008 100 41.12 
(13.99) 
54F, 36M Primary 
insomnia 
19 Spiegelhalder 2008 20 38.6 (10.1) 12F, 8M Primary 
insomnia 
20 Bastien 2008 16 36.81 
(10.19) 
10F, 6M Psychophysiolog
ical insomnia 
21 Edinger 2008 84 48.6 (16.8) 41F, 43M Primary 
insomnia 
22 Sagaspe 2007 13 45 (12) 5F, 8M Psychophysiolog
ical insomnia 
23 Orff 2007 17 36.1 (7.1) 13F, 4M Primary 
insomnia 
24 Riemann 2007 8 46.3 (14.3) 5F, 3M Primary 
insomnia 
25 Robertson 2007 15 27.7 (7.05) 8F, 7M Psychophysiolog
ical insomnia 
26 Yang 2007 15 34.3 (12.9) 10F, 5M Primary 
insomnia 
27 Buysse 2007 18 27.2 (7.9) 15F, 3M Primary 
insomnia 
28 MacMahon 2006 20 28.2 (10.1) 11F, 9M Primary 
insomnia 
29 Ouellet 2006 14 30.00 
(10.05) 
5F, 9M Insomnia 
syndrome (DSM-
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IV and ICSD) 
30 Nissen 2006 7 44.9 (4.1) 4F, 3M Primary 
insomnia 
31 Marchetti 2006 30 23.2 (1.69) 15F, 15M Psychophysiolog
ical insomnia 
32 Carney 2006 104 47.3 (16.8) 52F, 52M Primary 
insomnia 
33 Lineberger 2006 88 45.39 
(16.59) 
44F, 44M Primary 
insomnia 
34 Rioux 2006 11 48.00 (7.86) 5F, 6M Primary 
insomnia 
35 Salin-Pascual 2006 6 26.6 (5.0) 4F, 2M Primary 
insomnia 
36 Thacher 2006 10 34.7 (7.9) 7F, 3M Primary 
insomnia 
37 Devoto 2005 7 22.6 (2) 4F, 3M Primary 
insomnia 
 
 
Results 
 
Criterion A 
We recorded how control groups were defined with regards to Criterion A, i.e. “the 
individual has no complaints of sleep disturbance or daytime symptoms attributable to 
unsatisfactory sleep”. Firstly, the definitions applied to control subjects are 
summarized. These definitions varied, from “healthy”, “normal/good sleepers”, and 
“typically good sleepers”, and included descriptions such as no subjective complaints of 
sleep difficulties or insomnia, or sleep or insomnia complaints. More detailed definitions 
included that subjects characterize their sleep as restorative or refreshing, sleep 
satisfaction, relatively imperturbable sleep, and falling asleep as soon as your head 
touches the pillow. Additional specifications included that subjects report no history of 
sleep disorders or insomnia, either current or in the past, and objective sleep thresholds 
were also used. Sleep questionnaires can be used to quantify sleep-related thresholds, 
and 5% of studies reported cut-off scores or descriptive information for the Pittsburgh 
Sleep Quality Index (PSQI), with the Insomnia Severity Index (ISI) similarly used by 30% 
of papers. Many studies (51%) reported sleep diary parameters of control subjects, and a 
majority of studies (65%) reported descriptive sleep information from PSG measures, 
with 2 studies (5%) reporting actigraphy-derived sleep parameters. 
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In terms of meeting criteria A, we required papers to have explicit exclusion criteria 
based on both measures of sleep disruption (i.e. sleep continuity), and daytime effects 
(e.g. report sleep as restorative). In total 8% of papers met this criterion. 
 
Criterion B 
Criterion B is defined as an individual having “a routine standard sleep/wake schedule 
characterized by regular bedtimes and rising times”. To assess this, we recorded 
information relevant to sleep timing within the articles. Four studies (11%) reported 
average bed times/rise times, and the range of subjects’ sleep timing was reported by 
30% of studies, either descriptively, or as inclusion criterion (e.g. to confirm consistency 
of habitual sleep patterns with a specified sleep laboratory schedule). One study 
reported an actigraphy-derived measure of circadian phase, and another reported a 
measure of diurnal preference. Other relevant exclusion criteria included shift working 
patterns and long range travel, as well as circadian rhythm sleep disorders or abnormal 
usual sleep schedules. With regards to meeting criteria for sleep timing, adherence to 
this criterion was defined by explicit exclusion criteria for sleep timing, i.e. bed times 
and rise times, and met by 30% of papers. 
 
Criterion C 
Criterion C is defined as “no evidence of a sleep-disruptive medical or mental disorder”. 
 
Table 19. Summary of adherence to RDC Criteria. ‘+’ indicates full adherence to 
criteria, and ‘-’ indicates apparent non-adherence. 
 
 1st Author Year Criterion 
A 
Criterion 
B 
Criterion 
C 
Criterion 
D 
Criterion 
E 
1 Bastien 2013 - - + + + 
2 Huang 2012 - - + - + 
3 Israel 2012 - - + + + 
4 Morgan 2012 - - + + - 
5 Corsi-Cabrera 2012 - + - - + 
6 Forget 2011 - - + - + 
7 De Zambotti 2011 - + + + - 
8 Nissen 2011 - - + - - 
9 Spiegelhalder 2011 - + + - + 
10 Manconi 2010 - - - - - 
11 Winkelman 2010 - + + + - 
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A majority of studies applied general medical examinations, which were used to assess 
health, and the absence of signs or symptoms of a disorder (e.g. blood screening tests). 
Twelve studies (32%) also reported BMI scores, and 56% used or reported data from 
additional questionnaire screening measures for symptoms of mental health conditions, 
such as depression or anxiety. At least one medical condition was excluded for by 84% of 
studies, and specific disorders listed included unstable hypertension, thyroid disorders, 
seizure disorders, neurodegenerative disease, chronic pain, significant head trauma or 
loss of consciousness, cardiovascular  or respiratory disease, diabetes, dementia, 
multiple sclerosis, pregnancy, hepatitis, cancer, Parkinson’s disease, rheumatoid 
arthritis, and gastroesophagael reflux disease, asthma, chronic obstructive pulmonary 
disease. At least one psychiatric disorder was excluded by 86% of studies, which 
12 Deuschle 2010 - - - - - 
13 Spiegelhalder 2010 - - - - - 
14 Parrino 2009 - - - - + 
15 Lanfranchi 2009 - + + + + 
16 Buysse 2008 - - + + + 
17 Winkelman 2008 - + + + + 
18 Feige 2008 - + + + + 
19 Spiegelhalder 2008 - - - - - 
20 Bastien 2008 + - + + + 
21 Edinger 2008 - - + - + 
22 Sagaspe 2007 - + - - + 
23 Orff 2007 - + + + + 
24 Riemann 2007 - - + - - 
25 Robertson 2007 - - + + - 
26 Yang 2007 - + + + + 
27 Buysse 2007 - - + + + 
28 MacMahon 2006 - - - - - 
29 Ouellet 2006 - + + - - 
30 Nissen 2006 - - + - - 
31 Marchetti 2006 + - - - - 
32 Carney 2006 - - + - + 
33 Lineberger 2006 - - + + + 
34 Rioux 2006 + - + - - 
35 Salin-Pascual 2006 - - - - - 
36 Thacher 2006 - - + + + 
37 Devoto 2005 - - - - - 
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included mood disorders, psychotic disorders, anxiety disorders, eating disorders, 
somatoform disorders, and substance abuse disorder (this latter is considered in more 
detail under Criterion D). When this criterion was judged via exclusions for medical and 
psychiatric disorders, 70% of papers met this criterion. 
 
Criterion D 
Criterion D is defined as “no evidence of sleep disruption due to a substance exposure, 
use, abuse, or withdrawal”. Generally, articles assessed subjects for evidence of a 
disorder which would be relevant to this criterion. In total, 76% of articles reported 
exclusion criteria as to medication use, and most commonly selected those subjects who 
were either not on medication, not using medication affecting sleep, or taking CNS-
active agent, psychotropic agents, or hypnotics. Drug abuse or dependence was 
excluded by 57% of studies, with alcohol, caffeine, or nicotine consumption mentioned 
by 59% of articles. When D was defined as explicit exclusions for substance abuse and 
medication use, 43% of studies met criterion. 
 
Criterion E 
The final criterion is “no evidence of a primary sleep disorder”. A number of studies 
(59%) reported PSG screening for sleep apnea and limb movements in control subjects. 
Evidence of sleep disruption, or other sleep disorders, was assessed by 76% of articles 
and included evidence of current disorder, evidence of symptoms, and/or past (or 
family) history. In addition, other disorders (e.g. nocturia, enuresis, bruxism) were 
mentioned occasionally. When this criterion was defined as explicit exclusion criteria 
for sleep disorders in conjunction with PSG, 54% of papers met criteria. 
 
In total, no papers were judged to meet all five criteria. 16% met four criteria, 24% of 
papers met three criteria, 27% met two criteria, and 14% met one criterion, with 19% of 
papers meeting none. 
 
Discussion 
 
Overall, the selected articles screened subjects well for potential disorders (whether 
physical, psychiatric, or sleep). However, the criteria applied to control subjects 
differed between studies, and information relevant to criteria seemed to be used to 
describe subjects groups, rather than as explicit a priori exclusion criteria as such. 
There are also differences between laboratories as to how exactly subjects are 
identified, and Criteria A and B seem to require clarity. While Edinger et al. (2004) 
define A as “no complaints of sleep disturbance, or daytime symptoms attributable to 
poor sleep”, there is a lack of consensus as to how exactly this should be defined. For 
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example, some specify sleep diary criteria, while others use questionnaire cut-offs, 
and/or a lack of ‘sleep complaint’, or absence of insomnia disorder as such. We would 
interpret A as comprising three main elements, firstly, whether an individual is 
experiencing sleep disturbance (i.e. via sleep duration or sleep continuity measures). 
Secondly, whether subjects are satisfied with their sleep, and experience good sleep 
quality. In addition to this, the experience of adverse sleep-related daytime effects 
would lead to the exclusion of control subjects. 
 
Criterion B, defined as “a routine standard sleep/wake schedule characterized by 
regular bedtimes and rising times” (Edinger et al., 2004) seems to comprise several 
components, in particular, the habitual timing of sleep, and its stability. Evidence of 
circadian rhythm sleep disorders often seemed to be used to assess this criterion, 
overlapping with Criterion E. While a majority of authors reported use of sleep diaries, 
which can be used to assess this, it is often unclear exactly how these components are 
defined in practice. Many authors defined normal sleep timing parameters, although 
normality would seem to depend on the study sample, and would be affected, for 
example, by age (Ohayon et al., 2004). Sleep timing, chronotype, and sleep quality 
seem to be interlinked (Barclay et al., 2005; Monk et al., 2003; Barclay et al., 2010). 
Furthermore, while the stability of sleep timing seems to be important for control 
subjects, this component seems to be rarely directly addressed, other than by shift 
work, and it is unclear whether any exclusions were made based on sleep timing 
stability as such. The variability, or stability, of sleep timing could also contribute to 
good sleep (e.g., Espie, 2002), and differences in sleep timing between the working 
week and the weekend could contribute to variability in sleep timing (Monk et al., 
2003), and social jetlag (Wittman et al., 2006; Roenneberg et al., 2003). Questionnaire 
measures such as the Sleep Timing Questionnaire (Monk et al., 2003) could be used to 
quantify the components of sleep timing, as could measures derived from sleep diary 
parameters. We would define B as conventional (for a particular population) bed times 
and rise times, which are consistent (+ one hour, at least four days a week). 
 
For the remaining criteria, there seems to be some ambiguity as to the precise 
definitions. Furthermore, clear definitions are needed in order to standardize methods 
and measures. For example, we would interpret C as a currently diagnosable serious 
medical or mental disorder. We would define Criterion D by the abuse of substances 
(e.g. alcohol, caffeine, nicotine, or drugs), or by the use of prescription medication. 
Lastly, we would define E as a currently diagnosable sleep disorder, i.e. 
narcolepsy/cataplexy, periodic limb movements or restless legs, parasomnias, circadian 
rhythm sleep disorders, and insomnia disorder, and in conjunction with PSG screening 
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(e.g. for sleep apnea and periodic limb movements). Moreover, the presence of a 
significant health disorder, without associated sleep disruption, may be unlikely given 
the overlap of sleep with general health (Luyster et al., 2012 ; Spiegel et al., 2009). 
While the final three components (C, D and E) seem particularly applicable within a 
medical setting, they may not be appropriate or necessary for use in all research 
settings, to ensure normal sleepers are selected. 
 
Defining normal sleep: A research agenda 
 
All of these components can be assessed in different ways, such as by simple self-
reports (e.g. do you have insomnia?), a personal history (e.g. a previous diagnosis), 
evidence of symptoms (e.g. screening measures or PSG), and a diagnostic clinical 
interview by trained experts. The precise levels of assessment applied would depend 
on, for example, the number of subjects to be tested, access to resources (e.g. PSG, 
laboratory facilities), and the experience of the researcher (e.g. in diagnosing the 
presence of a disorder). To aid standardization across the field, we suggest that precise 
definitions, exclusion criteria, and descriptive information, are reported as much as 
possible. Furthermore, the use of standardized methods, such as the consensus sleep 
diary (Carney et al., 2012), will help aid comparisons between studies, as the precise 
contents of sleep diaries can vary between laboratories. In addition, Edinger et al. 
(2004) recommend reporting information as to the methods of recruitment and types of 
individuals, and the criteria for normal sleep may need to be tailored, for example, in 
elderly subjects (Ohayon et al., 2004). Here we suggest specific assessment tools 
thought sufficient to identify normal sleepers, favouring questionnaire methods and 
aiming to reduce the burden on participants as much as possible (see Figure 39). 
 
Means, standard deviations, and ranges are also recommended to be reported for 
common sleep measures, as well as quantitative thresholds, and the measures from 
which these are derived. Indeed, we found sleep diaries to be often used, although full 
descriptive information, as stated above, was not always reported. Edinger et al. (2004) 
report that most insomnia studies describe control subjects as being without sleep 
complaints or insomnia. Exclusions were found to be made for medical disorders which 
commonly affect sleep (~50%), symptoms of psychiatric disorder (~42%), psychoactive 
agents (~23%), evidence of sleep timing disruption (~15%), normal sleep values (~8.5%), 
or primary sleep disorders (<4%), and over 85% of samples were selected based on less 
than three of these criteria; results which also appear broadly consistent with the 
present review. However, in our sample of primary or physiological insomnia patients 
and controls, these values are higher overall, and in both studies sleep timing measures 
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are among the least reported. Here we suggest a definition of normal sleep, for use 
with control subjects in contrast to patients, and in studies of healthy sleepers (e.g. 
sleep deprivation paradigms). Furthermore, this may be of particular importance in 
student populations, whose sleep has been described as “erratic” (Lund et al., 2010). 
 
Figure 39. Suggested criteria and assessment of normal sleepers 
 
 
With regards to specific criteria as to normal sleep parameters, studies of insomnia have 
previously defined criteria for normal sleepers (Espie et al., 2012; Kyle et al., 2014). For 
example, papers may define sleep parameter thresholds for insomnia subjects, such as a 
sleep-onset latency or wake-time after sleep onset duration of greater than 30 minutes, 
total sleep time less than six hours, and sleep efficiency less than 85% (Kyle et al., 
2014; Lineberger et al., 2006), and it could be possible to extrapolate criteria for 
normal sleepers from such reports. Furthermore, studies of sleep deprivation and 
epidemiological studies provide evidence of the effects of sleep manipulations, and of 
normal ranges within the general population. In the absence of existing specifications 
for normal sleep, we would suggest the following definition and possible measurement 
tools. 
 
Firstly, an individual does not meet criteria for an existing sleep disorder (i.e. insomnia 
disorder, circadian rhythm sleep disorder, sleep apnea, narcolepsy/cataplexy, periodic 
limb movements or restless legs syndrome, or a parasomnia). We suggest that the 
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presence of periodic limb movements or restless legs syndrome, and sleep apnea should 
be assessed via polysomnography. Espie (Wilson et al., 2010) has developed a screening 
algorithm for CRSD, parasomnias, restless legs syndrome or periodic limb movements, 
sleep apnea, and narcolepsy. The ISI (Bastien, Vallieres and Morin, 2001) can be used to 
assess the severity of insomnia symptoms in those with a sleep complaint, and sleep 
complaints together with daytime sleepiness may be indicative of a circadian rhythm 
sleep disorder (CRSD; Doghamji et al., 2004). The sleep disorders questionnaire can also 
be used to assess sleep apnea, narcolepsy, and restless legs syndrome or periodic limb 
movements (Douglass et al., 1994). The diagnosis of narcolepsy without cataplexy has 
been described in greater depth in 2014 (Baumann et al., 2014). In order to reduce the 
questionnaire burden on research participants, we suggest that the brief screening 
algorithm developed by Espie should be used to identify the likely presence of 
narcolepsy, parasomnias, and circadian rhythm sleep disorders, and used to confirm a 
lack of sleep apnea, periodic limb movements or restless legs syndrome. However, the 
questions here are minimal, and PSG would provide a higher level of evidence. 
Furthermore, actigraphy can be used to assess CRSD, and the Sleep Condition Indicator 
(Espie et al., 2014) can be used to screen for insomnia disorder. 
 
Secondly, an individual should report no adverse daytime effects associated with poor 
sleep, at least within the previous week. Questionnaire measures could also be used to 
assess this, such as question 7 of the ISI (Bastien, Vallieres and Morin, 2001), or 
component 7 of the PSQI (Buysse et al., 1989). Thirdly, an individual should report 
general satisfaction with their sleep, which can be assessed via the subjective 
components of a sleep diary (Carney et al., 2012), component 1 of the PSQI (Buysse et 
al., 1989), or question 4 of the ISI (Bastien, Vallieres and Morin, 2001). We suggest that 
question 6 of the PSQI – ‘During the past month, how would you rate your sleep quality 
overall?’ should be used to assess general sleep satisfaction. For no adverse daytime 
effects of poor sleep, PSQI questions 7, 8 and 9 could be used, with complaints less 
frequently than once or twice a week. Alternatively, ISI question 3 could be used to 
assess this, as could questions 5, 6, and 7 of the Sleep Condition Indicator (Espie et al., 
2014). Fourthly, we suggest specific definitions of sleep parameters which we would 
suggest are indicative of normal sleep. In particular, we suggest thresholds for sleep 
duration, sleep continuity, time in bed, and sleep timing.  
 
Typical sleep duration criteria are included, in keeping with a recent description of 
sleep health (Buysse, 2013), and as short sleep duration/sleep restriction is linked to 
negative effects on health (Luyster et al., 2012; Spiegel et al., 2009; Meerlo, Sgoifo and 
Suchecki, 2008) and mortality (Kripke et al., 2011). Individuals with insomnia, who also 
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have a short sleep duration, also seem to experience a more severe disorder 
(depression, heart and metabolic health; Vgontzas et al., 2013). As an excessive sleep 
need, or time in bed, can be indicative of mood disorders (Kaplan and Harvey, 2009), 
we would define normal sleep by a sleep duration of less than nine hours a night, and 
more than five hours a night (in the absence of diminished sleep continuity). 
Furthermore the amount of sleep typically achieved should be consistent with sleep 
need (c.f. Luyster et al., 2012; Buysee, 2014), and this is affected by factors such as age 
(Lund et al., 2010; Ohanyon et al., 2004). 
 
Sleep restriction also affects the ability to judge sleep need well (Van Dongen et al., 
2003). For example, a study with “naturally short sleepers” found that many potential 
subjects reported that their short sleep duration was associated with work or care-
giving, or poor physical or mental health (Monk et al., 2001). Indicators of naturally 
short sleep duration included that these sleepers did not seem to be making up for lost 
sleep at weekends, and had identical Epworth Sleepiness Scale (ESS) scores as control 
subjects. These subjects slept on average for 6 hours a night or less, and were found to 
show significantly greater evidence of hypomanic symptoms (Monk et al., 2001). These 
studies taken together indicate that there are few people who are naturally short 
sleepers, and those who are evidence signs of mood disruption. However, these 
guidelines will require testing and ultimately there will be a trade-off between 
sensitivity and specificity. We would suggest that sleep timing be assessed via questions 
one and three of the PSQI, or via the Sleep Timing Questionnaire (Monk et al., 2003; 
STQ). Sleep duration could be assessed via the PSQI, with question 8 (daytime 
sleepiness) used to assess whether sleep need is being met. These measures combined 
implicitly set limits on time in bed. 
 
On measures of sleep continuity, sleep onset latency, wake time after sleep onset, and 
early morning awakenings should each be less than 30 minutes, with a sleep efficiency 
of greater than 85%. These components can be assessed via sleep diary (Carney et al., 
2012) or the PSQI (Buysse et al., 1989). With regards to sleep scheduling, ordinarily, the 
timing of sleep should be consistent with a 9am-5pm work pattern. We would suggest a 
typical bed-time of between 22:00-01:00, with a rise time of 06:00-09:00. Furthermore, 
these times should not vary markedly, with sleep times consistent, within an hour, most 
days a week. The Sleep Timing Questionnaire (Monk et al., 2003), and sleep diaries 
(Carney et al., 2012), can be used to assess sleep timing and stability. However, ideally, 
all components of normal sleep could be captured by the use of a single measure, and 
sleep diaries are not always practical. While a comprehensive definition of good sleep in 
contrast to normal sleep is beyond the scope of the present review, we suggest 
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documenting applied criteria, to allow for future work in this area (see Figure 3). 
Furthermore, these components are consistent with those recently identified by Buysse, 
(2014) (sleep duration, efficiency/continuity, timing, alertness, and satisfaction), as 
being important for sleep health. A sleep health questionnaire was also described 
(Buysse, 2014). 
 
Additional criteria might be needed for the screening/selection of good sleepers, such 
as the endorsement of good sleep, alongside the absence of complaint. Good sleepers 
and normal sleepers could be somewhat different subject groups, and this could be 
worth investigating further. For example, three hypotheses may be made as to their 
differences. Firstly, good sleepers may be less likely to report or experience sleep 
disruption. Secondly, the effects of sleep loss on daytime functioning could be less 
severe, or minimal, for good sleepers. Thirdly, good sleepers could have a general 
resilience against poor health and towards well-being. For example, the Ford Insomnia 
Response to Stress Test (FIRST) can be used to assess vulnerability towards sleep 
disruption (Drake et al., 2004), and the importance of sleep adaptability has been 
recognized theoretically (Espie, 2002; Kaplan and Harvey, 2009). Understanding this 
resilience to poor sleep/insomnia could have important implications for individuals and 
organizations, where sleep disruption may be expected. 
 
As a result of this review, we have developed the Revised Research Criteria for Defining 
Normal Sleeper Controls (Figure 40.) for use with control subjects. Here, we suggest 
four main components of normal sleep, i.e. sleep quality, sleep timing, sleep duration, 
and general health. These correspond broadly to each of the 5 components previously 
identified (Edinger et al., 2004). We would define sleep quality with three 
subcomponents, which are: sleep duration and continuity, subjective sleep impression, 
and its impact on functioning. Sleep timing includes habitual bed and rise times, and 
their impact, as well as sleep timing stability. With regards to other sleep disorders, 
four key sleep disorders are most relevant to screen for, i.e. narcolepsy/cataplexy, 
sleep disordered breathing or sleep apnea, parasomnias, and restless legs and periodic 
limb movements. Insomnia disorder and circadian rhythm sleep disorders can be 
assumed to be covered within sleep quality and sleep timing. Under general health, we 
have combined C and D of the RDC, and included mental and physical health with 
medication use and substance abuse. However, extreme levels of substance abuse 
would overlap with mental health (i.e. at the level of a substance abuse disorder), and 
substance abuse would include illicit drugs as well as, for example, nicotine, alcohol, 
and caffeine. 
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Figure 40. Revised research diagnostic criteria for selecting normal sleeper controls 
 
In summary, while results suggest that in general the methods of assessing normal 
sleepers cover the key components of normal sleep as specified by Edinger et al. (2004), 
there is variability in the exact procedures used by different laboratories. However, an 
important limitation of the present results is that review papers used a well-defined 
insomnia sample, and results may differ if a broader inclusion criterion was used. It 
should also be noted that some of the studies reviewed may have begun before the 
publication of the RDC in 2004, and were published afterwards. Nonetheless, even 
within the current sample important issues in identifying controls were identified. 
Different fields could also apply different definitions to normal sleepers/control 
subjects, and we agree with Edinger et al. (2004) that “due to this lack of 
standardization, synthesizing results of multiple … studies is a difficult if not impossible 
task”. As a first step, greater reporting of descriptive sleep information would aid in 
clarifying the exact nature of control groups. If screening of sleep disruption and timing 
can be clarified, additional methods could be redundant, and this would help reduce 
the burden on controls. While existing measures, such as the Pittsburgh Sleep Quality 
Index (Buysse et al., 1989) and Insomnia Severity Index (Bastien, Vallieres and Morin, 
2001), provide ranges for a lack of sleep disruption, these measures are not used 
consistently. Furthermore, as predominately global measures, these questionnaires do 
not tend to be reported at the item-level, and do not address all components of the 
RDC (Edinger et al., 2004). The use of this criterion for normal sleep would help clarify 
how the components of the RDC are assessed, aiding the understanding of how insomnia 
develops, as well as the nature of good sleep itself, by helping to standardize this field. 
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Chapter 9 
 
General Discussion 
 
 
Synthesis 
 
Study one suggests that the previous night’s sleep affects emotion identification from 
static faces, with regards to happiness recognition. Depression scores also contributed 
towards the accuracy of recognizing happiness, although effects of sleep group were not 
significant. There were no effects of sleep on a measure of subjective empathy. Results 
from Study Two suggest that insomnia disorder is linked to impairments in dynamic 
emotion recognition, with the categorization of high-intensity expressions of sadness 
and low-intensity expressions of surprise. However there were no significant effects on 
reaction times or intensity ratings. These results appear comparable with previous 
results by Kyle et al. (2014) who found impaired perception of intensity in patients with 
psychophysiological insomnia. These effects were found with the intensity ratings of 
static fearful and sad faces. Psychological distress was found to contribute towards 
these results.  
 
In general, poor sleep and depression contribute towards happiness recognition, and 
poor sleep is associated with greater levels of psychological distress. Insomnia also 
affects the recognition of sadness and surprise, with no effects on intensity ratings or 
reaction times. However, there was evidence that emotional understanding was 
affected by insomnia. In patients with psychophysiological insomnia, faces displaying 
sadness and fear are rated as less intense, with no effects on categorization accuracy, 
and psychological distress contributes towards results. These results taken together 
suggest that emotion recognition is impaired with insomnia, in particular, the 
perception of intensity or recognition of faces with varying levels of intensity is 
affected. Poor sleep in general does not seem to affect results, although measures of 
the previous night’s sleep and depression were found to affect happiness recognition. 
This is perhaps in keeping with a study by Van Der Helm et al. (2010) which found sleep 
deprivation was associated with impaired intensity ratings in the mid-intensity range of 
faces depicting anger and happiness. Sleep loss may contribute towards mood 
dysregulation and insomnia, resulting in the greater impairments in emotion perception 
in subjects with insomnia disorder (Experiment Two and Kyle et al., 2014), and may be 
in keeping with a role of hyperarousal in insomnia disorder. Future studies would be 
required to investigate the precise interactions of sleep disruption, insomnia, and 
psychological distress with emotion recognition. For example, the relationships between 
185 
 
sleep and arousal could become altered as insomnia disorder develops, and emotion 
perception could contribute towards this and/or indicate it. 
 
We then sought to better characterize the relationship of sleep with emotion 
recognition in normal sleepers. Chapter 5 Experiment One found that time since waking 
affected sensitivity towards temporal parameters, and intensity ratings of mid-intensity 
expressions of sadness and anger when dynamic faces were used. In Chapter 5 
Experiment One, the early group were more sensitive to the temporal parameters, 
whereas in Experiment Two the early group rated the emotional faces as less intense. 
Differences in the direction of results are attributed to the time of testing in the late 
group, with associated differences in test setting and physiological phase. These results 
were not replicated with emotion recognition in static faces across the day (Chapter 6), 
suggesting that the effects of time since waking are subtle, and sensitive to task 
characteristics. We suggest that testing participants in the early evening or later 
requires that results be interpreted with caution, as results may be different when 
testing takes place during the typical working day. Such testing would ideally include 
measures of physiological phase. Chapter 7 investigated whether the previous results 
with emotion face recognition extend to additional tasks of theory of mind. Results 
suggest that insomnia disorder is associated with speeded responses on the false belief 
task but slowed performance on the perspective taking task. There were no effects on 
accuracy or subjective empathy. Results are interpreted as reflecting the dysregulation 
of arousal in insomnia disorder, with evidence of both hyperarousal and fatigue in these 
participants. The variability in arousal of normal sleepers also needs to be considered 
when testing participants later on in the day. These results are in keeping with reports 
of subjective daytime impairments in insomnia disorder (Kyle, Espie and Morgan, 2010). 
Results also suggest that future studies would benefit from a well-characterized control 
group and specific test times; otherwise the directionality of results may be misleading. 
  
In general, results suggest that sleep affects emotion perception in both normal 
sleepers and insomnia disorder (see Table 20 below). 
 
Table 20. Summary of thesis results 
 Normal sleepers (students) General (student) population Insomnia disorder (student sample) Insomnia disorder (UGSC sample) 
Results - No effects of test time in reaction 
times of normal sleepers to 
emotional images or faces, despite 
group differences in reported global 
vigour, when static faces are used. 
Some evidence that the early (three 
hour) group make more error with 
happiness (Chapter 6). 
- Significant group differences in 
sensitivity towards temporal 
parameters, with the early group 
more sensitive. No effects on 
categorization labels or intensity 
ratings, when dynamic stimuli are 
used (repeated testing). No group 
differences on subjective mood or 
sleepiness (Chapter 5, Experiment 
One). 
- Significant group differences in 
intensity ratings,   of mid-intensity 
sad and angry faces, with the early 
group less sensitive. No significant 
effects with categorization labels, 
when dynamic stimuli are used 
(repeated testing. Significant group 
- Previous nights’ sleep and 
depression scores affect happiness 
recognition, with effects of 
previous nights’ sleep on happiness 
reaction times. There were no 
significant effects on subjective 
empathy. No effects of sleep 
groups derived from PSQI scores 
sampled as a continuous variable 
(Chapter 3). 
 
- Significant effects of insomnia 
disorder on emotion 
categorization, when dynamic 
faces are used. In particular these 
subjects were less accurate in 
recognizing sad faces of high 
intensity and surprise faces of low 
intensity. There were no 
significant effects of intensity 
judgements or reaction times. 
Regression analyses suggest effects 
of sleep and mood on happiness 
recognition (Chapter 4). 
- Significant effects of insomnia 
disorder on theory-of-mind task 
performance. In particular the 
insomnia subjects were faster to 
respond in the false belief task, 
but slower to respond in the 
perspective-taking task. There 
were no effects on accuracy 
(Chapter 7). 
- Psychophysiological insomnia was 
linked to lower intensity ratings of 
sad and fearful faces. There were 
no effects on categorization 
(dynamic faces). Results were not 
linked to sleepiness (vigilance task 
performance or ratings) (Kyle, 
Beattie et al., 2014). 
- Primary insomnia linked to 
perceived social effects and 
exclusion, as well as a lack of 
understanding (Kyle, Espie and 
Morgan, 2010). 
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differences in reported alert 
cognition and sleepiness/fatigue 
(Chapter 5 Experiment Two). 
Summary Emotion perception changes between 
morning and evening, with late evening 
subjects more sensitive with regards to 
intensity ratings of mid-intensity sad 
and angry 4D faces. This seems to 
correspond to differences in subjective 
alertness. 
 
Early evening participants seem to be 
less sensitive with regards to sensitivity 
towards temporal parameters in 4D 
faces, with no group differences in 
alertness. 
 
Some evidence of more errors when 
categorizing happy static faces in the 
early group, with significant group 
differences in global vigour. 
Depression scores and the previous 
nights’ sleep affect happiness 
recognition error rates, with effects of 
the previous nights’ sleep on happiness 
recognition reaction times. 
Impaired categorization accuracy of 4D 
high intensity sad faces and low 
intensity surprise faces. Also significant 
differences in reaction times to theory-
of-mind tasks. 
Lower intensity ratings of sad and 
fearful static faces. Reported 
impairments in social functioning. 
 
 
 
 
 
Results suggest that participants tested in the late evening are more sensitive when 
making intensity judgements of mid-intensity sad and angry dynamic faces (Chapter 5 
Experiment 2). This could indicate that sleep is important in “re-calibrating” the human 
emotional brain (Gujar et al., 2011). The psychobiological model suggests that normal 
sleepers de-arouse in the lead up to sleep (Espie, 2002), and the current results may 
suggest that if this fails to occur the sensitivity towards specific emotions (sad and 
angry) is heightened. Indeed, acute stress has been found to increase amygdala 
activation to all emotional faces, decreasing its specificity but increasing sensitivity 
(Van Marle et al., 2009). Espie (2002) suggests that the inhibition of de-arousal is 
sufficient to result in poor sleep, and insomnia disorder may be the result of additional 
factors.  
 
The maintenance of insomnia has been linked to increasingly negatively toned cognitive 
activity (Harvey, 2002), REM sleep instability (Riemann et al., 2012), and attentional 
bias towards sleep (Espie et al., 2006). In insomnia participants, hyperarousal is thought 
to play a key role (Riemann et al., 2010; Bonnet and Arand, 2010), and these subjects 
show a smaller decline in metabolism in several brain areas between waking and non-
REM sleep (Nofzinger et al., 2004). These subjects also showed waking hypo-metabolism 
in the frontal cortex when compared to controls (Nofzinger et al., 2004). We found 
these subjects to make more categorization errors with dynamic high intensity sad faces 
and low intensity surprise faces (Chapter 4), and to make lower intensity judgements 
towards static sad and fearful faces (Kyle et al., 2014). As such, hyperarousal in 
insomnia may manifest as behavioural impairments in emotion recognition, although the 
manipulation/testing of intensity appears to be crucial in this.  
 
These results therefore appear consistent with insomnia theories, whereby sleep 
disruption and poor sleep affect the inhibition of de-arousal, and likely create a vicious 
cycle whereby poor sleep is perpetuated (Espie 2002; Espie et al., 2006). An insomnia 
complaint is thought to develop in a minority of people who experience poor sleep, and 
the processes by which this occurs are still being delineated. However, “excessively 
negatively toned cognitive activity” is thought to contribute towards insomnia 
maintenance (Harvey, 2002), and the results in this thesis suggest one way in which this 
could occur. Specifically, people with insomnia may increasingly attend to their sleep in 
an attention-intention-effort process, which paradoxically inhibits sleep (Espie et al., 
2006). Attention towards the daytime consequences of poor sleep is thought to 
perpetuate the emotional dysregulation in insomnia (Harvey, 2002), and people with 
insomnia report concerns with daytime functioning (Kyle, Espie, and Morgan, 2010). The 
results of this thesis appear to support a role of sleep in socio-emotional functioning in 
normal sleepers, poor sleepers, and people with insomnia. This could therefore 
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represent one pathway by which insomnia becomes a chronic disorder. Future studies 
may wish to consider the emotional consequences of these effects, and their role in 
emotional dysregulation. 
 
Figure 41. A psychobiological model of good sleep. Insomnia is proposed as resulting 
from chronic inhibition of one or more of the component processes. Copied with 
permission by Espie, (2002) from Annual Review of Psychology (53). 
 
 
 
This is consistent with patient reports of impaired functioning (Kyle, Espie and Morgan, 
2010), and evidence of alterations in reaction times when performing theory of mind 
tasks (Chapter 7). Also relevant is the association in Kyle et al. (2014) of performance 
with a measure of psychological distress, rather than measures of sleepiness or sleep 
diary measures. This appears in contrast to our results in normal sleepers, where 
subjective mood/sleepiness differences were found in tasks with alterations in emotion 
intensity recognition (Chapter 5 Experiment 2) and evidence of impaired happiness 
recognition (Chapter 6). Chapter 3 with subjects in the general student population also 
found the previous nights’ sleep to be linked to happiness recognition, although 
depression scores also contributed. However, it should be noted that the late group in 
Chapter 5 Experiment One were less sensitive towards the temporal parameters in 
dynamic faces, with no effects on recognition. Future studies should assess the links of 
temporal parameter sensitivity with emotion recognition, and these subjects are 
anticipated to have been tested at a different physiological phase than those subjects in 
Chapter 5 Experiment Two. 
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Also of interest is the result that happiness recognition (accuracy and reaction times) 
from static faces in a general population sample is linked to the previous nights’ sleep 
(Chapter 3). Happiness is typically associated with high recognition rates (Calvo and 
Lundqvist, 2008). Happiness recognition would be expected to be linked to depression, 
and indeed depression was a predictor of reaction times with happy faces (Chapter 3). 
Relatedly, there was evidence that those normal sleepers tested early in the day made 
more errors when recognizing static happy faces (Chapter 6). This might suggest that 
that the effects of sleep in normal sleepers impact upon mood. Phillips et al. (2003) 
suggest that stimuli are appraised leading to an affective state, and that emotional 
regulation affects both the affective state and stimuli appraisal. The effects of sleep 
disruption on mood are well known (Baglioni et al., 2010), and the sleep deprivation of 
healthy subjects impairs emotional regulation (Yoo et al., 2007). For example, sleep 
disruption prior to trauma increases the likelihood that healthy subjects will develop a 
psychiatric disorder (Bryant et al., 2010). We also report evidence that sadness 
recognition is impaired in insomnia (Chapter 4; Kyle et al., 2014). There is some 
evidence that the recognition of both happy and sad faces is impaired in depression 
(Bourke, Douglas and Porter, 2010). Although the links of emotion and sleep are 
complex (Kahn, Sheppes and Sadeh, 2013), there is evidence that insomnia and 
depression are linked (Staner, 2010), and insomnia can predict the occurrence of 
depression (Baglioni et al., 2011). In general, alterations in emotion recognition and 
theory of mind performance may constitute a perpetuating factor by which insomnia is 
maintained (c.f. Harvey, 2002). 
 
The role of intensity also appears particularly important. In general, recognition 
accuracy of static faces was high, and this is consistent with the literature (Calvo and 
Lundqvist, 2008). As a consequence, task difficulty has often been increased by 
researchers investigating emotion recognition and psychopathology (e.g. Csukly et al., 
2009; Gilboa-Schechtman et al., 2008; Yoon, Joorman and Gotlib, 2009; Surguladze et 
al., 2004). For example, Cooper, Rowe, and Penton-Voak (2008) criticize the use of a 10 
second emotion face presentation time, failing to repeat a previously reported effect 
under a more natural testing condition. Adolphs (2002) also suggests that emotions can 
be combined in different ways, and methods of increasing task difficulty could impair 
ecological validity. Yu, Garrod and Schyns (2012) have created a 4D platform of 
emotional expressions taking account of physiological constraints. Dynamic faces have 
been linked to greater arousal (Sato and Yoshikawa, 2007) and may therefore be better 
able to identify differences in normal sleepers and insomnia participants (Espie, 2002; 
Bonnet and Arand, 2010; Riemann et al., 2010). It has been suggested that intensity 
decisions follow on from emotion categorization, and greater intensity is greater 
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recognition (Utuma et al., 2009). Future studies should investigate normal emotion 
recognition within this 4D platform in greater depth. 
 
Limitations 
 
Study participants  
 
Sleep quality is a general term which is often applied to how sleep is perceived, or sleep 
continuity. There is no agreed definition of ‘sleep quality’, and indeed this could have a 
different meaning for different individuals (Krystal and Edinger, 2008). As such, this can 
be assessed in different ways, which are dependent upon how this concept is defined. 
Poor sleep quality is prevalent among students, with one third reportedly staying up 
until 3am at least once a week (Lund et al., 2010). Delayed sleep phase disorder is also 
common in young adults (c.f. Crowley, Acebo, and Carskadon, 2007). As such, there was 
a high baseline level of sleep disruption within the current study population, and this 
was reflected in a higher cut-off for poor sleep on the PSQI. Normal sleepers and poor 
sleepers also show similarities in which factors they use to judge their sleep quality, 
although there are also some differences (Harvey et al., 2008). As such, it may be the 
case that the normal sleepers in the current sample had had previous transient 
experiences of poor sleep. This could be relevant for understanding the aetiology of 
insomnia, and could be looked at in greater depth in future studies. However, the 
insomnia disorder participants showed significant differences in several measures 
suggesting that these participants were a distinct group. Future studies could also 
explore the trajectory of sleep complaints in these subjects, in order to assess whether 
these individuals go on to develop a chronic insomnia problem.  
 
The experience of sleep disruption is common, and has been investigated over time in 
the general population. Cluster analysis suggests that there are four patterns of 
insomnia symptoms over the adult lifespan (Green et al., 2012). Some participants 
report no problems getting to sleep or maintaining sleep over time, whereas others 
report a low likelihood of sleep latency problems but a fairly high chance of sleep 
maintenance difficulties. The third category of participants reported low probabilities 
of either sleep problem at initial sampling, but increasingly reported the presence of 
both sleep latency and maintenance problems at later sampling. A fourth class reported 
fairly high probabilities of both sleep latency and maintenance problems throughout the 
study (Green et al., 2012). As such, it appears that some people are consistent good 
sleepers over time, while others show chronically disrupted sleep. There seems to be a 
vulnerability to developing insomnia symptoms over the adult lifespan in the remaining 
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two groups, and it seems possible that the sleep and circadian effects of ageing 
contribute to this. 
 
With regards to the current sample, the flexibility of the study lifestyle may contribute 
towards sleep disruption, as the sleep of students has been described as erratic (Lund et 
al., 2010). This could contribute towards the high baseline levels of sleep disruption 
within this sample. Insomnia disorder may also manifest differently within these 
subjects. In particular, the severity of insomnia seems to be somewhat lower in the 
current student sample, and they may be able to employ a greater range of coping 
strategies due to lifestyle flexibility. Future studies could therefore make greater use of 
student subjects in order to understand protective and vulnerability related factors in 
the development of chronic insomnia. This could potentially have important 
ramifications, as insomnia is known to precede depression (Baglioni et al., 2010), and 
the early prevention of insomnia could prevent future health disorders. 
 
Understanding of emotion  
 
Emotion has been called one of the most contentious research areas in psychology 
(Gross, Sheppes and Urry, 2011). With regards to emotion recognition tasks, selecting 
emotion labels has been described as a cognitive task, with evidence of top-down 
effects on the emotional brain,  whereas matching faces has been described as a 
perceptual task (Hariri, Bookheimer and Mazziotta, 2000; Liebermann et al., 2007). 
Emotional labeling could be linked to emotional re-appraisal (Liebermann et al., 2007), 
and such tasks are akin to real-life, where the appraisal and evaluation of incoming 
stimuli includes deciding which emotion is being displayed from several options. A 
limitation of the current studies is how task instructions influenced the neural response 
to stimuli. Furthermore, while links between emotion perception, affect, and affect 
regulation have been described (e.g. Phillips et al., 2003), further work is necessary in 
order to evidence the precise nature of their inter-relationships. Of particular interest 
is the correspondence of subjective mood with emotion recognition performance, at 
brain and behaviour levels of response. 
 
Multiple measures of emotionality 
 
Facial EMG can measure subtle levels of facial expressivity (see Dimberg, 1990), and has 
been used to assess individual differences in emotionality (Neta, Norris and Whalen, 
2009; Dimberg and Thunberg, 2007). Other physiological measures can also be used to 
assess emotion (e.g. Thayer and Lane, 2000; Amstadter, 2008), and the  
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use of multiple measures of emotion would allow assessment of their inter-
relationships. This could help to clarify the nature of the emotional dsyregulation in 
insomnia, and the role of hyperarousal. There are also differences between people in 
their emotional ability, which can be linked to alexithymia (Lumley et al., 2005).  
Effects of mood induction on emotion task performance also have been reported (Lee et 
al., 2008; Chepenik, Cornew, and Farah, 2007; Trevisani, Johnson, and Carver, 2008; 
Schmid and Mast, 2010). Future studies could consider the role of posed and natural 
expressions of emotion, and their effects on both expressed emotional displays and 
emotional recognition. Furthermore, this would be relevant to the role of emotional 
displays in social signalling and experienced affect. 
 
Role of the circadian system 
 
While sleep loss and sleep disruption have been found to affect emotion perception, the 
circadian system could also exert effects, and this area has been rather less studied 
than the effects of sleep loss. The role of light in emotion perception, and blue light, 
which plays an important role in the circadian system, has been found to affect how 
emotional information is processed (Vandewalle et al., 2010). In particular, this spectral 
quality of ambient light increases brain reactivity to angry voices, whereas green light 
does not, without any effects with neutral stimuli (Vanderwalle et al., 2010). Hot, 
Leconte and Sequeira (2005) presented subjects with images of neutral scenes and high 
arousal negatively-valenced scenes, and found a time of day effect on the skin 
conductance response (SCR) to aversive images. They found a significant linear trend to 
unpleasant images, and a significant quadratic trend to neutral images, across the day. 
Circadian effects have been investigated via measures of diurnal preference, with 
Paradee et al. (2008) reporting a significant effect of chronotype-congruent test times 
in overall emotion recognition performance among a group of rehabilitation patients. 
Emotion performance has also been assessed at different times of day in repeated-
sampling of the skin-conductance response (SCR). Future studies could consider in 
greater depth the role of the circadian system in emotion recognition and social 
interactions, in both normal sleepers and people with insomnia 
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Future Directions 
 
Facial expressions in context 
 
The emotional context of facial expressions affects how they are recognised (Righart 
and de Gelder, 2008; Aviezer et al., 2008). The effects of such cues may be especially 
pertinent in psychopathology, such as anxiety (Blanchette, Richards, and Cross, 2007) 
and depression (Blysma, Morris and Rottenberg, 2008). Future studies could therefore 
investigate the role of the emotional setting in emotion recognition. Facial expressions 
are processed in conjunction with other cues, and bodily cues, such as gaze (Ewbank, 
Fox, and Calder, 2010; Bindemann, Burton and Langton, 2008) and bodily signals 
(Aviezer, Trope, and Todorov, 2012), contribute to the emotional setting. The 
integration of these cues likely involves multi-modal processing (e.g. Calder and Young, 
2005). The social context also affects emotional expressivity, and this depends on 
whether an individual is alone or with other people (Schmidt, Cohn and Tian, 2003).  
 
Effects of pharmacology 
 
The administration of pharmacological agents can also shed light on the mechanisms by 
which effects occur. Future studies could also explore the effects of pharmacology on 
emotion recognition, as insomnia is often comorbid with other conditions. Modafinil has 
also been found to improve complex emotion recognition after sleep deprivation, 
although learning could have contributed towards these results (Huck et al., 2008). 
Several research groups have sought to examine the role of neurotransmitter pathways 
in emotion perception, both in healthy subjects and psychiatric disorders. For example, 
impulsivity has been linked to the ventral striatum, and the dopamine pathway, as well 
as its related functional polymorphisms (Hariri, 2009). Furthermore, individual 
differences in temperament and trait affect are important in complex human 
behaviours such as social interactions, and could contribute towards the development of 
psychological disorders (Hariri, 2009). Several studies report beneficial effects of 
antidepressants on emotion task performance (Savaskan et al., 2008; Harmer et al., 
2009; Tranter et al., 2009). For example, the effects of experimental manipulations of 
serotonin and dopamine levels on cognition have been investigated in recovered 
patients (Hayward et al., 2005; McTavish et al., 2005; Merens, Booij and Van Der Does, 
2008). Similar manipulations have also been employed with healthy adults (Harmer et 
al., 2003; Arce et al., 2008; Paulus et al., 2005), and those with family history of 
affective illness (Van Der Veen et al., 2007). Stress paradigms have also been used in 
conjunction with manipulations of neurotransmitter levels (Firk and Markus, 2008), and 
195 
 
such an approach could be pertinent in the context of insomnia as a disorder of 
hyperarousal (Riemann et al., 2010; Bonnet and Arand, 2010). These studies could also 
perhaps help to aid in the treatment of insomnia. 
 
Alternative tasks of social functioning 
 
Social competence includes face recognition, emotion recognition, and theory of mind, 
in coordination with contextual and environmental factors (Iarocci, Yager, and Elfers, 
2007). Explicit mentalizing is thought to be linked to the ability to reflect upon mental 
states, in the self (introspection) and others (Frith and Frith, 2012). Such processes are 
relevant to social emotions and decision making (Singer, 2012). While a number of tasks 
of decision making have been investigated with sleep deprived participants, to date few 
have been applied to poor sleeper groups. Such studies are also necessary in order to 
address the complexity of social interactions, and how sleep could contribute to this.  
 
Performance in Insomnia 
 
While insomnia is defined on the basis of subjective reports of poor sleep quality, which 
occurs despite adequate sleep opportunity (Edinger et al., 2004), and associated 
daytime effects (e.g. Ustinov et al., 2010), finding objective differences in task 
performance has been difficult for researchers (e.g. Orff et al., 2007; Varkevisser et al., 
2007). This has led to the suggestion that the reported performance deficits in insomnia 
could be more linked to the perception of compensatory ‘effort’ in maintaining 
performance, than actual performance impairments as such (Orff et al., 2007; 
Varkevisser et al., 2007). Others have suggested that performance deficits are subtle 
(Shekleton, Rogers and Rajaratnam, 2010; Fortier-Brochu et al., 2012), and that 
sensitive tasks have yet to be found (Espie and Kyle, 2008). In keeping with this, a 
recent meta-analysis suggests that people with insomnia show effects on memory tasks 
in particular (Fortier-Brochu et al., 2012). Results from the current studies suggest that 
emotion recognition and theory of mind is affected in insomnia disorder, indicating that 
experimental tasks drawn from other areas of psychology could be used to identify 
performance impairments.  
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Conclusions 
 
Results suggest that sleep affects emotion recognition in both normal sleepers and 
people with insomnia. In normal sleepers emotion recognition and sensitivity towards 
temporal parameters are affected by time since waking, although time since waking and 
the nature of stimuli seem to affect the direction of results. The previous nights’s sleep 
and depression scores also affect happiness recognition in the general (student) 
population. These results suggest subtle effects of sleep on socio-emotional functioning, 
and could have implications for the development of psychiatric disorders such as 
depression. Emotion recognition is also impaired in insomnia disorder, with specific 
effects towards high intensity expressions of sadness and low-intensity expressions of 
surprise. Insomnia also affects reaction times in theory of mind tasks. Results are 
consistent with previous reports of social functioning impairments in primary insomnia 
(Kyle, Espie, and Morgan, 2010), as well as results of the systematic review, suggesting 
that socio-emotional functioning is impaired in insomnia disorder. Future studies should 
extend these results by using neuroimaging measures. These results are interpreted 
within the context of the etiology of insomnia, with reference to theories as to role of 
arousal and hyperarousal. 
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Appendix One: Measures and Stimuli 
 
The Insomnia Severity Index (ISI) assesses the severity of insomnia symptoms over the 
past week, with 5 questions which measure sleep disturbances and daytime effects 
(Bastien et al., 2001). A total score below 8 indicates no significant insomnia, scores 8 - 
14 suggest sub-threshold insomnia, and scores 15 - 28 indicates clinical insomnia. In 
insomnia patients, this measure correlates with assessments of sleep continuity, with 3 
factors identified- daytime effects, sleep disruption severity, and sleep satisfaction 
(Bastien et al., 2001). The reliability of the ISI has been assessed by Bastien et al., 
(2001), who found evidence of contenst validity, sensitivity, with concurrent validity 
and internal consistency. 
 
The Morningness-Eveningness Questionnaire (MEQ) has 19 questions to assess diurnal 
preference (Horne and Ostberg, 1976). Scores range from 16 – 86, with lower scores 
indicating greater eveningness. A four-factor structure, of peak time, morning affect, 
retiring and rising has been identified (Caci et al., 2009). This measure appears valid, 
with significant correlations with sleep timing variables (Horne and Ostberg, 1976). A 
Turkish version of this measure shows high reliability over time, with a test-retest 
reliability co-efficinet of 0.84 (Punduk, Gur and Ercan, 2005) 
 
Sleep diaries assess sleep patterns in detail (Carney et al., 2012), and participants 
completed a sleep diary on the day of testing rating their sleep for the previous night 
(Morin and Espie, 2004). This consisted of 11 questions assessing their sleep, as well as 
questions relating to subjective sleep quality. This measure has construct validity as 
assessed by focus groups (Carney et al., 2012). However, the reliability of sleep diaries 
needs to be investigated further due to the nature of sleep, with its instability violating 
an assumption of test-re-test reliability (Carney et al., 2012). 
 
The Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index (PSQI) measures sleep quality over the past month, 
and scores range from 0 – 21 (Buysse et al., 1989). Nineteen items comprise seven 
components (subjective sleep quality, sleep latency, sleep duration, habitual sleep 
efficiency, sleep disturbances, use of sleeping medication, and daytime dysfunction). 
This measure discriminates between those with insomnia and good sleepers with good 
sensitivity and specificity, at a global score > 5 (Buysse et al., 1989; Backhaus et al., 
2002). Due to the high levels of sleep disruption within a student population (Lund et 
al., 2010), the threshold for poor sleep was set at > 6. This was been found to result in a 
slightly lower sensitivity of 93.4% and 100% specificity for clinically significant sleep 
disruption (Backhaus et al., 2002). Among primary insomnia patients, the test-retest 
reliability is 0.087 (Backhaus et al., 2002). 
235 
 
 
The Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS; Zigmond and Snaith, 1983) has 14 
questions to measure anxiety and depression over the past week. Scores range from 0 – 
21, with scores below 8 considered normal, scores 8 – 11 subclinical, and scores 12 or 
over suggesting clinical levels of anxiety or depression. A two-factor structure has 
typically been supported (Cosco et al., 2012). The scoring of this measure has been 
found to be reliable by Zigmond and Snaith (1983), who also report high internal 
consistency.  Patient and interview ratings were also correlated. 
 
The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980) measures cognitive and affective 
empathy with two subscales for each (i.e., perspective-taking, fantasy scale, 
empathetic concern, personal distress). Twenty-eight items comprise this measure, and 
the four components are scored independently. This multidimensional approach was 
validated by factor loadings and a factor analysis suggesting the validity of this 
approach. These subscales were also found to be internally reliable, with temporal 
stability over time. 
 
A 4D stimuli platform was used to generate dynamic stimuli, and is described in detail 
by Yu, Garrod and Schyns, (2012). Four certified Facial Action Coding System (FACS) 
coders were used to model 41 core Action Units (AUs). These movements were then 
translated into functions, which could be used to reproduce each movement. From 
these functions, which represent each action unit, six temporal parameters were 
derived. These parameters correspond to peak amplitude, peak latency, onset latency, 
offset latency, acceleration, and deceleration. These values formed the basis of each 
facial animation. However, these animations were organized so as to only present 
physiologically possible facial expressions. Furthermore, additional constraints limited 
the range of the degrees of freedom, and parameters were not independent (see Yu, 
Garrod, and Schyns, 2012). Parametric values were therefore selected for each AU 
pseudo-randomly, creating 1200 facial animations, which were shown on eight individual 
facial identities (four male and four female). 
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Appendix 2: Effect sizes 
 
Chapter 3: Effect sizes of emotion recognition performance and empathy 
 
 
    
NS PS Effect sizes 
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Cohen’s D 
ANGER ACC 76.19 18.21 72.22 13.07 -0.27 
FEAR ACC 66.79 16.18 64.48 21.47 -0.18 
SAD ACC 75.48 13.24 74.21 17.21 -0.12 
DISGUST ACC 67.14 18.55 67.46 19.70 0.02 
SURPRISE ACC 82.26 10.85 81.55 11.38 -0.08 
HAPPY ACC 98.57 2.66 98.02 3.12 -0.26 
ANGER RT 2259.19 329.46 2210.33 356.18 -0.19 
FEAR RT 2712.13 666.98 2551.36 468.74 -0.30 
SAD RT 2271.36 320.48 2223.07 375.63 -0.19 
DISGUST RT 2471.93 804.97 2194.45 461.53 -0.43 
SURPRISE RT 2363.17 365.17 2265.38 356.79 -0.34 
HAPPY RT 1866.20 220.53 1772.29 158.75 -0.54 
IRI PT 18.63 3.80 16.71 5.19 -0.64 
IRI FS 16.89 4.90 16.57 5.17 -0.08 
IRI EC 20.00 3.77 20.48 4.23 0.16 
IRI PD 12.06 5.26 13.05 4.79 0.24 
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Chapter 5: Experiment 2 
 
 
 
Early-Late Effect sizes 
Mean difference Pooled Std Dev  Cohen’s D 
HAPPY INTENSITY 1 -0.14071 0.46639  -0.30 
SURPRISE INTENSITY 1 -0.01071 0.36613  -0.03 
FEAR INTENSITY 1 0 0  N/A 
DISGUST INTENSITY 1 -0.18124 0.35034  -0.52 
ANGER INTENSITY 1 -0.23571 0.43571  -0.54 
SAD INTENSITY 1 0.066087 0.58194  0.11 
HAPPY INTENSITY 2 -0.28889 0.67905  -0.43 
SURPRISE INTENSITY 2 -0.00388 0.7138  -0.01 
FEAR INTENSITY 2 -0.10121 0.29614  -0.34 
DISGUST INTENSITY 2 -0.03737 0.55663  -0.07 
ANGER INTENSITY 2 -0.46296 0.72591  -0.64 
SAD INTENSITY 2 -0.31868 0.56376  -0.57 
HAPPY INTENSITY 3 0.12698 0.66479  0.19 
SURPRISE INTENSITY 3 -0.01339 0.73103  -0.02 
FEAR INTENSITY 3 -0.02143 0.60718  -0.04 
DISGUST INTENSITY 3 -0.31798 0.75509  -0.42 
ANGER INTENSITY 3 -0.42308 0.78174  -0.54 
SAD INTENSITY 3 -0.38995 0.78353  -0.50 
HAPPY INTENSITY 4 0.09899 1.0193  0.10 
SURPRISE INTENSITY 4 0.001463 1.0031  0.00 
FEAR INTENSITY 4 -0.21511 1.0579  -0.20 
DISGUST INTENSITY 4 -0.05584 0.90424  -0.06 
ANGER INTENSITY 4 -0.04448 0.96602  -0.05 
SAD INTENSITY 4 -0.40502 0.99065  -0.41 
HAPPY INTENSITY 5 -0.05356 1.0768  -0.05 
SURPRISE INTENSITY 5 0.00149 1.0024  0.00 
FEAR INTENSITY 5 -0.23894 1.0858  -0.22 
DISGUST INTENSITY 5 0.1616 0.98463  0.16 
ANGER INTENSITY 5 0.018356 0.93537  0.02 
SAD INTENSITY 5 -0.28999 0.98452  -0.29 
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Chapter 6: Effect sizes of task performance 
 
 3h Group 12h Group   
 Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Cohen’s D 
Anger face 14.77273 12.48592 15.00000 10.95445 -0.02 
Fear face 12.04545 12.01775 9.52381 7.05421 0.25 
Happy Face 2.04545 3.67070 0.23810 1.09109 0.66 
Sad face 10.22727 8.79357 11.19048 9.98809 -0.10 
Anger IAPS 12.72727 9.84732 20.00000 16.04681 -0.55 
Fear IAPS 17.27273 11.72373 20.47619 12.83596 -0.26 
Happy IAPS 0.90909 1.97386 0.95238 2.55883 -0.02 
Sad IAPS 8.40909 8.22111 7.14286 9.81981 0.14 
Anger face RT 2060.38636 410.63890 2187.69048 362.94061 -0.33 
Fear face RT 2152.36364 369.33312 2249.92857 356.04425 -0.27 
Happy face RT 1601.40909 92.03967 1677.78571 166.43111 -0.57 
Sad face RT 1936.59091 206.66920 2146.07143 423.96890 -0.63 
Anger IAPS  RT 2418.72727 489.22226 2475.09524 647.07756 -0.10 
Fear IAPS RT 2798.61364 714.56707 2943.45238 869.80947 -0.18 
Happy IAPS  RT 1931.34091 295.83632 1930.59524 276.85152 0.00 
Sad IAPS RT 2158.84091 360.72923 2274.52381 325.57835 -0.34 
MFFT ER 11.59091 17.95407 20.95238 24.57738 -0.44 
MFFT RT 5291.22727 9428.51306 9423.33333 10130.85082 -0.42 
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 3h Group 9h Group   
 Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Cohen’s D 
Anger face 14.77273 12.48592 14.50000 10.87005 0.02 
Fear face 12.04545 12.01775 7.50000 7.86398 0.44 
Happy Face 2.04545 3.67070 0.25000 1.11803 0.65 
Sad face 10.22727 8.79357 8.75000 8.56477 0.17 
Anger IAPS 12.72727 9.84732 23.50000 20.39737 -0.68 
Fear IAPS 17.27273 11.72373 15.25000 11.17740 0.18 
Happy IAPS 0.90909 1.97386 1.25000 2.22131 -0.16 
Sad IAPS 8.40909 8.22111 4.25000 5.91052 0.58 
Anger face RT 2060.38636 410.63890 1974.05000 337.75645 0.23 
Fear face RT 2152.36364 369.33312 2154.42500 386.21685 -0.01 
Happy face RT 1601.40909 92.03967 1608.20000 142.24778 -0.06 
Sad face RT 1936.59091 206.66920 1979.65000 306.61681 -0.17 
Anger IAPS  RT 2418.72727 489.22226 2349.67500 474.30798 0.14 
Fear IAPS RT 2798.61364 714.56707 2585.07500 496.69646 0.34 
Happy IAPS  RT 1931.34091 295.83632 1844.25000 173.99172 0.35 
Sad IAPS RT 2158.84091 360.72923 2134.45000 288.15639 0.07 
MFFT ER 11.59091 17.95407 11.00000 20.30038 0.03 
MFFT RT 5291.22727 9428.51306 4890.22500 8624.53011 0.04 
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 3h Group 6h Group   
 Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Cohen’s D 
Anger face 14.77273 12.48592 20.62500 13.04778 -0.46 
Fear face 12.04545 12.01775 12.50000 10.83473 -0.04 
Happy Face 2.04545 3.67070 1.25000 3.68605 0.22 
Sad face 10.22727 8.79357 8.54167 9.26414 0.19 
Anger IAPS 12.72727 9.84732 21.04167 18.35514 -0.56 
Fear IAPS 17.27273 11.72373 24.58333 15.73674 -0.52 
Happy IAPS 0.90909 1.97386 0.62500 2.24214 0.13 
Sad IAPS 8.40909 8.22111 3.33333 4.34057 0.78 
Anger face RT 2060.38636 410.63890 2122.33333 453.95675 -0.14 
Fear face RT 2152.36364 369.33312 2315.56250 542.31227 -0.35 
Happy face RT 1601.40909 92.03967 1661.25000 220.97895 -0.35 
Sad face RT 1936.59091 206.66920 2117.22917 473.48103 -0.49 
Anger IAPS  RT 2418.72727 489.22226 2414.16667 597.20222 0.01 
Fear IAPS RT 2798.61364 714.56707 2837.22917 701.37192 -0.05 
Happy IAPS  RT 1931.34091 295.83632 1954.35417 329.23774 -0.07 
Sad IAPS RT 2158.84091 360.72923 2186.75000 455.10042 -0.07 
MFFT ER 11.59091 17.95407 12.08333 16.14585 -0.03 
MFFT RT 5291.22727 9428.51306 7287.75000 9312.13595 -0.21 
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 6h Group 9h Group   
 Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Cohen’s D 
Anger face 20.62500 13.04778 14.50000 10.87005 0.78 
Fear face 12.50000 10.83473 7.50000 7.86398 1.72 
Happy Face 1.25000 3.68605 0.25000 1.11803 8.39 
Sad face 8.54167 9.26414 8.75000 8.56477 1.70 
Anger IAPS 21.04167 18.35514 23.50000 20.39737 0.03 
Fear IAPS 24.58333 15.73674 15.25000 11.17740 0.63 
Happy IAPS 0.62500 2.24214 1.25000 2.22131 10.19 
Sad IAPS 3.33333 4.34057 4.25000 5.91052 3.86 
Anger face RT 2122.33333 453.95675 1974.05000 337.75645 -4.81 
Fear face RT 2315.56250 542.31227 2154.42500 386.21685 -4.46 
Happy face RT 1661.25000 220.97895 1608.20000 142.24778 -8.36 
Sad face RT 2117.22917 473.48103 1979.65000 306.61681 -4.81 
Anger IAPS  RT 2414.16667 597.20222 2349.67500 474.30798 -4.27 
Fear IAPS RT 2837.22917 701.37192 2585.07500 496.69646 -4.15 
Happy IAPS  RT 1954.35417 329.23774 1844.25000 173.99172 -6.73 
Sad IAPS RT 2186.75000 455.10042 2134.45000 288.15639 -5.43 
MFFT ER 12.08333 16.14585 11.00000 20.30038 0.72 
MFFT RT 7287.75000 9312.13595 4890.22500 8624.53011 -0.54 
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 6h Group 12h Group   
 Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Cohen’s D 
Anger face 20.62500 13.04778 15.00000 10.95445 0.46 
Fear face 12.50000 10.83473 9.52381 7.05421 0.32 
Happy Face 1.25000 3.68605 0.23810 1.09109 0.36 
Sad face 8.54167 9.26414 11.19048 9.98809 -0.28 
Anger IAPS 21.04167 18.35514 20.00000 16.04681 0.06 
Fear IAPS 24.58333 15.73674 20.47619 12.83596 0.28 
Happy IAPS 0.62500 2.24214 0.95238 2.55883 -0.14 
Sad IAPS 3.33333 4.34057 7.14286 9.81981 -0.51 
Anger face RT 2122.33333 453.95675 2187.69048 362.94061 -0.16 
Fear face RT 2315.56250 542.31227 2249.92857 356.04425 0.14 
Happy face RT 1661.25000 220.97895 1677.78571 166.43111 -0.08 
Sad face RT 2117.22917 473.48103 2146.07143 423.96890 -0.06 
Anger IAPS  RT 2414.16667 597.20222 2475.09524 647.07756 -0.10 
Fear IAPS RT 2837.22917 701.37192 2943.45238 869.80947 -0.14 
Happy IAPS  RT 1954.35417 329.23774 1930.59524 276.85152 0.08 
Sad IAPS RT 2186.75000 455.10042 2274.52381 325.57835 -0.22 
MFFT ER 12.08333 16.14585 20.95238 24.57738 -0.43 
MFFT RT 7287.75000 9312.13595 9423.33333 10130.85082 -0.22 
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 9h Group 12h Group   
 Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Cohen’s D 
Anger face 14.50000 10.87005 15.00000 10.95445 -0.05 
Fear face 7.50000 7.86398 9.52381 7.05421 -0.27 
Happy Face 0.25000 1.11803 0.23810 1.09109 0.01 
Sad face 8.75000 8.56477 11.19048 9.98809 -0.26 
Anger IAPS 23.50000 20.39737 20.00000 16.04681 0.19 
Fear IAPS 15.25000 11.17740 20.47619 12.83596 -0.43 
Happy IAPS 1.25000 2.22131 0.95238 2.55883 0.12 
Sad IAPS 4.25000 5.91052 7.14286 9.81981 -0.35 
Anger face RT 1974.05000 337.75645 2187.69048 362.94061 -0.61 
Fear face RT 2154.42500 386.21685 2249.92857 356.04425 -0.26 
Happy face RT 1608.20000 142.24778 1677.78571 166.43111 -0.45 
Sad face RT 1979.65000 306.61681 2146.07143 423.96890 -0.45 
Anger IAPS  RT 2349.67500 474.30798 2475.09524 647.07756 -0.22 
Fear IAPS RT 2585.07500 496.69646 2943.45238 869.80947 -0.50 
Happy IAPS  RT 1844.25000 173.99172 1930.59524 276.85152 -0.37 
Sad IAPS RT 2134.45000 288.15639 2274.52381 325.57835 -0.45 
MFFT ER 11.00000 20.30038 20.95238 24.57738 -0.44 
MFFT RT 4890.22500 8624.53011 9423.33333 10130.85082 -0.48 
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Chapter 7: Effect sizes of task performance 
 
 NS INS  
 Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Cohen’s D 
GROUP NS ME_ACC .80 .05 .77 .09 0.41 
ME_RT 5325.29 1490.18 4902.74 2159.47 0.23 
FB_ACC 97.02 5.46 97.02 6.74 0.00 
TB_ACC 94.05 10.91 94.05 7.52 0.00 
FB_RT 5181.57 788.98 4599.08 652.78 0.81 
TB_RT 5065.72 895.72 4514.50 651.04 0.71 
PT_ACC_THEY_C .88 .30 .80 .39 0.23 
PT_ACC_THEY_I .92 .07 .87 .09 0.62 
PT_ACC_YOU_C .96 .04 .96 .06 0.00 
PT_ACC_YOU_I .91 .10 .95 .06 -0.49 
PT_RT_THEY_C 759.83 172.14 699.39 132.31 0.39 
PT_RT_THEY_I 882.25 191.56 846.71 140.24 0.21 
PT_RT_YOU_C 782.12 179.71 734.37 143.13 0.29 
PT_RT_YOU_I 861.49 198.44 778.83 176.25 0.44 
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